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CHAPTER ONE

EXPERIENCE:

THE CRUCIBLE FOR

RELIGION IN JOHNSON'S SERMONS

I

Even the most cursory reading of Samuel Johnson's
writing makes it clear that he was intensely interested in
religious and moral issues.

Walter Jackson Bate has con-

structed an extremely lucid analysis of the complex
interrelationship between the religious and secular
aspects of Samuel Johnson's definition of--and exhortations to--right conduct in the Rambler essays.1

Bate's

analysis is an essential point of departure for this
dissertation which focuses on the complexity of that same
relationship within Johnson's Sermons.

This dissertation

will explore the sophisticated interrelationship in the
Sermons between the religious and the secular aspects of
Johnson's exhortation to right thinking and living as
basic for an appreciation of the solace he offers us for
the vacuity of life.
1 Walter Jackson Bate, The Achievement of Samuel
Johnson (New York: Oxford University Press,-r955). See,
especially, Chapters II, III, and IV.

1

2

Yet, the question remains to be asked:
of Johnson's Sermons?

Why a study

While the study of the religious

views and moral philosophy of Johnson has been a subject
of great interest for more than two hundred years, few
scholars have turned their attention to the Sermons.
since nearly all of Johnson's writing reflects his
interest in religion, it would seem logical and worthwhile
to consider in some detail the single context, apart from
his Prayers and Meditations, which contains his religious
views in their most concentrated form.
Johnson believed that the question of what one must
do to be saved--"the important question which it becomes
every human being to study from the first hour of reason
to the last" (Sermon 28, 302)--could be seriously
considered only if men could recognize without selfdelusion some essential characteristics of their nature:
the dangerous sallies of the imagination, the insatiable
desires of the will, and man's limited use of reason.

I

have no doubt that these principles expressed by Johnson
in his Sermons can be found in his other works.
claim for the uniqueness of the Sermons.

I make no

Yet, after

having said this, I must state that I do find the Sermons
different from Johnson's other works because throughout
the Sermons he portrays the utter pervasiveness of the
vacuity of life.

Indeed, the idea that human life is in a

special sense "vacuous" may be seen as the starting point

3

of Samuel Johnson's thought on the diverse aspects of
human nature which he treats in the Sermons.

His basic

metaphor for human experience is the empty receptacle
which cannot tolerate its own emptiness; it is used in the
sermons to describe that very problem which most vexed
him--the problem of reconciling the misery and wickedness
of the temporal state with the Christian hope of redemption and eternal happiness.
In the Sermons, we find no dethroned monarchs, no
Abyssinian princes searching the world for the perfect way
of life, no famous poets disappointed of a pension.

The

world of the Sermons is largely the world of shopkeepers
and merchants; it is a world of middle-class persons with
modest ambitions and humble hopes.

Johnson shows us that

sorrow is sorrow regardless of the social or intellectual
sphere it operates in; every man needs sympathy from time
to time, needs his hopes encouraged.

Most importantly,

the Sermons demonstrate that religion is efficacious in
this world, and that even these ordinary shopkeepers can
aspire to salvation and can attain it with as much toil as
their superiors.
Johnson's Sermons demand an absorbed and reflective
reading in which the reader at every point compares his or
her own way of living with the life described in the
sermon text.

Thus, a sermon like Sermon

1£, on the folly

of vanity, will have failed in its effect for someone who
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regards it as the sort of thing that happens only to other
people.

The sermon begins to work only when the reader

enters and engages it, associating its analysis with some
half-forgotten private experiences and realizing, perhaps
with surprise, his or her own susceptibility.

Walter

Jackson Bate says that ''it does not minimize Johnson's
criticism or indeed his writing on human experience itself
to say that his ultimate greatness lies in the example
they provide" (Achievement, 233).

Johnson pursues his

readers beyond the page, back into the pragmatism of daily
life:
If we cast our eyes over the earth, and extend
our observations through the system of human
beings, what shall we find but scenes of misery
and innumerable varieties of calamity and
distress, the pains of sickness, the wounds of
casualty, the gripings of hunger, and the cold
of nakedness; wretches wandering without an
habitation, exposed to the contempt of the
proud, and the insults of the cruel, goaded
forward, by the stings of poverty, to dishonest
acts, which perhaps relieve their present
misery, only to draw some more dreadful distress
upon them. And what are we taught, by all these
different states of unhappiness? what, but the
necessity of that virtue by which they are
relieved; by which the orphan may be supplied
with a father, and the widow with a defender; by
which nakedness may be clothed, and sickness set
free from adventitious pains; the stranger
solaced in his wanderings, and the· hungry
restored to vigour and to ease? (Sermon 19,
207).

~

The Sermons are not merely relevant for Sundays; rather,
Johnson follows the reader into the street, the
marketplace, and the coffeehouse as he puts religion to

5

the test of addressing the practical realities of Monday
and Tuesday.
Indeed, Johnson's Sermons fulfill his own description
of the didactic function of an author:
The task of an author is, either to teach what
is not known, or to recommend known truths, by
his manner of adorning them; either to let new
light in upon the mind, and open new scenes to
the prospect, or to vary the dress and situation
of common objects, so as to give them fresh
grace and more powerful attractions, to spread
such flowers over the regions through which the
intellect has already made its progress, as may
tempt it to return, and take a second view of
things hastily passed over, or negligently
regarded.
Either of these labours is very difficult,
because, that they may not be fruitless, men
must not only be persuaded of their errors, but
reconciled to their guide; they must not only
confess their ignorance, but, what is still less
pleasing, must allow that he from whom they are
to learn is more knowing than themselves
(Rambler l, 14-15).
Johnson helps us locate each of the vices he treats in the
Sermons somewhere in ourselves.

Just how he does this is

not immediately clear; the present dissertation will
explore some of the strategies Johnson employs for
achieving this response from the auditors of his Sermons.
For example, he does not confess his own failings in any
overt way, nor does he lure us in with many anecdotes or
vivid pictures of evil; rather, the Sermons show us with
terrible clarity the logic of our personal involvement in
sin, tracing its origin in man's nature to its pragmatic
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consequences in daily life and never allowing us to feel
superior.
Since Johnson's psychological insights into human
nature play such an important role in understanding his
pragmatic approach to religion in the Sermons, some
clarification of the term psychology is in order.

In the

seventeenth century, the word referred to a study of the
doctrine of the soul or the science of spirits.

However,

by the 1730's, it had taken on its modern sense, being
applied to mental processes rather than to a study of
spirits.2

Kathleen Grange says that
from about 1690 to 1800, psychology was considered to be an account of the intellectual
operations of the mind, as in Locke's study of
"ideas" in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690) or in Charles Bonnet's study of
the soul and its faculties in his Essai de
psychologie (1754).3

Even more importantly, however, Grange adds that for some
thinkers the word psychology included only intellectual
operations--"memory, imagination, judgment, reason, and
attention"--and was not a study of the emotions which fell
under the term moral philosophy (444).

While Johnson does

not use the word psychology, preferring instead the
2 See the term psychology as defined in the Oxford
English Dictionary.
3 Kathleen M. Grange, "Pinel and Eighteenth-Century
Psychiatry," Bulletin of the History of Medicine, 35
(1961), 444.
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phrase, "anatomy of the mind" (Adventurer 95, 427),4 his
understanding of man's nature clearly includes both
emotion and intellect.

Indeed, in his Preface to

Shakespeare, Johnson unites the concepts which Grange
artificially distinguishes as psychology and moral
philosophy when he describes a science which attempts
to analyze the mind, to trace the passions to
their sources, to unfold the seminal principles
of vice and virtue, or sound the depths of the
heart for the motives of action (88).5
The complexity and extensiveness of this description
is real and not rhetorical; pursuing an almost Lockean
methodology, Johnson included the whole scope of man's
attributes in his writings.

"The anatomy of the mind, as

that of the body," Johnson wrote, "must perpetually
exhibit the same appearances" (Adventurer _22, 427) because
in spite of the temporary effects of unique events or the
arbitrary behavior resulting from accidental customs,
"human nature is always the same" (Adventurer 99, 431).
Such uniformity permits Johnson to describe human nature-4 Samuel Johnson, The Idler and The Adventurer, ed.
W. J. Bate, John M. Bullitt, and r::--F-:--Powell, Vol. II of
The Yale Edition of the Works of Samuel Johnson (New
Have~Yale University Press,l963).
Subsequent
references are to this edition and are designated by essay
and page number.
5 Samuel Johnson, Preface to Shakespeare, ed. Arthur
Sherbo, Vols. VII and VIII of The Yale Edition of the
Works of Samuel Johnson (New Haven:---Yale University
Press,1968).

8
a profile of man's basic mental constitution together with
the underlying motivations for his actions--and when
explained appropriately, it also allows ordinary man to
understand his temperament, his desires, and his potential
for choice and action.
~

Indeed, Johnson says the precept,

thyself, is
a dictate, which, in the whole extent of its
meaning, may be said to comprise all the
speculation requisite to a moral agent. For
what more can be necessary to the regulation of
life, than the knowledge of our original, our
end, our duties, and our relation to other
beings?
(Rambler 24, 131).

Since, then, "every error in human conduct must arise from
ignorance of ourselves," one obligation of Johnson as a
sermon writer was to remind his audience about the
limitations of human nature.

He saw that the actual

battleground where the fight against evil and unhappiness
takes place was largely a psychological one--in the sense
of the term discussed earlier, encompassing both emotion
and intellect--a battle over self-inflicted pains and
self-created frustrations.6

As we shall see from an

examination of his Sermons, the whole realm of Johnson's
understanding of human nature included not only man's
intellectual and emotional faculties but, as an adjunct,
man's spiritual aspirations as well.

Indeed, no attentive

6 Johnson frequently points to the psychological
basis for unhappiness. See, for example, Sermons l and
11_; Ramblers 66, 68, 72, and 98.
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reader of Johnson has ever doubted the truth of Boswell's
assertion that "the history of his mind as to religion is
an important article" (Life, I, 67).

However, Johnson's

modern, almost "existential," understanding of the nature
of man in the Sermons, in contrast to the positions
reflected by the English homiletic tradition, has not been
much considered by contemporary scholars.

Moreover, an

examination of the pragmatic orientation of the Sermons
has been hindered by two marked phenomena in Johnsonian
criticism:

(1) an inability to separate biographical

interest in Johnson from an investigation into his work;
(2) a narrow or specialized focus which tends to distort
Johnson's assertions regarding the integration he found in
human nature.

Each of these hindrances bears looking at

because, by doing so, we can better discover what
specifically remains to be done.
Samuel Johnson has been viewed chiefly as a
biographical subject by many critics.

Seen by some as

unquestionably representative of eighteenth-century
England, Johnson has been labeled as the perpetrator or
the victim of the shortsightedness and the defects of his
age.

The contrast between the public and the private

Johnson has been generally noted and frequently disparaged
as evidence of simplicity rather than complexity.

The

fact that Boswell defends Johnson against the charge of
writing on behalf of a faction and in return for a pension

10
indicates the fondness with which opponents deliver and
even acquaintances adopt ad hominem arguments.
The first difficulty, then, in Johnsonian criticism
has resulted from an incomplete distinction between
"psychologizing ~Johnson" and "psychologizing of him."7
Leopold Damrosch, Jr. has remarked that "the world has
never been willing to take Johnson's works apart from
their writer,"8 and this has been especially true when the
investigation has touched upon psychological matters.
Johnson's character and his life--his melancholy, his
fears, and his habits--are so interesting in light of
modern psychoanalysis that almost any discussion of his
writings about human nature quickly focuses upon the
author rather than upon the ideas he is presenting.
The phenomenon of shifting the emphasis away from the
writings to the author and thus subordinating his
philosophy to his biography has taken several different
forms.

The oldest and most extreme version is that of

some writers, many of whom were psychiatrists, who drew
upon Johnsonian materials with the goal of diagnosing
Johnson's "condition" or "problem" according to the
theories of modern psychiatry.

Johnson's works were

7 Donald J. Greene, ed., Samuel Johnson: A
Collection of Critical Essays (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice Hall, 1965), 5.
8 Leopold Damrosch, Jr., Samuel Johnson and the
Tragic Sense (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1972), 61.
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consulted not in an effort to understand them critically
or aesthetically, but for clues by which Johnson himself
might be used "as a case history. 11 9
In his discussion of the apathetic fallacy, historian
David Hackett Fischer points out the logical absurdity of
insisting upon a psychogenetic basis for other people's
ideologies because such a position regards "rational men
as if they were not rational," involves "metahistorical
doctrines which transcend empiricism" (and are therefore
neither provable nor disprovable), and consists of little
9 A brief survey of Johnson's "doctors" yields a wide
range of diagnoses for his personality. Johnson is
labelled as a person who suffered from anxiety hysteria,
sexual impotence, oral and anal aggression, an inferiority
complex, an Oedipus complex, etc. For example, see:
William Kenney, "Dr. Johnson and the Psychiatrists,"
American Imago, 17 (Spring 1960), 76; R. MacDonald Ladell,
"The Neurosis of Dr. Samuel Johnson," British Journal of
Medical Psychology, 9 (1929), 314-323; Charles MacLaurin,
"Dr. Johnson," in Mere Mortals: Medico-Historical Essays
(London: Jonathan Cape, 1925), 13-35; Edward Hitschman,
"Samuel Johnson's Character: A Psychoanalytic Interpretation," Psychoanalytic Review, 32 (April 1945), 207-218; w.
Russell Brain, "Authors and Psychopaths," British Medical
Journal, 2 (24 December 1949), 1433-1439, and "A PostMortem on Dr. Johnson," London Hospital Gazette, 37 (May,
June 1934), 225-230, 288-289; Katharine c. Balderston,
"Johnson's Vile Melancholy," in The Age of Johnson:
Essays Presented to Chauncey Brewster Tinker, ed. F. w.
Hilles (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949), 10-11;
George Irwin, "Dr. Johnson's Troubled Mind," in Greene,
ed., Critical Essays, 28-29, and Samuel Johnson: A
Personality in Conflict (London: Oxford University Press,
1971), 76-79; Herman Liebert, "Reflections on Samuel
Johnson," in Greene, ed. Critical Essays, 17; Walter B. c.
Watkins, Perilous Balance (1939; rpt., Cambridge, MA:
Walker De Berry, 1960), 91; Bertrand H. Bronson, Johnson
Agonistes and Other Essays (1944; rpt., Los Angeles:
University of California Press, 1965), 8.

12
more than "motivational special pleading. 11 10

Furthermore,

the ever-present implication that Johnson's ideas are the
product of his "problem" verges upon the psychogenetic
fallacy; it seeks to subvert an idea by criticizing its
origin.11

For example, Walter B. C. Watkins traces

Johnson's understanding of human nature to "a projection
of his own personality" (49) and says that Johnson has
spun "his own bitter mental experience into the web of
wisdom" (59).

Rasselas has been seen as autobiographical,

with Rasselas, Imlac, and the mad astronomer representing
three different aspects of Johnson.12

The ending of the

Vision of Theodore has been called "an eloquent evocation
of his [Johnson's] own condition" (Damrosch, 63).

Arieh

Sachs has argued that "the central assumptions of
Johnson's thought gain added depth and force when viewed
in terms of Johnson's particular being, in terms, that is,
of his biography. 11 13

Such a shift of attention as this is

certainly not unreasonable, but Sachs goes much further,
10 David Hackett Fischer, Historians' Fallacies:
Toward ~ Logic of Historical Thought (New York: Harper
and Row, 1970), 193-195.
11 William s. Sahakian and Mabel Lewis Sahakian,
Ideas of the Great Philosophers (New York: Barnes and
Noble,~966), 22.
12 Richard B. Hovey, "Dr. Samuel Johnson, Psychiatrist," Modern Language Quarterly, 15 (December 1954),
321-325.
13 Arieh Sachs, Passionate Intelligence
Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), 10.

(Baltimore:

13

saying that "the experience of a desperately neurotic man
was turned into a generalized scheme of morals and
religion which could claim universal validity" (14).

Such

an assertion, coming early in the book, tends to reduce
the integrity of Johnson's ideas, no matter how seriously
and judiciously those ideas are examined.
some of these evaluations do help us to understand
Johnson better, and insofar as they touch upon recognizable aspects of his character--such as his melancholy
and fear of death--they have value.

Yet, to be told that

Johnson had an Oedipus complex, for example, leaves us
nearly as ignorant as we were before, and a good deal more
uncomfortable, because we know the diagnosis was made not
from a clinical analysis of the person, but from a
selection of anecdotes about him examined two hundred
years after he died.
The psychoanalytically-oriented scholars' assertion
that Johnson's mental condition gave rise to his thoughts
suggests the less speculative critical methodology
employed in this dissertation; namely, that Johnson's
writings help us to gain at least a general insight into
his character.

Tracing the results of this hypothesis has

yielded productive Johnsonian scholarship over the past
twenty-five years.14

The orientation of these critics has

14 For example, see: John Wain, Samuel Johnson: A
Biography (New York: Viking Press, 1974); Peter Quennell,
Samuel Johnson: His Friends and Enemies (New York:
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been extremely useful because it has contributed some
credible information about Johnson, and when Johnson drew
upon or generalized from his own life, as he often did,
this has been helpfully pointed out.

Nevertheless, the

tendency often has been to lose track of the philosophy
through intense scrutiny of its psychological origins.

It

is essentially unfair to an author to ascribe his views to
personal problems or to his need to believe because we
then tend to cease taking those ideas seriously.

Johnson

wrote expressly about this problem:
Those whom the appearance of virtue, or the
evidence of genius, have tempted to a nearer
knowledge of the writer in whose performances
they may be found, have indeed had frequent
reason to repent their curiosity; the bubble
that sparkled before them has become common
water at the touch; the phantom of perfection
has vanished when they wished to press it to
their bosom (Rambler 14, 74).
Even more significant than this reason is that which
Johnson cites in response to the charge of hypocrisy on
the part of writers who cannot live as well as they write:
it may be prudent for a writer, who apprehends
that he shall not enforce his own maxims by his
domestic character, to conceal his name that he
may not injure them (Rambler 14, 78).

American Heritage Press, 1972); Walter Jackson Bate,
Samuel Johnson (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich,
1975).
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The coup de grace to all efforts which insisted upon
a psychogenetic basis for an individual's ideology was
delivered by William James in The Varieties of Religious
Experience.

James termed any attempt to judge an idea on

the basis of the author's life "the genetic fallacy."

He

argued that such a practice was altogether illegitimate
and observed that some very sound discoveries in human
history were made by individuals whose sanity was
sometimes in question.

Moreover, James asserted that if

an individual attempted to discredit another's religious
beliefs on the grounds that they were simply projections
of insecurities and fears, he would respond that a lack of
belief could be likewise related to hostility toward
authority figures.15
As we shall see, Johnson dramatically anticipated
William James' position on "the genetic fallacy."

Indeed,

Johnson took great pains to keep his own life apart and
away from his published works.

For example, Walter

Jackson Bate, the critical editor of the Yale edition of
Johnson's Rambler essays, notes that
as he prepared to begin the Rambler, he deeply
wished the purity and soundness of the work to
be free from the prejudices the reader might
bring to it if he knew the author (Vol. III,
xxv).

~

15 William James, The Varieties of Religious Experi(New York: Doubleday and Company, 1963), 454-464.
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Many of his works, like the Rambler, Idler, Adventurer,
and Rasselas, were published anonymously; he wrote the
sermons for others to preach and publish under their own
names.
Indeed, it is important to remember that Samuel
Johnson never delivered a sermon.

He wrote approximately

forty sermons of which twenty-eight are extant.

Of these

twenty-eight, only two were published in Johnson's
lifetime, twenty-five appeared posthumously,16 and "The
convict's Address to His Unhappy Brethren" appeared in
16 The chief collection of Samuel Johnson's Sermons
is known as the Taylor collection. The Reverend John
Taylor, a lifelong friend of Johnson's, died in 1788; he
left a number of sermons among his personal effects.
Johnson wrote one of these sermons for the funeral of his
own wife; it was published in 1788 as an octavo pamphlet
of eighteen pages, by the Reverend Samuel Hayes [See, A
Sermon Written .Qy the Late Samuel Johnson, LL.D. for the
Funeral of his Wife. Published by the Reverend Samuel
Hayes, A:M.--Usher of Westminster School. London:
printed for T. Cadell, in the Strand, 1788].
In May, 1788, thirteen sermons from the Taylor
collection were published in an octavo volume of 285
pages. [See, Sermons on Different Subjects, Left for
Publication .Qy John Taylor, LL.D., Late Prebendary of
Westminster, Rector of Bosworth, Leicestershire, and
Minister of St. Margaret's, Westminster. Published by the
Reverend Samuel Hayes, A.M. Usher of Westminster School.
London: Printed for T. Cadell, in the Strand, 1788]. In
July, 1789, a second octavo volume of 239 pages and
containing twelve additional sermons, including the one
written by Johnson for the funeral of his wife, was also
published by Samuel Hayes. [See, Sermons on Different
Subjects, Left for Publication .Qy John TaylOr, LL.D., Late
Prebendary of Westminster, Rector of Bosworth, Leicestershire, and Minister of St. Margaret's, Westminster.
Volume the Second. Published by the Reverend Samuel
Hayes, A.M. Late Senior Usher of Westminster School. To
which is added, "A Sermon Written by Samuel Johnson, LL.D.
for the Funeral of his Wife." London: Printed for T.
Cadell, in the Strand, 1789].

17
print for the first time in the Yale edition of Johnson's
.§_ermons.
The first sermon published in Johnson's lifetime was
written in 1745 for the Reverend Henry Hervey Aston, a
close friend, who delivered it before the Sons of the
clergy;17 the other published sermon was written in 1777
for the Reverend William Dodd, a clergyman awaiting the
death sentence to be carried out against him for forgery,
who preached it before his fellow prisoners at Newgate.18
The Aston sermon was attributed to Johnson by L. F.
Powell,19 and we have Johnson's own acknowledgement of the
authorship of the Dodd sermon (Life, III, 141-142.).
There can be no denying that a knowledge of the life
of an author, as well as some acquaintance with his age
and his contemporaries, can be useful in understanding his
work.

However, a problem with the psychogenetic approach

17 The Aston sermon was published as an octavo
pamphlet of twenty-eight pages. see, Aston, Henry Hervey.
A Sermon Preached at the Cathedral Church of St. Paul,
Before the Sons of the Clergy, On Thursday the secona of
May, 1745, Being the Day of their Annual Feast. By the
Honourable and Reverend Henry Hervey Aston, A.M. Rector
of Shotteley in the County of Suffolk. London: Printed
for J. Brindley, Bookseller to His Royal Highness the
Prince of Wales, at the Feathers in New-Bond-Street; and
sold by M. Cooper, in Paternoster-Row, 1745.
18 The Dodd sermon was published as an octavo
pamphlet of twenty-four pages. see, Dodd, William. The
Convict's Address to His Unhappy Brethren. Delivered in
the Chapel of Newgate, on Friday, June 6, 1777. London:
printed for G. Kearsly, at No. 46, in Fleet-Street, 1777.
19 Powell, L. F. "Dr. Johnson and a Friend,"
Times, 25 Nov. 1938, 15-16.

London
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to ideology is that it often tends to ignore the empirical
evidence suggested by the work itself.

The contention of

this dissertation is that Johnson's ideas, as found in his
sermons, must be taken on their own merits and judged
accordingly.

They are neither to be accepted reverently

because of the greatness of their author nor are they to
be dismissed because of the suggested pathology of his
personality.

As we will demonstrate, Johnson's major

contribution in his Sermons lies in his layman's approach
to matters of ultimate concern and that pragmatic approach
must be judged on its own merits.
A second difficulty in Johnsonian criticism has
resulted from the particular focus of many investigators-a focus which often omits or minimizes one of the key
elements in Johnsonian thought.

Johnson's understanding

of human nature, as reflected in his Sermons, embraces a
psychological, ethical, and spiritual body of knowledge;
none of these elements can be justly separated from the
others if the goal is to describe accurately and
coherently his view of man.

For example, Richard B.

Schwartz maintains that "scientific investigation [for
Johnson] was conducted within a religious context;"20
Damrosch argues that religion for Johnson is linked firmly
to the rational (76); and Jean Hagstrum demonstrates that
20 Richard B. Schwartz, Samuel Johnson and the New
Science (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press;-1971),
164.
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faith for Johnson was "not mysticism or inward light but
acceptance of testimony and even sense evidence upon the
highest possible authority. 11 21
Johnson's observations on the nature of man reflect
his conviction that human beings are in the process of
integrating powerful forces within their personalities.
BY not recognizing this dynamic or process aspect within
Johnsonian thought, scholars have sometimes fallen into
errors of emphasis or interpretation, even in otherwise
excellent and extremely useful studies.

For example, one

early tendency of such critics was to deny either the
existence or the sincerity of Johnson's religious
concerns.

Leslie Stephen stresses the "worldliness" of

many eighteenth-century writers, including Johnson, saying
that they "seemed to close their eyes as resolutely as
possible to all thoughts of eternity, infinity, heaven,
and hell. 11 22

Stephen argues that this orientation caused

them to become "practical moralists" (367) who "turn their
backs upon the infinite and abandon the effort at a
solution" to the "inscrutable enigma of life" (370).

It

is not surprising, then, that Stephen sees Johnson as a
21 Jean H. Hagstrum, Samuel Johnson's Literary
Criticism (1952; rpt., Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1967), 69.
22 Leslie Stephen, History of English Thought in the
§ighteenth Century (New York: Peter Smith, 1949), II,
370.
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moralist preaching only social doctrines such as "work and
don't whine" (376).
In his study of Samuel Johnson, Joseph Wood Krutch
also refuses to take Johnson's faith seriously, either in
terms of Johnson's own profession of it, or as part of the
solution to the vacuity of life.

For example, Krutch says

that in Rasselas Johnson uses a fairly mechanical formula
without much genuine substance to it:
Again and again when he is faced with the
necessity either of consoling others or of
facing some sorrow of his own, the steps are the
same. First, the consolations of religion.
Then, to others or to himself, the advice: Seek
the palliatives for those ills which are
susceptible of no radical remedy. That the man
as well as the child can be pleased with a
rattle and tickled with a straw is indeed one of
nature's most kindly laws.23
Bertrand Bronson views Johnson's religion as a last resort
to which he was driven "by the desperate character of the
quest for happiness" (41) and as a self-imposed "straightjacket" which Johnson needed to control himself (170).
In more recent years, scholars have become
increasingly aware of the importance that a variety of
religious concerns have in Johnson's writing.24
23 Joseph Wood Krutch, Samuel Johnson
Henry Holt, 1944), 184.

Yet,

(New York:

24 For example, Johnson's stylistic indebtedness to
churchmen has been examined in completely different ways
by two critics. Katherine c. Balderston, "Dr. Johnson's
Use of William Law in the Dictionary," Philological
Quarterly, XXIX (1960), 379-388, explores the implications
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these studies of Johnson's religious concerns have turned
their attention almost exclusively to the doctrinal arena
and have omitted analyzing Johnson's understanding of
man's struggle to integrate the psychological, ethical and
spiritual dimensions of his nature.

Robert Voitle

corrects many of the mistakes of the earlier scholars
whose views we have sketched.

Voitle denies Krutch's

views that Johnson uses religion only as a club to enforce
social conformity25 and he vigorously disagrees with the
assertion that Johnson did not believe in the possibility
that man could reform (32).
In Samuel Johnson:

A Layman's Religion, Maurice

Quinlan examines the broad aspects of Johnson's doctrinal
affiliation with the church establishment and the leading
theologians of the day.

The book analyzes in detail

certain key religious doctrines such as the Atonement and
Repentance.26

Quinlan firmly establishes the fact that

Johnson was a devout Christian, and that such themes as
of the type and quantity of excerpts from Law in successive editions of the Dictionary. W. K. Wimsatt, The Prose
Style of Samuel Johnson (New Haven, 1941), suggests that
the theologians mentioned by Boswell [Life, I, 219] and
Sir John Hawkins [Life of Samuel Johnson, LL.D., ed.
Bertram H. Davis (New York, 1961), 116], as well as Robert
South and Samuel Clarke, be studied as influences on
Johnson's style.
25 Robert Voitle, Samuel Johnson the Moralist
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1961), 157.
26 Maurice J. Quinlan, Samuel Johnson: ~Layman's
Religion (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1964),
46-84.
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meditating upon death and the need for charitable acts
resulted from a considered belief of his Christian duty
(52-53; 136).

Other critics have focused on one major

aspect of Johnson's religion, such as Johnson's welldocumented fear of death.27

Moreover, isolated facets of

Johnson's religion have come under critical scrutiny.

For

example, Bate analyzes Johnson's religious scruples in
terms of neurotic compulsion (Achievement, 158-159) and
Watkins attributes Johnson's sporadic church attendance to
his emotional ebullience (Perilous Balance, 57).
In The Religious Thought of Samuel Johnson, Chester
Chapin laments that Bate and Voitle discuss Johnson's
ethical theory apart from his religious views.28
Specifically, Chapin deserves much credit for pointing out
the extraordinary implications of Johnson's assertion that
''all theory is against freedom of the will; all experience
for it" for understanding the religious basis for his
exhortations to right conduct (115-117).

However, some

discussion of Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding
in this connection would have been appropriate since on
27 For the theory of fear as obsession, see Krutch,
548; also see Ernest c. Messner, The Forgotten Hume (New
York, 1943), 193. For the theory of fear as part of
orthodox Christian belief, see Jean Hagstrum, "On Dr.
J~hnson's Fear of Death,''
~Journal of English Literary
History, 14 (1947), 308-319.
28 Chester F. Chapin, The Religious Thought of Samuel
Johnson (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1968),
92.
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manY other critical issues Johnson's opinions very closely
correspond to those of Locke.

The present dissertation

draws the parallel between Locke's discussion of free will
and Johnson's treatment of it in his Sermons and argues
that the Essay provides a significant alternative to
either acceptance of Hobbesian determinism or simple
rejection of "all theory."

An examination of Locke's

position on the liberty of man's will provides a more
complete picture of the intellectual background for
Johnson's thought on the subject.

Furthermore, an

analysis of Johnson's treatment of the liberty of the will
in his Sermons offers a corrective to the charge of
Chapin, Bate, and Voitle that Johnson's writings
demonstrate as pessimistic a view of human nature as
anyone ever presented.
Richard Schwartz takes an even darker view of
Johnson's thought when he implies that personal
reformation or the amelioration of evil in this life is
nearly futile; he says that "Johnson sees the problem [of
pain) as insoluble and, finally a mystery"29 and that
Johnson becomes merely "a cataloguer or illustrator of
evil" (60).

Schwartz does acknowledge Johnson's

recognition that "the prevalence of evil in human society
is often the product of human imagination" (49) and that
29 Richard B. Schwartz, Samuel Johnson and the
Problem of Evil (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press,
1975), 36." - -
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"our task is to gain what ground we can with Reason and
Religion as our guides" (59).

These latter assertions of

Schwartz are examined in this dissertation in light of the
additional evidence provided by Johnson's Sermons.

The

present study demonstrates Johnson's pragmatic awareness
that the greater part, though not all, of su.tfering here
on earth is caused by man's self-delusive nature.

Johnson

argues in his Sermons that this suffering can be ameliorated by moral action which produces a life that can be
better enjoyed.
In one of the best books treating Johnson's understanding of human nature, Walter Jackson Bate has written
extensively on human desire, imagination, and reason as
these concepts function in Johnson's understanding of the
nature of man.

In The Achievement of Samuel Johnson, Bate

very perceptively distinguishes between the mechanism of
desire and the eventual objects fixed upon (69); this is a
central idea in Johnson which few other critics have
noted.

Bate astutely observes the unity of vigor and

order in Johnson's style and demonstrates that in
Johnson's personal religion there exists the needed
personal freedom and emotional satisfaction compatible
with the equally needed centrality and control of
religious orthodoxy.

Moreover, Bate has delineated a

large portion of Johnson's understanding of the processes
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by which man's desire and imagination struggle to be
integrated with man's reason:
the "hunger of imagination" . . . and the
"stability of truth" . . . form the twin poles
between which Johnson's practical insights into
human life and destiny move back and forth
(Achievement, 134).
Bate's position, however, omits much of Johnson's
awareness that religion can effectively address the
tension between the chimeras created by man's imagination,
the insatiable desires of his will, and man's limited use
of reason.

Moreover, Bate almost completely neglects the

evidence provided by Johnson's Sermons which suggests that
Johnson's observations on the nature of man have a clear
foundation in religious tradition.

The present

dissertation will explore these gaps left by Bate's
investigation.

This study of the Sermons reveals

Johnson's astute awareness that religion provides
pragmatically satisfying answers for those precise
problems caused by man's self-delusive nature.
The only book-length study of Johnson's Sermons
available to date is James Gray's Johnson's Sermons:
Study.30

A

Gray discusses the composition and the printing

of Johnson's Sermons, placing special emphasis on
Johnson's long-standing friendship with the Reverend John
30 James Gray, Johnson's Sermons:
Clarendon Press, 1972).

A Study (Oxford:
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Taylor of Ashbourne for whom twenty-five of the twentyeight extant Sermons were written.

The central part of

Gray's study is an examination of the influence of the
theology of William Law, the first important influence on
Johnson's adult religious life, and of Samuel Clarke,
whose sermons Johnson considered the best in the language
"bating a little heresy," on Johnson's Sermons.

Gray

traces Johnson's attitudes and beliefs on death,
suffering, happiness, repentance, the Atonement and the
Incarnation, rewards and punishments, and the hope for an
afterlife to their possible sources in influential English
divines.

He argues that Johnson's treatment of these

subjects in his Sermons suggests that he sought a
systematic creed that could be contained within the bounds
of human reason and credulity.

Gray's conclusion is that

it is nearly impossible to separate the religious and
secular aspects of Johnson's admonitions to moral conduct
without seriously distorting his achievement in the
Sermons.
The present dissertation may accurately be
classified, with Gray's study, as an argument for the
integrated nature of Johnson's exhortations to right
thinking and living.

However, there is an important

difference between Gray's study and mine.

Gray deals

Primarily with the establishment of the argument; this
dissertation implicitly accepts that argument and uses it
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as a point of departure for its analysis of Johnson's
§._ermons.
Gray's analysis of William Law emphasizes the
contemptus mundi theme and stresses the value of a
spiritual regimen and a concern with "the somber realities
of death and the last judgment" (122).

However, the

present dissertation argues that Gray's discussion of Law
carries the contemptus mundi theme further than Johnson
himself did in his Sermons.

Indeed, the Sermons support

the view that for Johnson religion provided the solace man
needs for the vacuity he experiences in this life.
Religion provides consolations in this world as well as
promising the reward of eternal salvation.

Whatever the

tension between man's self-delusive nature and the demands
of moral behavior, Johnson's Sermons suggest that man not
eschew this life but rather engage it as the responsible
way of struggling for salvation.
Gray does not explore the implications of the
important tension in Johnson's Sermons between reason and
revelation, a tension which has significant bearing on the
relevance and credibility of revelation for man's salvation.

The present dissertation demonstrates that the

Sermons accentuate Johnson's belief that not even Scriptural revelation is exempt from the critical scrutiny of
Pragmatic experience.

Because he viewed reason as man's

most celestial faculty, Johnson devoted a major portion of
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his effort as a sermonist to the delineation of those
conditions under which reason could play its proper role
in guiding man's ethical conduct in this life and
preparing him for the next.

Johnson did not, however,

believe that human affairs could be conducted wholly by
the light of reason.

Unless reason is supplemented by

religion, the dangers of man's self-delusive nature could
not be avoided.

The Sermons recognize that in many

circumstances man's reason is powerless or insufficient;
nevertheless, they demonstrate that human conduct can be
far more rational than it usually is and the Sermons
explain how man can make the fullest use of his capacities
for rational behavior.
Gray's study provides useful parallels in content
between Johnson's Sermons and the English homiletic
tradition.

This dissertation extends Gray's discussion of

homiletic sources and models for Johnson's Sermons to an
examination of Johnson's stylistic modifications of that
tradition.

His Sermons contain significant deviations in

form from those characteristics which he found so
praiseworthy in the works of many English divines.

All

Johnson's modifications suggest his belief that man's
faith is forged more from the realities of secular life
and less from conventional ascetic ideals.
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II
Johnson is usually viewed as a moralist of a deeply
conservative--even reactionary--bias because he is usually
classified as a Christian moralist.

Such an assessment is

an oversimplification because Johnson is clearly a
moralist who is also Christian.

It is too easy to pigeon-

hole him by automatically placing him within a certain
tradition and then viewing him as a participant within
that static philosophical system.

Johnson wrote in a

period when man's conception of himself and his world was
on the threshold of major change.

There was a palpable

shift from viewing the human mind as a static entity to a
stance which saw it as a complex of processes.31

Within

that framework, the Christian moralist tradition, which
encompasses religious, sociological, and psychological
thought, was primarily a static conceptualization.
However, even in Johnson's time it was beginning to
weaken, and the transformation itself is most tellingly
reflected in the fact that rather than seeking identity
and purpose through the established institutions-political, social, ecclesial--man began to seek his
identity and purpose within himself.
Until that vantage point had been solidly attained,
rationalist philosophers, in their

~earch

for order in the

31 Lancelot Law Whyte, The Unconscious Before Freud
(New York: Basic Books, Inc-.-,-1960), 49.

30

universe, postulated general conceptions of human nature
which tended to be static, closed systems of thought,
"abstractions achieved by emphasizing permanent entities
and neglecting their changing relationships" (Whyte, 48).
The essential difference between the static concept of the
unchanging nature of the human mind and Johnson's concept
is that the former perceives human nature as a grouping of
singular, unconnected attributes, motives, and responses,
which are fixed in a hierarchical arrangement; Johnson
perceives human nature to be an integrated process of
instinctual forces, emotions, and responses that are in
flux within the individual.
In his Sermons, Johnson depicts the mind not as a
hierarchy of separate faculties of reason, imagination,
desires, and instincts, but as a more complex development
of the instincts to "elemental" feelings of "hope and
fear, love and hatred, desire and aversion" (Sermons 10,
12, 14, 15, 1Jl; Rambler 49).

The various faculties of the

mind, in Johnsonian psychology, are thus intimately
connected.

Moreover, whereas Johnson says that the

passions, the desires, and the imagination are not to be
extirpated but to be integrated into the whole personality
(Sermon 18, 193-4; Rambler 66), the static conceptualization of man's nature sees the imagination, desires and
passions often in conflict with reason.
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In the Christian moralist tradition, the static
philosophy of man's mental faculties and of the nature of
self-knowledge reflects a feeling of self-distrust.

Man's

paradoxical position is that, while he is a higher being
than the animals because he possesses reason, he is also
weak and limited because of the eruption of his passions.
With his reason constantly in conflict with his passions,
desires, and imagination, man cannot trust the impulses of
his instincts, nor can he even trust his physical
senses.32

The major character ideal of Christianity is

that of the ascetic,33 whose emphasis on the eradication
of sinful impulses is a synecdoche for the extirpation of
all man's desires, fantasies, and passions.
In this tradition, the individual Christian looks
outward for help in attaining the ideal, for control of
his passions, to the norms and commandments of established
religion.

His orientation and identification is to

reflect the greater glory of God by living as closely as
possible to Christ-like perfection, according to "right
reason" rather than the treacherous instincts and passions
that originally took man out of his happy state.

Thus,

William Law, whose Serious Call is a representative
32 Paul Fussell, The Rhetorical World of Augustan
Humanism: Ethics and Imagery from Swift to Burke
(Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1965), 76.
33 Philip Rieff, The Triumph of the Therapeutic:
Uses of Faith After Freud (New York: Harper & Row, 1966),
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expression of Christian orientation and identification,
both because of its clarity in presenting the issues and
because of its influence in the eighteenth century, says:
If it is our glory and happiness to have a
rational nature, that is endued with wisdom and
reason, that is capable of imitating the Divine
nature, then it must be our glory and happiness
to improve our reason and wisdom, to act up to
the excellency of our rational nature, and to
imitate God in all our actions to the utmost of
our power (47).
The attitude expressed in this passage informs Law's whole
treatise on the Christian way of life.
The central ethic of the Christian is, therefore, "to
love our neighbor as ourselves, to love all mankind as God
has loved them" (Law, 53).

This particular doctrine is a

major mode of inculcating selflessness in the individual
and so orienting him outward for the greater purpose of
reflecting the glory of God.

This ethic together with the

admonition know thyself directs the individual to
knowledge of his primary relationship to God, and through
God, to love of his fellow man.

Through the rejection of

self--the ascetic ideal--the individual is led to love his
fellow man.
Where does Johnson stand with respect to these
concepts?

When we consider how Johnson's psychology

informs his morality, we find that he adheres to the
conventional tenets of the Christian moral tradition.
However, we also discover that Johnson transforms the
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motivation for right conduct from the Christian ascetic
ideal of self-denial to a motivation based on pragmatic
and secular self-interest.

Throughout his Sermons,

Johnson does not rule out love of virtue for its own sake
as a desirable goal, but he makes clear that his precepts
are not intended chiefly for those who already love virtue
for its own sake.

The Sermons are designed instead for

those who are struggling to practice virtue and need to
have their self-interest enlisted on its side.

Moreover,

Johnson considers enlightened self-interest a very
different matter from selfishness and a perfectly valid
foundation for moral conduct.

This is a view he shared

with others, including Locke.

Locke, for example, not

only regarded the rational pursuit of happiness as
praiseworthy but as obligatory--a pursuit that men have no
right to neglect.
Johnson asks the conventional moral questions in his
Sermons:

how are we to be saved?

what solace or hope is

there for man as he experiences the emptiness of life?
However, his answers are always framed by his unconventional and experiential understanding of the nature of
man.

Through the efforts of human beings to integrate

their reason with their imagination and desire, through
realistic perceptions about the self and about relationships with others, through not postulating Christ as a
character ideal to be realistically attempted, Johnson
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suggests that man can hope, not only for the conventional
reward of eternal life, but also for solace from the
vacuity of this life.
Indeed, the Sermons are nothing if they are not a
study of the ways in which religion addresses the problem
of human vacuity.

The centrality of the perception that

life is vacuous to Johnsonian thought went unnoticed by
Boswell; it was left to Mrs. Thrale to note that
the vacuity of Life had at some early period of
his life perhaps so struck upon the Mind of Mr.
Johnson, that it became by repeated impressions
his favourite hypothesis, & the general Tenor of
his reasonings commonly ended in that: The
Things therefore which other philosophers
attribute to various and contradictory Causes
appeared to him uniform enough; all was done to
fill up the time upon his Principle. One Man
for example was profligate, followed the Girls
or the Gaming Table,--why Life must be filled up
Madam, & the man was capable of nothing less
Sensua1.34
To understand Johnson's meaning of vacuity is to
understand the way in which his observations on the nature
of man within the Sermons are guided by the implicit
polarities of eternity and temporality, reason and
imagination, desire and fulfillment:35
3 4 Hester Lynch Piozzi, Thraliana: The Diary of
~·Hester Lynch Thrale (Later Mrs. Piozzi), 1776-1809.
Ed. Katherine c. Balderston (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1951), I, 179.
3 5 In the Dictionary, Johnson defines vacuity as "(1)
emptiness; state of being unfilled; (2) space unfilled;
space unoccupied; (3) inanity; want of reality."
Significantly, all six examples Johnson uses for these
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The whole mind becomes a gloomy vacuity, without
any image or form of pleasure, a chaos of
confused wishes, directed to no particular end,
or to that which, while we wish, we cannot hope
to obtain (Sermon 25, 267).
Johnson sees human activity as a futile attempt to fill an
inner void, as an incessant and hopeless search for
"novelty" and "diversity" with which to feed the hunger of
human nature:
If the most active and industrious of mankind
was able, at the close of life, to recollect
distinctly his past moments, and distribute
them, in a regular account, according to the
manner in which they have been spent, it is
scarcely to be imagined how few would be marked
out to the mind, by any permanent or visible
effects, how small a proportion his real action
would bear to his seeming possibilities of
action, how may chasms he would find of wide and
continued vacuity, and how many interstitial
spaces unfilled, even in the most tumultuous
hurries of business, and the most eager
vehemence of pursuit (Rambler~, 41).
The contradiction between the infinite desires of human
nature for fulfillment and the insufficiency of the
temporal ends with which human nature becomes obsessed
suggest that the answers provided by religion could
resolve this contradiction and help man cope with the
vacuity of life.
three definitions refer to either the physical, emotional
or spiritual emptiness of human nature. Indeed, his
quotation from Rogers is illustrative of Johnson's use of
vacuity in his Sermons: "God, who alone can answer all
our longings, and fill every vacuity of our soul, should
entirely possess our heart."
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In every Sermon, Johnson notes that it is the
preponderance of vacuity in our lives which moves us to
seek the consolation and encouragement provided by
religion.

However, even in his call for a life of

spiritual perspective--man's ability to contrast this
transitory life with the sure prospect of eternal
happiness--Johnson does not expect man to respond in any
transcendental way.

He tells us in his Sermons that such

a spiritual perspective on life provides the pragmatic
motivation we need to integrate the chimeras of the
imagination and the insatiable desires of the will with
the stability of our reason.

CHAPTER TWO

JOHNSON'S SERMONS AND THE NATURE OF MAN

I

Long before the philosophical inquiries of William
James, Alfred North Whitehead, or John Dewey, Samuel
Johnson asked similar probing questions of religion--"Does
it work? Is it practical?"

Indeed, whether he was reading

poetry or drama, philosophy or theology, Johnson was
impatient with anything that lacked common sense or that
did not conform to human experience.

Furthermore, he did

not regard his own approach to religion as unique or as
somehow set apart by either mental acuity or careful
cultivation.
The object of the pages which follow is to demonstrate that Johnson was above all a pragmatist in

writing

his Sermons; he tested all ideas, even orthodox
theological doctrines, against the reality of human
experience.
metaphysical.

He had little interest in the abstract or the
When Johnson asked, "Is it true?" what he

really meant was, "Will it work?"

It is a commonplace

that every homilist is speaking essentially to himself and
37
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this appears to be true of Johnson throughout his Sermons.
The sermons are so meaningful precisely because they are
50

practical, so helpful to those looking for suggestions

and hints as to how to wrestle with the pains of life.
Johnson sought and succeeded in putting that kind of
common sense content into his homilies.

Most Johnsonian

critics are concerned with showing the affinities between
his Sermons and the ideas of Hobbes, Mandeville, Locke or
Hume, and Johnson was, of course, a child of his age.
However, few critics have sufficiently appreciated the
pragmatic nature of his Sermons in which Johnson uses
human experience as a test and judge for religion's
consolations for the vacuity of life.
Modern critics of Samuel Johnson's moral thought
often label his view of man as "pessimistic" and seek
parallels for it in the writings of Thomas Hobbes and
Bernard Mandeville.

Walter Jackson Bate finds Johnson's

views among the most pessimistic to be encountered in
Western thought (Samuel Johnson, 298; 492).

Robert Voitle

discovers in Johnson's gloomy view of human nature
possible justification for some readers' regarding him as
a Calvinist.

Voitle also points to the strong parallels

between Johnson and Mandeville, especially in the latter's
notorious Fable of the Bees, where the evil that men do is
seen as springing from an innate depravity (Samuel Johnson
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the Moralist, 131, 154).

Paul Alkon stresses Johnson's

dependence upon and agreement with Hobbes in seeing human
life in the state of nature as "solitary, poor, nasty, and
brutish" and in believing unselfish action to be alien to
human beings (Samuel Johnson and Moral Discipline, 41).
It cannot be denied that Johnson's conception of

human nature is a somber one, especially when compared to
the more optimistic view of man so conspicuous in the
works of such popular writers as Fielding and Sterne.1
Moreover, since in the latter half of the eighteenth
century it had become increasingly fashionable in some
circles to refer to man as naturally benevolent, it is not
surprising that even some of Johnson's contemporaries
thought his pronouncements severe.

Boswell relates that

Lady Macleod, upon hearing Johnson deny natural goodness
1 Johnson's observations on the weakness, corruption,
and limitations of human nature were widely recorded.
According to Frances Reynolds, the sister of Sir Joshua
Reynolds, Dr. Johnson's "general and common" assertion was
"that Man was by Nature much more inclined to evil than to
good'' (II, 256), in Samuel Johnson, Johnsonian Miscellanies, ed. George Birkbeck Hill (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1897). In her Anecdotes, Mrs. Thrale mentions the
"fixity" of Johnson's opinions on "the natural depravity
of mankind and the remains of original sin" (115-116).
Readers of Boswell's Tour to the Hebrides will recollect
Johnson's sharp response t~Lady Macleod, who asked
whether man was naturally good--"No, Madam, no more than a
wolf" (V, 211), in James Boswell, The Life of Samuel
Johnson, LL.D., ed. George Birkbeck Hi~rev. and enl. by
L. F. Powell (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934-1950).
Hereafter, cited in the text as Life.
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to man, "started, • . . saying in a low voice,

'This is

worse than Swift"' (Life, V, 211).
As Bate, Voitle, and Alken suggest, several of Samuel
Johnson's statements do bring to mind the opinions of
Hobbes and Mandeville.

Nearly a century before Johnson

made his observations on the nature of man, Thomas Hobbes
drew an image of human nature that was far from idyllic.
Hobbes invited the readers of his Leviathan to discover,
based on their own observations of man, whether the
unflattering things he said of human nature were not
inescapably true.

The elements within man that make for

hostility, spite, and malice are no secret:
All the world knows that such is the nature of
man, that dissenting in questions which concern
their power, or profit, or pre-eminence of wit,
they slander and curse each other . . . . For
such is the nature of men that howsoever they
may acknowledge many others to be more witty or
more eloquent or more learned, yet they will
hardly believe there be many so wise as
themselves; for they see their own wit at hand
and other men's at a distance.2
Hobbes believed that the testimony of actions is much more
reliable than that of words in assessing the extent of
human depravity:
2 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, in British Moralists:
Being Selections from Writers Principally of the
Eighteenth Century, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1897), Vol. II, 318. All quotations from
Leviathan are from this edition.
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For every man looks that his companion should
value him at the same rate he sets upon himself;
and upon all signs of contempt or undervaluing
[he] naturally endeavors . . . to extort a
greater value from his contemners by damage and
from others by example. So that in the nature
of man we find three principal causes of
quarrel:
first, competition; secondly, diffidence; thirdly, glory . . . . We see even in
well-governed states, where there are laws and
punishments appointed for offenders, yet
particular men travel not without their sword by
their side for their defenses; neither sleep
they without shutting not only their doors
against their fellow subjects, but also their
trunks and coffers for fear of domestics.
Can
men give a clearer testimony of the distrust
they have of each other, and all of all?
(Leviathan, II, 15; 319-21).
Whether Hobbes portrays man in a state of nature or
"advanced" to a state of civil society, his observations
on the human condition are as insightful as Johnson's own
perceptions of human life.

For example, Johnson describes

man as being first
. . . wild and unsocial, living each man to
himself, taking from the weak, and losing to the
strong.
In their first coalitions of society,
much of this original savageness is retained.
Of general happiness, the product of general
confidence, there is yet no thought. Men
continue to prosecute their own advantages by
the nearest way; and the utmost severity of the
civil law is necessary to restrain individuals
from plundering each other. The restraints then
necessary, are restraints from plunder, from
acts of publick violence, and undisguised
oppression. The ferocity of our ancestors, as
of all other nations, produced not fraud, but
rapine. They had not yet learned to cheat, and
attempted only to rob. As manners grow more
polished, with the knowledge of good, men attain
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likewise dexterity in evil. Open rapine becomes
less frequent, and violence gives way to cunning. Those who before invaded pastures and
stormed houses, now begin to enrich themselves
by unequal contracts and fraudulent intromissions . . . . I am afraid the increase of
commerce and the incessant struggle for riches
which commerce excites, gives us no prospect of
an end speedily to be expected of artifice and
fraud (Life, II, 198-9).
The laws and customs of civilization only force the
relentless human current for power and domination into
other channels; human beings remain essentially the same-frail, limited, corrupt and prone to evil.
Following Hobbes' imperative for a clear-sighted view
of man, Mandeville's avowed purpose in The Fable of the
Bees is to show man what he is:
Most Writers are always teaching Men what they
should be, and hardly ever trouble their Heads
with telling them what they really are (Fable,
I, 39).3
To Mandeville, man is simply "the most perfect of animals"
(Fable, I, 44).

In The Fable of the Bees, society is

shown as a bee-hive.

This hive is prosperous and great as

long as pride, selfishness, corruption, luxury, hypocrisy,
fraud, injustice, and every conceivable vice are freely
practiced.

One day, however, Jove "rid the bawling Hive

3 Bernard Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees: £!:_,
Private Vices, Publick Benef'Its, ed. F:- ~Kaye, vols. !II (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924). All quotations from
~ Fable are from this edition.
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of gree d . "

The result of Jove's purge was that trade and

the professions languished, unemployment and depopulation
set in, and the few surviving bees deserted their hive for
a hollow tree.

The moral regarding civilization, as

Mandeville draws it, is:
Then leave complaints: fools only strive
To make great an honest hive.
To enjoy the world's conveniencies,
Be famed in war, yet live in ease,
Without great vices is a vain
Utopia seated in the Brain.
Fraud, luxury, and pride must live,
While we the benefits receive:
Hunger's a dreadful plague, no doubt,
Yet who digests or thrives without?
Bare Virtue can't make nations live
In Splendor (Fable, I, 37).
Mandeville maintains that people generally profess to
value real virtue, but they never practice it, and if they
did, everything they really value, judging by their
behavior, would vanish.

Consequently, they are faced with

an impossible choice, either real virtue and poverty or
vices and prosperity:
. . . they, that would revive
A Golden Age, must be as free,
For Acorns, as for Honesty (Fable, I, 37).
The foundation for Mandeville's scheme of values is his
view of human nature:
I believe man (besides Skin, Flesh, Bones, etc.,
that are obvious to the Eye) to be a compound of
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various Passions, that all of them, as they are
provoked and come uppermost, govern him by
turns, whether he will or not (Fable, I, 39).
Based on this view of human nature, Mandeville contends
that virtue ought to be defined as self-denial:
It being the Interest then of the very worst of
them, more than any, to preach up Publickspiritedness that they might reap the Fruits of
the Labour and Self-denial of others, and at the
same time indulge their own Appetites with less
disturbance, they agreed with the rest, to call
everything, which, without regard to the
Publick, Man should commit to gratify any of his
Appetites, VICE; if in that Action there cou'd
be observed the least prospect, that it might
either be Injurious to any of the Society, or
ever render himself less serviceable to others:
And to give the Name of VIRTUE to every Performance, by which Man, contrary to the impulse of
Nature, should endeavour the benefit of others,
or the Conquest of his own Passions out of a
Rational Ambition of being good (Fable, I, 489) •

Virtue however is a very fashionable word, and
some of the most luxurious are extremely fond of
the amiable sound; tho' they mean nothing by it,
but a great veneration for whatever is courtly
or sublime, and an equal aversion to everything,
that is vulgar or unbecoming. They seem to
imagine that it chiefly consists in strict
compliance to all the Laws of Honour that have
any regard to the Respect that is due to
themselves . . • . It is counted ridiculous for
Men to commit Violence upon themselves, or to
maintain, that Virtue requires Self-denial; all
Court Philosophers are agreed, that nothing can
be lovely or desireable, that is mortifying or
uneasy (Fable, II, 12).
Mandeville's whole speculation in The Fable of the Bees
turns on this definition of virtue which implies a
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contradiction within human nature.

Given the nature of

man--a compound of passions which are forever struggling
to control him, with the strongest always winning out-E.,elfless behavior, the practice of virtue, is not only
impractical but impossible:
If it be urg'd • . . there might be such People
[the truly virtuous]; I answer that it is as
possible that Cats, instead of killing Rats and
Mice, should feed them, and go about the House
to suckle and nurse their young ones; or that a
Kite should call the Hens to their Meat, as the
Cock does, and sit brooding over their Chickens
instead of devouring 'em; but if they should all
do so, they would cease to be Cats and Kites; it
is inconsistent with their Natures, and the
Species of Creatures which now we mean, when we
name Cats and Kites, would be extinct as soon as
that could come to pass (Fable, I, 134).
The worldliness, the hypocrisy, the backsliding are not,
then, accidental--they are the necessary consequences of
human nature.
Like Mandeville, whom he had read with some appreciation, Johnson rejects any possibility of disinterested
human goodness.4

To say otherwise is to suggest,

4 According to Mrs. Thrale, Johnson was "indeed a
most acute observer" of the consequences of man's limited,
corrupt, and frail nature; he "used to say sometimes, half
in jest, half in earnest, that they were the remains of
his old tutor Mandeville's instructions. As a book,
however, he took care always loudly to condemn the Fable
21 ~Bees, but not without adding, 'that it was the work
of a thinking man"' (Anecdotes, 115-116).
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absurdly, that Samuel Johnson held, in effect, a Pelagian
understanding of man.

Rather, he told Mrs. Thrale:

I hope I have not lost my Sensibility of Wrong,
but I hope likewise that I have seen sufficient
of the World to prevent my expecting to find an5
Action whose Motives, & all its Parts are good.
Moreover, throughout his Sermons, Johnson consistently
describes the nature of man as weak, limited, corrupt, and
subject to temptation.

For example, when he explores the

destructive effects of hardness of heart on the practice
of religion in Sermon l, he observes that
The continual occurrence of temptation, and that
imbecility of nature, which every man sees in
others, and has experienced in himself, seems to
have made many doubtful of the possibility of
salvation (32).6
5 Hester Lynch Piozzi, Thraliana: The Diary of Mrs.
Hester Lynch Thrale (Later Mrs. Piozzi) 1776-1809, ed.
Katherine c. Balderston (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951),

183-184.

6 Samuel Johnson, Sermons, ed. Jean H. Hagstrum and
James Gray, vol. XIV of The Yale Edition of the Works of
Samuel Johnson (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978).
Hereafter, cited in the text by both Sermon and page
number. Johnson frequently associates the word imbecility
with human nature. In the Dictionary, for example, he
defines imbecility as a "weakness; feebleness of mind or
body." Johnson also uses this term in a similar context
in his moral essays. For instance, in Idler 88, he
observes that "[man] . . • sooner confesses the depravity
of his will than the imbecillity of his nature" (274), in
The Idler and The Adventurer, ed. w. J. Bate, et al., Vol.
~of The Yale""""Edition of The Works of Samuel Johnson
(New Haven:---Yale University Press, 1963). Hereafter,
cited in the text by Adventurer or Idler number and page
number.
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Johnson portrays human nature in similar terms when he
examines the vexatious problem of conceit in Sermon 8 and
the consequences of human ignorance in

~ermon

16:

What can any man see either within or without
himself, that does not afford him some reason to
remark his own ignorance, imbecillity, and
meanness? (Sermon~, 94).
Such is the weakness of human nature, that every
particular state, or condition, lies open to
particular temptations (Sermon 16, 171).
However, when he deals with the more odious sins of human
pride in Sermon

& and

spiritual indolence in Sermon

z,

Johnson's assessment of human nature becomes more severe;
he uses the concept of depravity to describe man and, when
he warns against the dangers of pride, he suggests the
possibility of original corruption.
Pride is a corruption that seems almost originally ingrafted in our nature; it exerts itself
in our first years, and, without continual
endeavours to suppress it, influences our last
(Sermon£, 66).
Such is the present weakness and corruption of
human nature, that sincerity, real sincerity, is
rarely to be found (Sermon
80).

z,

But as startlingly severe as it may have appeared to
Mrs. Thrale and Lady Macleod, and as extraordinarily
pessimistic as it appears to Bate, Voitle, and Alkon,
Samuel Johnson's view of human nature was neither
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identical with that of Mandeville or Hobbes nor something
invented by him de novo.

Johnson was solidly within the

long tradition of Christian orthodoxy, at one with the
Apostle Paul, with Tertullian and Augustine, with Luther
and Calvin, a fact that many Johnsonian critics are
inclined to overlook.

That Mrs. Thrale and Lady MacLeod

should have been surprised is simply a commentary on the
Anglicanism of the day, which was inclined toward a mild
form of the Pelagian heresy.

The anthropology, or

doctrine of man, behind this Enlightenment version of
Anglican doctrine popular in the eighteenth century and
with which Johnson took sharp issue was mildly optimistic;
it eschewed the severe pessimism of Augustine and the
Reformers.

Johnson owed his dissent, finally, neither to

Mandeville and Hobbes on the one hand, nor to his familiarity with the gloomier Christian doctrine of early ages,
but to his own experience of human nature.

Johnson simply

did not find man to be the sweetly reasonable creature
seen by some of his contemporaries.

He did not view man

pessimistically but realistically.
The Thirty-Nine Articles of Religion appended to The
Book of Common Prayer include a strong Calvinist [one
could equally say Augustinian] view of human corruption:
Original sin • • . is the fruit and corruption
of every man that naturally is engendered of the
off spring of Adam, whereby man is very far gone
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from original righteousness, and is of his own
nature inclined to evil (Article IX of The
Thirty-Nine Articles of Religion).
That statement, together with many similar ones throughout
the Articles, was produced by the Church of England at a
time when the Calvinist influence was at its peak and it
has embarrassed the more "Catholic" Anglicans for centuries.

However, there is no evidence that Samuel Johnson

paid any heed to doctrinal debates among theologians.

He

gave scant attention to the origin of human corruption;
it was the effect which concerned Johnson--the reality of
which he could observe all about him.
Yet Johnson's genuine piety saved him from merely
surrendering to the bestial in man--to exalting pure force
which characterized the views of Hobbes and Mandeville.
Johnson 1 s treatment is altogether different:
Religion informs us that misery and sin were
produced together. The depravation of human
will was followed by a disorder of the harmony
of nature; and by that providence which often
places antidotes in the neighborhood of poisons,
vice was checked by misery, lest it should swell
to universal and unlimited dominion (Idler 89,
275).
Here is no exaltation of selfishness or the ruthless
exercise of power as true virtue, no Mandevillean argument
to "make the worse appear the better cause.''

Johnson

recognizes evil as evil, not something to be glorified and
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cultivated but to be viewed with horror.

What Johnson

admired in Mandeville was his keenness of observation, his
recognition of the ubiquity of human depravity.

However,

Johnson emphatically rejected Mandeville's contention that
selfishness was the natural state of man which ought to be
cultivated at the expense of bogus altruism.
The late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries
found strong interest in intellectual circles in the
definition of man, in the extent of human depravity and
its effects on man's behavior.

For example, Archbishop

John Tillotson, whose sermons were perhaps the most
formative of eighteenth-century religious thought,7
defined human nature and the extent of man's depravity in
these terms:
So that the degeneracy of human nature is
universally acknowledged, and God acquitted from
being the cause of it: but, however, the
posterity of Adam do all partake of the weakness
contracted by his fall, and so still labour
under the miseries and inconveniences of it.
But then this degeneracy is not total. For
though our faculties be much weakened and
disordered, yet they are not destroyed, nor
7 Leslie Stephen maintains that "Tillotson [was] the
writer of the seventeenth-century who was most generally
read and admired in the eighteenth" [History of English
Thought in the Eighteenth Century, 3rd. ed. (New York:
Peter Smith, 1949), I, 77). L. E. Elliot-Binns asserts
that "just as philosophy during most of the eighteenthcentury was dominated by the influence of Locke, so
orthodox theology was especially dominated by Archbishop
Tillotson" [The Early Evangelicals (London: Methuen,
1953), 90). -

51
wholly perverted. Our natural judgment and
conscience doth still dictate to us what is
good, and what we ought to do; and the impressions of the natural law, as to the great lines
of our duty, are still legible upon our hearts.
. . . Our judgment still dictates the very same
things which the law of God doth enjoin.8
The existence and effects of original sin were not widely
disputed even by the Deists.

However, they argued that if

the ravages of the Fall have not, as Tillotson declared,
obliterated our moral sense or our recognition of duty,
then there seems little need for divine revelation to
enlighten wayward humanity.

Human reason retains a

sufficient quantity of justitia originalis, original
righteousness, to find the path to virtue and human
fulfillment.

on the other hand, the Calvinists and

Augustinians insisted that human depravity had rendered
man nonposse non peccare, as Augustine put it, unable not
to sin.

Therefore, man was incapable of finding the way

to salvation without divine assistance and revelation.9
Johnson's observations on the nature of man, as
manifested in his Sermons, reflect a via media position
between the Calvinists and the Deists.

Johnson could not

agree with the latter that human reason was sufficient to
8 Archbishop John Tillotson, Works, ed. Thomas Birch.
(London: n.p., 1820), II, 478-479.
9 For an incisive analysis of this controversy, see:
Douglas H. White, "Swift and the Definition of Man,"
Modern Philology (May 1976, Part 2), 48-55.
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iead man to a useful set of ethical beliefs.

For Johnson,

reason was an aid to right conduct; he never believed that
human nature would automatically and positively respond to
the good.

On the other hand, Johnson recognized that

man's reason was not to be despised after the manner of
Luther and Calvin but to be embraced as a help for man in
his search for happiness.
What rendered Johnson's view shocking to his friends
was its difference from the prevalent optimism which
seemed to dominate the age.

There was great faith in the

ability of human reason to conquer all obstacles and to
solve all problems in human life.

For most English

intellectuals of the eighteenth century, including most of
the Churchmen, total depravity was not the popular
doctrine.

Nor, for Johnson, was human depravity total

because that notion would eradicate man's capacity for
virtuous action.

Yet, Johnson's own experience had taught

him that most men were far more rascally and undependable
than the prevailing optimism chose to acknowledge.

It was

on the basis of that experience that he insisted on his
more pessimistic view of human nature, not on the grounds
of fidelity to theological orthodoxy.
The Apostle Paul provides the classic text for that
theologically orthodox view of man:

53

As it is written, There is none righteous, no,
not one: There is none that understandeth,
there is none that seeketh after God. They are
all gone out of the way, they are together
become unprofitable; there is none that doeth
good, no, not one. Their throat is an open
sepulchre; with their tongues they have used
deceit; the poison of asps is under their lips:
Whose mouth is full of cursing and bitterness:
Their feet are swift to shed blood: Destruction
and misery are in their ways: And the way to
peace have they not known: there is no fear of
God before their eyes . . • . For all have
sinned and come short of the glory of God
(Romans 3: 9-23).
This view is echoed by St. Augustine when he vividly
describes the great depths into which man is sunk:
From the time when our nature sinned in paradise
• • • we have all become one lump of clay, a
lump of sin (massa peccati). Since, then, by
sinning we have forfeited our merit and God's
mercy is withdrawn from us so that we sinners
are owed nothing but eternal damnation, it is
pointless for a man from this lump to reply to
God and say: "why did you make me like this? 11 10
Each member of the human race is sinful because he
possesses a tainted nature, just as every pot made from a
lump of poor quality clay will be inherently defective.
Johnson neither accepted human depravity as inevitable, requiring political adaptation, nor did he advocate
a monolithic Leviathan to regulate brutish men.

Johnson's

concern in the Sermons was religious rather than
10 De Peccato Originalii, xxxix.44, in The Theology

.Q! Original Sin, trans. Edward Yarnold, S.J. (Hales
Corners:

Clergy Book Service, 1971), 55-56.
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political; he sought to assist men in attaining salvation
in the next life by helping them enjoy the fruits of
redemption in this life.

Hobbes, on the other hand,

eschewed moral judgments and contented himself with what
he regarded as a realistic political philosophy.
Mandeville scorned conventional morality as wholly alien
to human nature and, as Johnson observed, took:
the narrowest system of morality, monastick
morality, which holds pleasure itself to be a
vice, such as eating salt with our fish, because
it makes it taste better; and he reckons wealth
as a publick benefit, which is by no means
always true. Pleasure of itself is not vice
(Life, III, 292-293).
Mandeville and Hobbes were concerned with demonstrating
that human nature is such that it must be held in check by
a strong government.

Religion was viewed as a tool of

government--a sort of opiate with which to keep mankind
subservient to the monarch.

There are, to be sure,

certain parallels between Johnson's Sermons and the ideas
of Mandeville and Hobbes.

However, it appears that Bate,

Voitle and Alken sometimes fall into the logical error of
post hoc ergo propter hoc.

The frame of reference for the

corruption and limitations of human nature is shared by
Hobbes and Mandeville with the Christian tradition;
moreover, it is not simply the frame of reference which
determines the nature of the system but the further
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extension of the argument.

To be sure, both systems of

argument tend toward an authoritative structure; however,
the one represented by Hobbes and Mandeville leads toward
governmental control and the other represented by Johnson
leads toward man's salvation.

Johnson had ample

alternatives within the classic religious tradition from
which he extended the arguments found within his Sermons.
Martin Luther, for example, developed his theological
thought within the Order of the Augustinian Friars; it is
not surprising, then, that he claimed to derive many of
his leading ideas from his patron.

Like Augustine he

painted a dark picture of the effect of original sin on
the human race.

In his famous treatise The Bondage of the

Will, he argued that every man possesses a "corruption of
nature . . . the secret, root-sin . . . which bears the
fruit of evil works and words. 11 11

This secret sin is not

an act or series of acts but a state in which man finds
himself in relation to God, neighbor and self--a state of
estrangement which leads to radical selfishness and an
effort to find life's meaning in self-sufficiency.
Individual sinful acts are merely symptoms of this basic
state of mankind.
11 Martin Luther, The Bondage of the Will, in Martin
Luther: Selections from his Writings, ed. John Dillenberger (New York: Anchor Books, 1961), 168.
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Following Luther's teaching on original sin, John
Calvin explained how the consequences of the Fall not only
deprived man of the good that was in his nature, but have
made us a source of continual sinning:
that perversity is never idle within us, but
continually engenders new fruits; namely, those
workings of the flesh that we have just described; just as a burning furnace ceaselessly
throws up flames and sparks, and as a spring
spouts its water. Wherefore those who have
defined original sin as a lack of the original
justice which ought to be in man, although in
these words they have comprehended all the
substance, still they have not sufficiently
expressed the force of it. For our nature is
not merely empty and destitute, but it is so
fecund of every kind of evil that it cannot be
inactive.12
Even one of the more liberal of the eighteenth century
divines, Samuel Clark, urged his congregation to consider
themselves creatures:
who are born in sin, and conceived in iniquity;
who are brought forth in ignorance, and grow up
in a multiplicity of errors; whose understandings are dark, wills biassed, passions strong,
affections corrupted, a~~etites inordinate,
inclinations irregular.

12 John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion,
trans. John Allen (Philadelphia: Board of Christian
Education, 1936), II, i, 8-9.
13 Sermon CXLVI, "Christians Ought to Endeavor to
Attain Perfection," 282.
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Within his Sermons, however, Johnson resorts to the
extreme language of St. Paul, St. Augustine and the
Reformers only when speaking of the heinous sin of pride-the source of all man's other imperfections.

Although

Johnson recognizes the weaknesses and limitations of man's
nature, he is still not prepared to surrender all hope for
the human race.

Johnson never joins his more pessimistic

theological predecessors in accepting the totality of
human depravity nor in denying the freedom of the human
will.
The evidence, therefore, raises serious questions as
to the validity of W. Jackson Bate's contention that "we
could extract from Johnson's writings as pessimistic a
view of the human condition as anyone ever presented"
(298).

While pessimism is certainly a salient feature of

the Johnsonian view of man, it is no more than what Louis
Landa, in his edition of Gulliver's Travels, termed "the
pessimism at the heart of Christianity" (xxii).

II

G. K. Chesterton referred to original sin as the only
doctrine of Christianity which could be empirically verified.14

Though it is doubtful that Johnson would have

14 Cited in William Hordern, ~Layman's Guide to
Protestant Theology (New York: Macmillan, 1955), 106.
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agreed that original sin is the only such doctrine, he
clearly does believe that the evidence for its truth is
widely manifest.

Johnson never appeals to either revela-

tion or tradition to support his affirmations of human
frailty and natural depravity.

If he makes any appeal at

all, it is an appeal to human experience.

For example, at

the beginning of his sermon on marriage, Johnson says
that society is necessary to the happiness of
human nature, that the gloom of solitude, and
the stillness of retirement, however they may
flatter at a distance, with pleasing views of
independence and serenity, neither extinguish
the passions, nor enlighten the understanding,
that discontent will intrude upon privacy, and
temptations follow us to the desert, every one
may be easily convinced, either by his own
experience, or that of others (Sermon 1, 3).
In Sermon 15, Johnson bases his reflections on the
shortness of life upon the firm foundation of experience:
Nothing but daily experience could make it
credible, that we should see the daily descent
into the grave of those whom we love or fear,
admire or detest; that we should see one generation past, and another passing, see possessions
daily changing their owners, and the world, at
very short intervals, altering its appearance
• • . wherever we turn our eyes, [we] find
misfortune and distress, and have our ears daily
filled with the lamentations of misery • . . to
make us remember that life is miserable (160).
Moreover, when Johnson treats such diverse subjects as
fraud in Sermon 18 and charity in Sermon 19, he grounds
his arguments on human experience:
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The desire of happiness is inseparable from a
rational being, acquainted, by experience, with
the various gradations of pain and pleasure
(Sermon 18, 194).
If we cast our eyes over the earth, and extend
our observations through the system of human
beings, what shall we find but scenes of misery
and innumerable varieties of calamity and
distress, the pains of sickness, the wounds of
casualty, the gripings of hunger, and the cold
of nakedness . . .
(Sermon 19, 207).
Johnson's understanding of original sin is based, not
on theological speculation, but on the solid foundation of
experiential reality.

As he dictated to Boswell in 1781:

With respect to original sin, the inquiry is not
necessary; for whatever is the cause of human
corruption, men are evidently and confessedly so
corrupt, that all the laws of heaven and earth
are insufficient to restrain them from crimes
(Life, IV, 123-124).
In Rambler 175, Johnson again suggests that corruption is
so apparent in human experience that it cannot be ignored;
he portrays man's nature in terms which are similar to
those we noted earlier in his sermon on marriage [Sermon

lJ.
The depravity of mankind is so easily
discoverable, that nothing but the desert or the
cell can exclude it from notice. The knowledge
of crimes intrudes uncalled and undesired. They
whom their abstraction from common occurrences
hinders from seeing iniquity, will quickly have
their attention awakened by feeling it. Even he
who ventures not into the world, may learn its
corruption in his closet. For what are the
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treatises of morality, but persuasives to the
practices of duties, for which no arguments
would be necessary, but that we have continually
been tempted to violate or neglect them? What
are all the records of history, but narratives
of successive villainies, of treasons and
usurpations, massacres and wars? (Rambler 175,
160).15
A Christian, then, need not receive his belief about the
fallen nature of man from second-hand sources.

He should

be able to infer it from his own empirical observations:
"for what can any man see, either within or without
himself, that does not afford him some reason to remark
his own ignorance, imbecillity, and meanness?"

(Sermon~,

94).

There are certain topics, however, traditionally
associated with the doctrine of original sin, which cannot
be verified experientially.

Concerning these topics,

Johnson, not surprisingly, has almost nothing to say.
Consequently, though we are to consider his belief in the
universal, innate depravity of man a version of the traditional Christian doctrine, we must also be aware that it
is a relatively spare and attenuated version, containing
only the barest essence of the doctrine as expounded by
St. Augustine and as understood by the Reformation church.
15 Samuel Johnson, The Rambler, ed. w. J. Bate and
Albrecht B. Strauss, VolS:-III-V of The Yale Edition of
the Works of Samuel Johnson (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1969). Hereafter, cited in the text by Rambler and
Page number.
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About the cause of human depravity, for instance,
Johnson's only statement seems curiously disinterested.
He says only that original sin is "the propensity to evil,
which no doubt was occasioned by the Fall"

(Life, V, 88).

Furthermore, he expresses no opinion at all about the
other subjects commonly included in expositions of the
doctrine--nothing about the transmission of Adam's sin
through generation, nothing about the nature of
concupiscence, nothing about the inheritance of Adam's
guilt as well as his corruption, nothing about the extent
of human depravity, whether partial or total.

What

reasons exist for his reticence we cannot say with
absolute certainty, though he most probably relegated
these questions to the realm of idle speculation.16

The

16 Johnson may be following a tradition in English
theology which expressed strong reservations toward those
aspects of the doctrine of original sin which stressed
feelings of self-pity and guilt more than the corrective
moral activities necessitated by man's condition. For
example, Boswell notes:
Dr. Ogden, in his second sermon "On the Articles
of the Christian Faith," with admirable
acuteness thus addresses the opposers of that
Doctrine, which accounts for confusion, sin, and
misery, which we find in this life:
"It would
be severe in God, you think, to degrade us to
such a sad state as this, for the offence of our
first parents; but you can allow him to place us
in it without any inducement. Are our calamities lessened for not being ascribed to Adam?
If your condition be unhappy, is it not still
unhappy, whatever was the occasion? with the
aggravation of this reflection, that if it was
as good as it was at first designed, there seems
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onlY conclusion we may safely draw is that the doctrine of
original sin for Johnson is not a set of complex
theological hypotheses, but an obvious and very simple
fact of daily life:

"men are evidently and confessedly so

corrupt, that all the laws of heaven and earth are
insufficient to restrain them from crimes" (Life, IV, 123124).
In addition to its indebtedness to experience and its
heavy reliance on concrete example rather than abstract
theory, Johnson's view of human nature is also distinguished from the Augustinian conception of original sin by
its lack of interest in any dimensions of the fallen state
of man that are not moral.

It is clear from Sermon

2, for

example, that the Johnsonian version of the doctrine of
original sin represents not so much a religious as an
ethical conception of the human predicament:
. . . when [God] created man, he created him for
happiness; happiness indeed dependant upon his
own choice, and to be preserved by his own
conduct • . • Reason and experience assure us
that they [physical and moral evil] continue for
the most part so closely united, that, to avoid
misery, we must avoid sin, and that while it is
in our power to be virtuous, it is in our power
to be happy (Sermon 2, 55).

to be somewhat the less reason to look for its
amendment" (Life, IV, 123; note 3).
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Johnson does not share the preoccupation of many
eighteenth century divines with a deep sense of man's
alienation or estrangement--the "Dark Night of the Soul."
He shows little concern for probing the mystery of how
evil entered the world, a world created and governed by a
God of love and righteousness.

He is not troubled by a

need to probe deeply into the nature of man to find
ontological explanations for the evil propensity so
obvious in the human species.

Johnson appears to have

attached no other meaning to sin than that given in his
Dictionary:

"an act against the laws of God, a violation

of the laws of religion."

For Johnson, original sin is

simply the inherent propensity to commit these "act[s]
against the laws of God."

Salvation, accordingly, is not

obtained merely by looking to God for forgiveness and
reconciliation but rather by an active striving to
overcome one's sinfulness, using both one's own reason and
the aids provided by religion.

Johnson's religion is more

visceral than contemplative or devotional.

Chester Chapin

makes the point more forcefully when he observes that
Johnson's
considered opinion .
is that most men are
neither greatly good nor greatly wicked.
Johnson believes, as Miss Boothby [an Evangelical friend who adhered to the Calvinist doctrine
of total depravity] does not, that most men, by
an effort of will or 'reasoning' may become, if
not virtuous, at least more virtuous than they
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are . . . And so, for Johnson, the natural man
is not utterly helpless, utterly depraved.17
It is this divergence from the classical Protestant
tradition that no doubt prompted Jean Hagstrum to assert
that Johnson "seems not to have accepted fully or perhaps
even to have understood the doctrine of original sin or
total depravity in its extremer forms. 11 18

III
Samuel Johnson's reticence to speculate on the causes
and the extent of natural depravity allowed him to confine
his homiletic writing to the entirely appropriate subject
of man's present condition.

The vacuity of life is a

favorite observation of Johnson on man's present circumstances; his basic metaphor for human experience is the
empty receptacle which cannot tolerate its own emptiness .19

In the funeral sermon for his wife, Johnson used

17 The Religious Thought of Samuel Johnson
Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 1968), 62.

(Ann

18 Jean Hagstrum, Samuel Johnson's Literary Criticism
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), 69.
19 Arieh Sachs, in Passionate Intelligence:
Imagination and Reason in the Work of Samuel Johnson
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967),
perceptively notes the fundamental position which the
vacuity of life held in Johnson's writings.
Sachs
observes that
where the vacuity of life is not the explicit
theme of his writings or conversation, it is
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this metaphor to describe the effects which the death of a
ioved one has on even "the best minds":
the whole mind becomes a gloomy vacuity, without
any image or form of pleasure, a chaos of
confused wishes, directed to no particular end,
or to that which, while we wish, we cannot hope
to obtain (Sermon 25, 267).
The mind is powerfully dissatisfied with emptiness, but
its endeavors for filling itself cannot be successful
precisely because human nature is inherently frail and
imperfect as a result of original sin.

When he analyzes

man's insatiable desire for happiness in Sermon 14,
Johnson's underlying assumption is, once again, this sense
of the vacuity of life:
that almost every man is disappointed in his
search after happiness is apparent from the
clamorous complaints which are always to be
heard; from the restless discontent, which is
hourly to be observed, and from the incessant
pursuit of new objects, which employ almost
every moment of every man's life. For a desire
of change is a sufficient proof, that we are
dissatisfied with our present state • . • . It
will easily appear, that men fail to gain what
they so much desire, because they seek it where
it is not to be found, because they suffer
themselves to be dazzled by specious appearances, resign themselves up to the direction of
present as the underlying assumption and
constantly shows up in the imagery. All human
activity is seen as a futile attempt to fill an
aching inner void, an incessant and hopeless
search for 'novelty' and 'diversity' with which
to feed the hunger of the mind (5).
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their passions, and, when one pursuit has failed
of affording them that satisfaction which they
expected from it, apply themselves with the same
ardour to another equally unprofitable, and
waste their lives in successive delusions • . .
and in attempts to grasp a bubble, which . . .
is neither solid nor lasting (Sermon 14, 149150).
The fact is that nothing ensures discontent as certainly
as the active pursuit of contentment.

Courting merriment

will leave one mirthless; the search for happiness will
always end in unhappiness.

Yet all men, Johnson asserts

in sermon 14, seek happiness and, when they think that
they have found it, are only too willing to conceal from
themselves their dissatisfaction with their hard-won
"joy. "
The Johnsonian axiom that the human condition can be
defined by the vacuity of its experiences suggests that
life in his view is basically stagnant, but Johnson always
coupled this observation with an insistent stress on the
activity of the human will.

His understanding of this

human dilemma is extremely close to the classical
religious view of concupiscence which sees human nature
hungering insatiably for money, power, fame or sexual
pleasure.

None of them satisfy completely.

They only

make man more aware of his emptiness and lack of
fulfillment.

However, Johnson always coupled his

observations about the vacuity of the human condition with

67
an insistent emphasis on the activity of the human will.20
He believed that this faculty could best be described as
an innate hunger inextricably fixed in man's nature; its
constant seeking of objects for satisfaction could never
be satisfied.

Moreover, he viewed this desire as really a

spiritual hunger, only accidentally and unsatisfactorily
seeking vacuous earthly satisfactions.

These facts

explain why Johnson's solution is to redirect and regulate
the desire of the will rather than try to eliminate it.
In Johnson's view, the will can be completely satisfied
only when it is redirected to seek God.

Since his notion

of man's will is much closer to the traditional concept of
this faculty than to that of many of his contemporaries,
it would be good to examine some of these parallels.
According to a tradition that has its roots in both
Biblical and classical thinking, man is seen as a creature
dissatisfied with his immediate circumstances; he remains
so regardless of what he does to change or improve his
condition.

Man's nature is desirous but insatiable:

"all

the rivers run into the sea, yet the sea is not full, for
20 The paradox of the vacuity of human experience and
the insatiable activity of the will provides a fundamental
tension which inspires much of Johnson's secular and
religious writings. For example, it is discussed in
Rambler 2, 11-14, 6, 31-35, 8, 41, 16, 86-91, 41, 221, 66,
351-353,-85, 85-87~ 114, 243~247, 127, 315, 152; 44, 207";
310; it iS-implicit in The Vision of Theodore:-The VanI'ty
21 Human Wishes, and Rasselas; and it is made explicit in
all of his Sermons.
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the eye is not satisfied with seeing, nor the ear filled
with hearing"

(Ecclesiastes 1: 7-8).

The wise Solomon

wrote that the eyes of man are as insatiable as the fires
of hell (Proverbs 27: 20).

The problem is not entirely

man's inability to fulfill his wishes, even though this is
a crucial issue in understanding and regulating behavior,
because "the desires of mankind are much more numerous
than their attainments" (Rambler 104, 191; and Rasselas,

XLIV).
However, an even more serious problem--more serious
because of the futility implied in human endeavor--is that
achieved desires or realized goals do not bring happiness
or contentment:
He that succeeds in his first attempts is
animated to new designs; new designs produce new
anxieties and new opposition; and though the
second attempt should be equally happy, it will
be found, as soon as the transports of novelty
have ceased, as soon as custom made elevation
familiar, that peace is yet to sought, and that
new measures must be taken for the attainment of
that tranquillity, for which it is the nature of
man to languish, and the want of which, is ill
supplied by hurry and confusion, by pomp and
variety (Sermon l_!, 152).
This is an important point because its consequence is that
the happiness of an individual is not promoted by increasing acquisitions or fulfilling desires.

In his Sermons,

Johnson concentrated his efforts on the desire--the power
of the will--itself, rather than on its objects.

For
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example, Sermon 12 echoes the wisdom of the preacher in
Ecclesiastes:
all human actions terminate in vanity, and all
human hopes will end in vexation, is a position,
from which nature with-holds our credulity, and
which our fondness for the present life, and
worldly enjoyments, disposes us to doubt;
however forcibly it may be urged upon us, by
reason or experience • • • . Everyone wants
something to happiness, and when he had gained
what he first wanted, he wants something else;
he wears out life in efforts and pursuits, and
perhaps dies, regretting that he must leave the
world, when he is about to enjoy it . . . . So
great is our interest . . . to believe ourselves
able to procure our own happiness, that experience never convinces us of our impotence-. . . But surely we may be content to credit the
general voice of mankind . . • that if happiness
had been to be found, some would have found it,
and that it is vain to search longer for what
all have missed (Sermon 12, 127).
Sermon 12 reflects the Johnsonian axiom that human nature
is defined by the vacuity and boredom which results from
the incompatibility between the will's infinite desires
and the futile quality of the experience available to it
in this elusive temporality of life [cf. Rasselas].

The

expectation of any kind of permanent contentment or
happiness, then, is mocked by life itself:

whether we

strive for power, fame, wealth, wisdom, social achievement, perfection, or even attention, we do so only to be
happy and at peace with ourselves.

Yet the chasm between

expectation and result, promise and performance, hope and
reality, can never be bridged by human endeavor.

It is
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man's refusal to confess this fact that leads to his
ultimate frustration.
Aristotle described the soul as the center of desire.
He recognized that this desire was not necessarily for
things--f or the satisfaction of physical wants by physical
objects--but rather that the need was for satisfaction
itself [for pleasure, for happiness].

Aristotle main-

tained that this need was made inevitable because of the
construction of the soul:
If [the soul] has sensation, it must also have
imagination and appetite; for, where sensation
is, there is also pain and pleasure, and where
these are there must also be desire . . . . For
appetite consists of desire, inclination, and
wish . . . . and that which has sensation knows
pleasure and pain, the pleasant and the painful,
and that which knows these has also desire; for
desire is an appetite for what is pleasant.21
Rasselas' conclusion about his discontent hints at this
idea, as the prince suggests to himself either that man
has some non-animal sense not gratified by the Happy
Valley or that "he has some desires distinct from sense
which must be satisfied before he can be happy" [emphasis
21 Aristotle, Aristotle on the Soul, in Aristotle on

~ Soul, Parva Naturalia, On""""Breath-:---tr'ans. W. S. Hett---

(Cambridge:
77-81.

Harvard University Press, 1936), 413b-414b,
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mine].22

In Sermons l, &, 12, 14,

12., 16, and 18, Johnson

explores this notion of "desires distinct from sense" as
he describes man's futile pursuit after perfect peace.
And yet, though man recognizes the impossibility of
achieving perfect peace in any task he undertakes, he
strives for it anyway, and he never fails to be bitterly
disappointed when he falls short of this unrealistic goal:
He that succeeds in his first attempts is
animated to new designs; new designs produce new
anxieties and new opposition; and though the
second attempt should be equally happy, it will
be found, as soon as the transports of novelty
have ceased, as soon as custom has made elevation familiar, that peace is yet to be sought,
and that new measures must be taken for the
attainment of that tranquillity, for which it is
the nature of man to languish (Sermon 14, 152).
Perfect peace is clearly beyond the reach of imperfect
man; hence, Johnson urges man to redirect this desire by
placing complete trust only in God's perfect will.
Moreover, in his admonitions against such dangers to the
practice of religion as hardness of heart in Sermon 3 and
vanity in Sermon 12, Johnson again appeals to this concept
of "desires distinct from sense."

He insists that man can

begin the process of self-reformation by fixing his desire
solely on heaven:
22 Samuel Johnson, Rasselas, in Samuel Johnson: The
Oxford Authors, ed. Donald Greene (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 339. Hereafter cited in the text as
Rasselas.
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He is happy that carries about with him in the
world the temper of the cloister . . . who can
manage the business of life, with such indifference, as may shut out from his heart all incitements to fraud or injustice; who can partake
the pleasures of sense with temperance . . •
and, among all the vicissitudes of good and
evil, have his heart fixed only where true joys
are to be found (Sermon l, 33-34).
When the present state of man is considered,
when an estimate is made of his hopes, his
pleasures, and his possessions; when his hopes
appear to be deceitful, his labours ineffectual,
his pleasures unsatisfactory, and his possessions fugitive, it is natural to wish for an
abiding city, for a state more constant and
permanent, of which the objects may be more
proportioned to our wishes, and the enjoyments
to our capacities (Sermon 1£, 135).
Johnson would have come across a similar idea to the
notion of "desires distinct from sense" in Robert Burton's
Anatomy of Melancholy, a book he admired and quoted often.
Burton also recognized that desire seemed to rise as a
character independent of the needs or physical objects
that it sought, and that it was thus capable of wide
extension and rapid switching from one more or less arbitrary object to another without producing any kind of
satisfaction or happiness.

Burton saw in desire an almost

manic quality and he knew how little calculation or
deliberation was required to set it intensely onto an
object.

The resulting pain of unfulfillment Burton called

melancholy:
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A true saying it is, 'Desire hath no rest,' is
infinite in itself, endless, and as one calls
it, 'a perpetual rack, or horse mill . • . ' 'It
extends itself to everything,' as Guianerios
will have it, 'that is superfluously sought
after'; or to any 'fervent desire,' as Fernelius
interprets it; be it in what kind soever, it
tortures if immoderate, and is (according to
Plater and others) an especial cause of melancholy . . . . Austin confessed, that he was torn
a-pieces with his manifold desires: and so doth
Bernard complain that he could not rest from
them a minute, an hour:
'this I would have, and
that, and then I desire to be such and such'
(II.i.3.11).
The intensity of desire and the severity of the melancholy
resulting from the frustrating lack of satisfaction even
when each thing desired is obtained are two important
aspects of Burton's discussion which Johnson shared.
In his Dictionary, Johnson had carefully defined
desire

as "wish; eagerness to obtain or enjoy," implying

perhaps that the eagerness to enjoy might exist initially
apart from an eagerness to enjoy some thing.

Desire as a

verb is defined as "to wish" (rather than "to wish for"),
and under wish Johnson discriminates between the faculty
and the object in defining the noun in definition one as
"Longing desire" and in definition two as "Thing desired."
The example he gives from Dryden under desire shows at
least that desire is somewhat detached from expected
gratification:

"Desire's the vast extent of human mind; I

It mounts above, and leaves poor hope behind."

Johnson

also cites an example of the use of desire from Locke's
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!ssay Concerning Human Understanding:

"Desire is the

uneasiness a man finds in himself upon the absence of any
thing."

This example shows the beginning of a movement

away from tradition and toward a connection of desire to
objects, making desire a result of other operations
triggered by sensory stimuli.

Locke's view, however, is

much more complicated than this brief quotation reveals.23
Elsewhere in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke defines desire as "an uneasiness of the mind
for want of some absent good" (II.xxi,31).

His choice of

the term uneasiness--a term which by itself crosses the
barrier between the physical and the psychological--allows
him to move toward a near merging of the sensuous and the
intellectual in the fulfillment of desire, because pain
and pleasure are at once both physical and psychic:
All pain of the body, of what sort soever, and
disquiet of the mind, is uneasiness: and with
this is always joined desire, equal to the pain
or uneasiness felt; and is scarce distinguishable from it. For desire being nothing but an
uneasiness in the want of any good, in reference
to any pain felt, ease is that absent good; and
till that ease be attained, we may call it
23 The similarity between Johnson's views and Locke's
Philosophy has been examined in several studies. For
example, see: Jean Hagstrum, Samuel Johnson's Literary
Criticism, Chapter I; Donald Greene, The Politics of
Samuel Johnson (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960),
76-80, 244-46; Paul Alken, Samuel Johnson and Moral
Discipline, Chapter III and especially pages-90-100;
Wilbur Samuel Howell, "John Locke and the New Rhetoric,"
Q..uarterly Journal of Speech, 53 (1967}, 319-333.
.
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desire . . . . Besides this desire of ease from
pain, there is another of absent positive good.
. . • A.s much as we desire any absent good, so
much are we in pain for it . . . . But so much as
there is anywhere of desire, so much is of
uneasiness (II.xxi.31).
The easing of mental or physical pains (which is to say,
the fulfillment of desires) results in "pleasure" which
Locke traces to "happiness," when the pleasure is "produced in us by the operation of certain objects, either on
our minds or our bodies . • . '' (II.xxi.43).

That is, the

ultimate source of desire and the eventual recipient of
its actions is a purely psychological state:

happiness.

If it be further asked,--What is it moves
desire? I answer,--happiness, and that alone.
Happiness and misery are the names of two
extremes, the utmost bounds whereof we know not.
. . . but of some degrees of both we have very
lively impressions; made by several instances of
delight and joy on the one side, and torment and
sorrow on the other; which, for shortness' sake,
I shall comprehend under the names of pleasure
and pain; there being pleasure and pain of the
mind as well as the body • • . • Or, to speak
truly, they are all of the mind; though some
have their rise in the mind from thought, others
in the body from certain modifications of motion
[emphasis mine] (II.xxi.42).
Happiness, "the utmost pleasure we are capable of"
(II.xxi.43), keeps us desiring even when previous desires
have been obtained.

Seged, lord of Ethiopia, seems to

enact this idea when he dreams of and pursues ten days of
perfect happiness (Rambler 204 and 205), even though he
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describes himself in terms which would seem to represent
the culmination of all the hopes and ambitions of a ruler
(Rambler 204, 296).

He does this, Locke would say,

because there are "infinite degrees of happiness which are
not in our possession" (II.xxi.45) and because the
unregulated mind will always suffer when it allows itself
to desire an unlimited amount of some satisfaction before
it will be content.

This explains in part why possession

of a thing desired is often followed by disgust (Rambler
207; sermons .§., 12, 14, 15, 16, and 18).
But the desires for security, peace or happiness did
not provide Johnson with a completely satisfactory
explanation for the insatiable craving of man's will
because he knew that total fulfillment in this life was
impossible.

The explanation that appeared to fit was one

that transcended the physical and even the psychological
realms of human existence.

The Biblical tradition had

long recognized that human desire was really a spiritual
hunger:
As a hart longs for flowing streams, so longs my
soul for thee, o God. My soul thirsts for God,
for the living God (Psalm 42: 1-2).
Man's desire is really the soul's hunger for union with
its Creator; it is displaced when it fixes upon earthly
objects:
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The Lord is my shepherd, I shall not want;
he makes me lie down in green pastures.
He leads me beside still waters; he restores my
soul . . . . Even though I walk through the
valley of the shadow of death, I fear no evil;
for thou are with me; thy rod and thy staff,
they comfort me (Psalm 23: 1-4).
The Lord drew me up from the desolate pit, out
of the miry bog, and set my feet upon a rock,
making my steps secure . . . . Blessed is the man
who makes the Lord his trust, who does not turn
to the proud, to those who go astray after false
gods! (Psalm 40: 2-4).
Following this tradition, Johnson's Sermons acknowledge
the spiritual benefits that can accrue to man when his
desire is properly regulated and directed:
. . . it is natural to wish for an abiding city,
for a state more constant and permanent, of
which the objects may be more proportioned to
our wishes, and the enjoyments to our capacities
(Sermon 1£, 135).
The man who has accustomed himself to consider
that he is always in the presence of the Supreme
Being . • • easily withstands those temptations
which find a ready passage into the mind not
guarded and secured by this awful sense of the
Divine Presence (Sermon 1§., 174).
The knowledge that man's nature has a "capacity which our
present state is not able to fill" permits Johnson not
only to conclude that there is a "better mode of existence, which shall furnish employment for the whole soul,
and where pleasure shall be adequate to our powers of
fruition" (Idler 37, 117, and Sermons l, 33;

&,

63; 12,
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135; 16, 174), but it keeps him from exhibiting a naive

surprise at the incorrigible restlessness of human nature.
He declares that there is nothing unusual in the claim
that "all our gratifications are volatile, vagrant, and
easily dissipated."

Such a fact needed no proof, because

all admitted it in their own behavior:
It is, indeed, not necessary to shew by many
instances what all mankind confess, by an incessant call for variety, and restless pursuit of
enjoyments, which they value only because unpossessed (Rambler 78, 46).
Man, in his present state • . . has his mind
perpetually employed, in defence, or in
acquisition, in securing that which he has, or
attaining that which, he believes, he either
does, or shall, want.
He that desires happiness must necessarily
desire the means of happiness, must wish to
appropriate, and accumulate, whatever may
satisfy his desires. It is not sufficient to be
without want. He will try to place himself
beyond the fear of want; and endeavour to
provide future gratifications for future wishes,
and lay up in store future provisions for future
necessities (Sermon 18, 194).
Johnson is careful to teach that desire exists apart
from the things eventually desired.

This innate power of

the human will exists autonomously--hungering for anything
and everything insatiably--and it will fix upon almost any
object.

Consequently, the objects it is directed toward

can often be the result of choice or calculation.

This

conclusion is important and remarkable because Johnson was
quite unusual in recognizing that the thing desired is not
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the real stimulus for desire and that the objects of
desire could be controlled to a large degree by man's free
will.24

The implications of this position for moral

activity are very great--man can make choices about both
his wants and his pursuits, and with proper knowledge and
sufficient power, can change the objects of his desire and
pursuit from bad ones to good or from less good to better.
He is not chained by destiny to evil, misery, or failure;
he has the capacity to escape from his vacuous existence.
Johnson's astute focus on the process of desiring
itself allowed him to steadfastly defend the liberty of
man's will.

On hearing the freedom of man's will being

questioned on one occasion, Johnson exclaimed:

"All

theory is against the freedom of the will; all experience
for it!" (Life, III, 291).

For Johnson, if theory and

experience conflict, it is theory which must give way; the
fact that men act as though they are free agents is a
sufficient answer to all theoretical objections.

In

particular, Johnson found troublesome the conclusions
concerning free will which had been popularized through
24 This perceptive distinction within Johnsonian
thought was noted by Bate (The Achievement of Samuel
Johnson, 68-69).
~-
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the preaching and writing of Luther, Calvin, and their
followers.25

For example, in The Bondage of the Will,

25 Luther and Calvin, by denying the freedom of the
will, put man under a necessity of sinning; man was thus
deprived of moral responsibility for his actions. Johnson
was not the first to attack the pernicious effect of such
a theory on Christianity. As early as 1655, Jeremy
Taylor, in Unum Necessarium, attacked the Calvinist
position as
a destruction of all laws. It takes away
reward and punishment, and we have nothing
whereby we can serve God. And precepts of
holiness might as well be preached to a
wolf as to a man, if man were naturally and
inevitably wicked • . . . There would be no
use of reason or of discourse, no deliberation or counsel; and it were impossible for
the wit of man to make sense of thousands
of places of Scripture which speak to us if
we could hear and obey, or could refuse [In
Anglicanism: The Thought and Practice of
the Church of England, Illustrated from the
Religious Literature of the Seventeenth
Century, ed. Paul E. More and Frank L.
Cross (1935; rpt. London: S.P.C.K.,
1962), 650].
Samuel Clarke also argued that man was sufficiently
free to be morally responsible for his actions. For
example, in Sermon .JJ., Clarke wrote that
God . . • has not made us necessarily
wicked; he had made us, subject and liable
to temptation, but not of necessity slaves
to sin. That we are capable of corrupting
ourselves, is indeed the consequence of
that nature which God has given us; but all
actual corruptions, are the effects of our
free choice [Sermons on Several Subjects,
VII, 234-235].
Like Jeremy Taylor and Samuel Clarke, there is no
idea more characteristic of Johnson's religious position
than the notion that man is morally responsible for his
behavior. Johnson's exposure to the writings of Calvin,
Taylor, and Clarke can be demonstrated from Christie's
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Luther had insisted that human depravity is so extensive
as to exclude any notion of free will:
So, if we believe that Satan is the prince of
this world, ever ensnaring and opposing the
Kingdom of Christ with all his strength, and
that he does not let his prisoners go unless he
is driven out by the power of the Divine Spirit,
it is again apparent that there can be no free
will [emphasis mine] (203).
John Calvin follows Luther in stressing that man, while in
his separated state, can do nothing to overcome his inherited sinfulness; man is helpless, utterly corrupt, and
in bondage to sin.

In his Institutes of the Christian Re-

ligion, Calvin argues that
Since the Fall, it is certain that man has had
no free will to do good. . . . Man is now
destitute of free will and miserably subjected
to every evil . . . • [Man] is a slave to sin,
the meaning of which is that his spirit is so
wholly alienated from the righteousness of God
that he neither knows, desires, nor undertakes
anything that is not wicked, perverse, iniquitous and defiled [emphasis mine] (II.ii.5-6).
Johnson vigorously objected to such ideas:

"In

examining what part of our present misery is to be imputed
to God," he says, "we must carefully distinguish that
sale catalogue for Johnson's personal library. For
example, the works of Calvin are listed as entries 115 and
118; the works of Jeremy Taylor are listed as entries 213,
351, and 477; and the works of Samuel Clarke are listed as
entries 242 and 251.
[Christie, ~ Catalogue of the
Valuable Library of Books, of the late learned Samuel
Johnson (London: Mr. Christie, 1785].
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which is actually appointed by him, from that which is
only permitted, or that which is the consequence of
something done by ourselves," without his direction
(Sermon

2,

56).

Based on his experience of human nature,

Johnson argued further in Sermon

2

that self-improvement

is possible for man only because freedom of the will does
exist.

Johnson 1 s consistent opposition to the concept of

determinism is perhaps best summarized in his response to
the idea of a ruling passion.

In the Life of Pope, he

calls Pope's presentation of the doctrine ''pernicious as
well as false" because it at once preached submission to
irrational behavioral forces and the indulgence of
appetite:
. . . its tendency is to produce the belief of a
kind of moral predestination, or overruling
principle which cannot be resisted: he that
admits it, is prepared to comply with every
desire that caprice or opportunity shall excite,
and to flatter himself that he submits only to
the lawful dominion of Nature, in obeying the
resistless authority of his ruling Passion (Life
of Pope, 357).
Johnson's belief in free will was based in part on
his recognition that men often project the blame for their
problems onto other people or circumstances, refusing to
see the cause in their own natures.

For example, Johnson

says of Cowley, who thought that travelling would
alleviate his unhappiness, that

11

he never suspected that
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the cause of his unhappiness was within, that his own
passions were not sufficiently regulated"

(Rambler~,

35).

Because of pride, "the general source of our infelicity"
57), we refuse to blame ourselves for our

(Sermon~,

discontent--"Vanity inclines us to find faults anywhere
rather than in ourselves" (Idler 70, 218)--because "we are
all naturally credulous in our own favour" (Adventurer 74,
219).

The word naturally here is the key.

Humans are

proud by their very nature and, apart from the light and
power of religion, they will refuse to see themselves as
their own main problem.

We are "unwilling to believe

anything to our own disadvantage" (Adventurer 108, 448)
Johnson notes, and frequently we are "unwilling to be
taught" (Rambler

~,

14) anything new.

"Advice has no

force to suppress • . . vanity" (Rambler 155, 61-62), so
that reason by itself cannot cast off the daring desires
and behaviors which lead to unhappiness.
Free will, then, is the basis for Johnson's belief in
the possibility of moral and physical improvement for
man's present state.

In

Sermon~,

for example, Johnson

argues that men are reasoning creatures and not
automatons:
If we examine all the afflictions of mind, body,
and estate . . . we shall find God not otherwise
accessary to them, than as he works no miracles
to prevent them, as he suffers men to be masters
of themselves, and restrains them only by
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coercions applied to their reason. If God
should, by a particular exertion of his omnipotence, hinder murder or oppression, no man could
then be a murderer or an oppressor, because he
would be with-held from it by an irresistible
power; but then that power, which prevented
crimes, would destroy virtue; for virtue is the
consequence of choice. Men would be no longer-rational, or would be rational to no purpose,
because their actions would not be the result of
free-will, determined by moral motives; but the
settled and predestined motions of a machine
impelled by necessity [emphasis mine] (Sermon 5,
56).
God created man for happiness, "happiness indeed dependant
upon his [man's] own choice, and to be preserved by his
own conduct" (Sermon .2_, 55).

Man need not submit help-

lessly to fate "like a machine impelled by necessity"
(Sermon .2_, 56).
Furthermore, Boswell records several conversations in
which Johnson defends man's free will.

For example,

speaking on the question of atheism, when the supposition
of an eternal necessity without design, without a
governing mind, was discussed, Johnson counters the idea
with the "all-powerful intelligence" which creates men
having freedom of choice.

Thus, Johnson again rejects the

notion of human nature being a "machine impelled by
necessity" (Sermon .2_, 56) in this discussion with Boswell
(~,

v,

47-48).

On a later occasion, Boswell again returned to the
topic of free will, and was finally won over by Johnson.
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Here, Johnson clearly states the position for Boswell
which he had previously outlined in Sermon 5:
Moral evil is occasioned by free will, which
implies choice between good and evil. With all
the evil that there is, there is no man but
would rather be a free agent than a mere machine
without evil; and what is best for each individual may be best for the whole.
If a man
would rather be the machine, I cannot argue with
him. He is a different being from me (Life, v,
117).26
Johnson, then, stoutly asserted the freedom of man's will
in his Sermons, his secular writing,27 and his conversations.

According to Miss Reynolds,
There was nothing Dr. Johnson used to say of
which he was so certain as of the freedom of his
will, and no man, I believe, was ever more
attentive to preserve its rectitude • • . in
conformity with his religious tenets respecting
original sin (Johnsonian Miscellanies, II, 256).

By considering the will as a fundamental principle of
human nature, Samuel Johnson departed from much current
psychological theory, which included the desire or hunger
of the will as just one of a list of passions, either
26 Boswell records several other occasions when
Johnson spoke in defense of man's free will.
Perhaps the
most famous remark is:
"Sir, we know our will is free,
and there's an end on't" (Life, I~2).
27 See Rambler 43, 234-235; Rambler 113, 239; and
Idler 11, 37-39, for-additional evidence of Johnson's
belief--:that freedom of the will implies that man exercise
Personal responsibility for his moral improvement.
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direct (arising inunediately from objects or sensations) or
derivative (arising from other passions in conjunction
with objects and sensations).

Locke had listed love,

hatred, desire, joy, sorrow, hope, fear, despair, anger,
and envy as the passions (Essay, II.xx.1-13), while Hume's
list included desire, aversion, grief, joy, hope, fear,
despair, and security.28

Such rankings certainly take the

focus off desire as the single passion in need of careful
attention and regulation, and they leave singular
Johnson's view that "to subdue passion, and regulate
desire, is the great task of man, as a moral agent"
(Sermon~'

193).

Johnson's view, then, is that the power of man's will
to desire is a very powerful faculty existing apart from
outer stimuli; it cannot be suppressed, but it can be
regulated by a conscious selection of objects (Rambler 49,
266).

Since its essence is a spiritual hunger, it cannot

be satisfied by any quantitative worldly acquisition:
gratifying appetites only increases their demands (Rambler
38, 208), "our desires always increase with our possessions" (Adventurer 67, 387), and we "create wants as fast
as they are satisfied" (Adventurer 119, 462).

The power

of the human will can be satisfied only when it is
28 David Hurne, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A.
Selby-Bigge (Oxford:- Clarendon-Press, 1888), 277.
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properly directed to "wish for an abiding city, for a
state more constant and permanent, of which the objects
maY be more proportioned to our wishes, and the enjoyments
to our capacities" (Sermon .J:.l, 135).

Meanwhile, the task

of the sermon writer is not only to remind man of this, so
that man will cease the endless and futile pursuit of
every idle wish and irrational craving, but also to
instruct men, as personally responsible moral agents,
regarding their duty to direct and regulate desire to its
proper end.

It is notable that Johnson's pragmatic view

of human desire is different from that of many of the
theorists we have examined both in its nature and
importance.

Johnson was not content to rest his

observations on the nature of man with no more than a
theory of the will; he wanted to apply his ideas to the
improvement of the human condition--to reduce the miseries
caused by man's erroneous desires and pursuits, and to
warn men of the dangers of expecting their innate
faculties to lead them to perfect happiness in their
present state.

IV
In Johnson's understanding of human motivation, the
powers of the will and the imagination are viewed as
complementary drives.

The imagination is often the
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dangerously creative and delusive faculty of human nature
which invents objects or goals, real or unreal, possible
or impossible, for the power of the will--man's desire--to
fix upon.

Imagination in Johnsonian thought is ultimately

that power in man which blinds him to the limitations of
his nature.

When unregulated it is the cause of much of

man's unhappiness, extending his desires far beyond his
ability to obtain them, always promising happiness but
always disappointing the fulfillment.

However, the

imagination is not inherently "bad"; it is capable, with
the right direction, of benefiting man by acting
creatively rather than destructively.

Thus, it follows

that, as with man's will, Johnson does not propose to
suppress or eliminate the imagination; he seeks rather to
regulate and redirect it.
Some difficulty arises in attempting to define the
imagination for Johnson because he uses the term in
several different and not always interrelated senses-showing, to begin with, the complexity of the concept, and
to some extent, perhaps, the imprecision of identifying
similar processes with one name.

Raymond D. Havens gives

six senses in which Johnson uses the word imagination,
ranging from the source of literary creation to an agent
Which not only distorts the real world, but which can
Produce non-existent things for the mind to dwell on and
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wish to be rea1.29

Havens calls the imagination in this

latter sense a "power of conceiving what is unusual, what
is outside his experience, and perhaps improbable or
impossible" (245).

While the kind of imagination we are

concerned with derives from this idea, it is not just the
"power of conceiving" something new, unusual, or unreal
that gave Johnson his great distrust of the imagination,
but the power that faculty has to impose itself and its
creations upon the mind in the guise of truth or reality,
and the power to disturb man's faculty of the will.

Thus,

even though Johnson does believe that it has a certain,
though relatively small, constructive role, so often
harmful are the workings of an uncontrolled or overindulged imagination that he almost always focuses on its
negative powers.
Johnson had reason to fear the imagination--a fear
born of his own experience.

As he left Oxford, he fell

into a state of terrible depression against which all his
efforts at rational analysis and self-management seemed
futile.

He wallowed in guilt and self reproach; he

doubted his own sanity and entertained thoughts of
suicide:

29 Raymond D. Havens, "Johnson's Distrust of the
Imagination," English Literary History, 10 (1943), 243255.
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It may at first seem ironic that Johnson, who
was to figure in literary history as the supreme
exponent and symbol of practical common sense,
of unremitting grip on concrete reality, should
have begun his adult life in fear for his sanity
(Bate, Samuel Johnson, 116).
However, it was precisely his long and harrowing battle
with his own demonic imagination which turned him toward
the real world and away from those shadows which lured him
towards self-destruction.

So, although Johnson found

creative potential in the imagination, he also feared it
and never departed from his firm belief that it must be
held in control.
Johnson's Dictionary definitions and examples are
especially revealing here because they almost all show or
imply some uneasiness about or some suspect feeling toward
the imaginative faculty.

He defines imagination as

"fancy; the power of forming ideal pictures; the power of
representing things absent to one's self or others."

One

function of the imagination, then, is creating things
which do not exist--"ideal pictures."

Johnson's first

example, taken from Bacon, is a morally neutral one:
Imagination I understand to be the representation of an individual thought.
Imagination is
of three kinds: joined with belief of that which
is past; and of things present, or as if they
were present:
for I comprehend in this imagination feigned and at pleasure, as if one should
imagine such a man to be in the vestments of a
pope, or to have wings.
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The next example he offers, this time from Pope, is much
more disturbing because of imagination's power to alter or
destroy the memory of the real:

"Where beams of warm

imagination play, I The memory's soft figures melt away."
A second definition Johnson gives is "conception; image in
the mind; idea," and the examples, like this one from King
~,

imply a less-than-trustworthy faculty:
Better were I distract,
so should my thoughts be sever'd from my
griefs;
And woes, by wrong imaginations, lose
The knowledge of themselves.

The final definition is even more sinister:

"contrivance;

scheme," and the example is from Lamentations 3: 60:
"Thou hast seen all their vengeance and all their
imaginations against me."
As with the faculty of man's will, the belief that
the imagination posed certain hazards to rational man goes
back to antiquity.

Since the classical view of the

imagination is quite similar to Johnson's understanding in
several respects, it is worth examining these parallels
briefly as a means of clarification.

Donald F. Bond has

made clear that the imagination was distrusted in
classical thought because of its attractive and disturbing
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power.30

Both the Platonic and Stoic philosophers were

suspicious of the imagination, the Platonic philosophers
because of "its deceptive qualities and its inability to
attain to abstract truth" and the Stoics because it had
"the power of stirring up the passions to revolt" (58).
Marcus Aurelius, for example, repeatedly insists on
controlling imagination by a careful and continuous
examination of its products.

He writes:

Never allow yourself to be swept off your feet
when an impulse stirs, see first that it will
meet the claims of justice; when an impression
forms, assure yourself first of its certainty .
. . . Do away with all fancies.
Cease to be
passion's puppet . . . . Learn to recognize every
experience for what it is . . . . Erasing all
fancies, keep on saying to yourself . . . 'it
lies with me to perceive all things in their
true light, and to deal with each of them as it
merits. 1 31
One of the most significant pre-eighteenth-century
accounts of the imagination comes in Burton's Anatomy of
Melancholy.
Imagination,"

In the section of this work on "The Force of
Burton discusses the conditions which can

arise in those whose reasons are not capable of regulating
the imagination.

Of such people he says, "How many

30 Donald F. Bond, "'Distrust' of Imagination in
English Neoclassicism," Philological Quarterly, 14
(1935), 54-69.
31 Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, trans. Maxwell
Staniforth (Baltimore:
Penguin Books, 1964), IV.22VIII.29.
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chimeras, antics, golden mountains, and castles in the air
do they build unto themselves'' (I.ii.3.2).

Some are led

into "all vices" by a "false and corrupt imagination,"
many suffer from hysterical and psychosomatic complaints
as well as real diseases through imagination's power, and
sometimes the imagination can cause even death itself.
Burton's picture is extremely disturbing:
So that I may certainly conclude this strong
conceit or imagination is astrum hominis [man's
guiding star], and the rudder of this our ship,
which reason should steer, but, overborne by
phantasy, cannot manage, and so suffers itself
and this whole vessel of ours to be overruled,
and often overturned (I.ii.3.2).
Throughout his Sermons, Samuel Johnson recognized two
principal characteristics of the imagination which reflect
his appreciation and development of this classical
heritage.

The first was that our self-deception is not

entirely a product of a powerful imagination overthrowing
the will.

We are overpowered only part of the time; often

we willingly deceive ourselves, and encourage extensive
delusions because they are so pleasing.

Imlac discusses

this at length in the chapter of Rasselas on the
"Dangerous Prevalence of Imagination," where he says that
a man will begin by indulging the power of fiction, grow
to amuse "his desires with impossible enjoyments," and
finally confirm the reign of imagination (Chapter XLIV).
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Johnson emphasizes the willing credulity men allow to
their imaginations; the imposition of imagination upon us
is a welcome and desired one, not always one forced
against our will.

He summarizes this position in Sermon

12. when he observes that the imagination allows man to
withdraw from it [his present troubled and
dangerous state] to a fancied futurity, in which
whatever is crooked is to be made straight; in
which temptations are to be rejected, and
passions to be conquered; in which wisdom and
piety are to regulate the day; in which every
hour shall have its proper duty. The morning
shall awake beneficence, and the evening still
the soul in gratitude and devotion. Purposes
like these are often formed, and often forgotten. When remorse and solitude press hard upon
the mind, they afford a temporary refuge, which,
like other shelters from a storm, is forsaken,
when the calm returns (Sermon 12,, 163).
The second characteristic of the imagination emphasized by Johnson was that it is not simply a theoretical faculty to be defined and studied by philosophers, but
that it had actual and important effects upon the daily
life of average men, and that when it took over the mind,
tyrannizing over the will, very serious results were
inevitable.

The philosophical definition of imagination

to which Johnson assented, that it was the power of
forming ideas or images by recalling or combining
remembered sense impressions (Idler 44), was fairly common
in the century, and can be traced back to Locke and
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Hobbes.32

Hobbes had written, in the Leviathan, that

"imagination

• is nothing else but sense decaying or

weakened, by the absence of the object" (I, 27).

But as

we have seen from Johnson's own definitions of the term in
the Dictionary, the meanings more closely related to what
we might call practical or observable effects are more
significant for understanding the nature of man and his
actions than are the purely speculative, theoretical,
ones.33

Johnson consistently described the imagination in

terms of its practical effects:
Imagination, a licentious and vagrant faculty,
unsusceptible of limitations, and impatient of
restraint, has always endeavoured to baffle the
logician, to perplex the confines of
distinction, and burst the inclosures of
regularity (Rambler 125, 300).
The mind, long vitiated with trifles, and
entertained with wild and unnatural combinations
of ideas, becomes in a short time unable to
support the fatigue of reasoning; it is disgusted with a long succession of solemn images,
and retires from serious meditation, and
tiresome labour, to gayer fancies . . . . Thus he
soon grows indifferent to truth or falsehood,
32 See Kenneth MacLean, John Locke and English
Literature of the Eighteenth Century (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1936), p. 55ff.
33 This point is also made by Alkon in Samuel Johnson
Discipline (69-75). Alkon notes that Johnson
sees the imagination "as the handmaiden of illusion,
impossibility, and evil" (73) not because of any inherent
quality in its theoretical construction, but because of
the results it produces. Again, we see that the practical
finds more significance in Johnsonian thought than the
speculative.

~Moral
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and almost incapable of discerning one from the
other . . • . There are others who deride
religion for the sake of displaying their own
imaginations, of following the fashion of a
corrupt and licentious age, or gaining the
friendship of the great, or the applause of the
gay (Sermon 20, 221-222; 225).
The real danger of the imagination is the power it
possesses to persuade, to seem real or true, by actively
mimicking reality.

"Because imaginations persist in us

and resemble sensations," Aristotle had said, "living
creatures frequently act in accordance with them" (On the
soul, 429a).

Men do so "because the mind is temporarily

clouded over by emotion, or disease, or sleep" (428a).
Johnson believed that the imagination forcefully and
creatively presented its images to the mind for acceptance.

So the harm of the imagination is to present as

real or possible things unreal or impossible and thereby
to propose feelings (such as happiness) or successes (such
as possession of some object) both in nature and degree
incapable of being realized or enjoyed.

Yet, because of

the power of the imagination, these proposed feelings or
successes appeal so strongly as things both possible and
necessary, that they oppress the entire conscious mind and
will in anticipation.

For this reason, Johnson went far

beyond an attitude of critical amusement toward anyone who
"shuns fancied ills or chases airy good" (Vanity of Human
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wishes, I. 10).

He connected this shift from illusion to

delusion to a species of insanity:
There is no man whose imagination does not
sometimes predominate over his reason, who can
regulate his attention wholly by his will, and
whose ideas will come and go at his command. No
man will be found in whose mind airy notions do
not sometimes tyrannise, and force him to hope
or fear beyond the limits of sober probability.
All power of fancy over reason is a degree of
insanity (Rasselas, Chapter XLIV, 405-406).
When Johnson cautions against temptations to the sin of
"charging God foolishly" in Sermon 16, he observes this
same dangerous progression from illusion to delusion
whenever man attempts to escape the vacuity of existence:
It is frequently observed in common life, that
some favourite notion or inclination, long
indulged, takes such an entire possession of a
man's mind, and so engrosses his faculties, as
to mingle thoughts perhaps he is not himself
conscious of with almost all his conceptions,
and influence his whole behavior.
It will often
operate on occasions with which it could scarcely be imagined to have any connection, and will
discover itself, however it may lie concealed,
either in trifling incidents, or important
occurrences, when it is least expected or
foreseen.
It gives a particular direction to
every sentiment and action, and carries a man
forward, as by a kind of resistless impulse, or
insuperable destiny (Sermon 16, 173).
In its tyranny over man's will, the imagination can
produce three principal effects.

The first is to alienate

completely the imager from reality and to place him in a
dream world where all events take place purely by wishing.
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In this case the imagination paralyzes the thinker by
making reality irrelevant to his supposed accomplishments,
and thereby prevents any actions from being undertaken.
Johnson describes this indulgence as daydreaming merely
for the pleasure of it, without any real intent to act:
These gay sallies of imagination . . . are of no
farther use to mankind than to divert, and can
have no higher place in our esteem than any
other art that terminates in mere amusement
(Sermon 1.Q, 221).
This daydreaming does bring a degree of happiness or at
least amusement, but there is a danger not only of seeking
such idleness because of the ease with which it grants
pleasure, but of allowing the imagination to habitually
predominate over the reason:
All sin that is committed by Christians, is
committed either through an absolute forgetfulness of God, for the time in which the inordinate passion, of whatever kind it be, predominates and prevails; or because, if the ideas of
God and religion were present to our minds, they
were not strong enough to overcome and suppress
the desires excited by some pleasing, or the
apprehensions raised by some terrible, object.
. . . All mental images influence our conduct
with more or less force, as they are more or
less strongly impressed upon the mind; and they
are impressed more strongly, as they are more
frequently recollected or renewed (Sermon 2
101).
1

The second effect of the imagination's tyranny over
the will is its power to impose upon man, in order to
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flatter the ego and assuage the conscience, the idea that
no self-improving action is needed because he is already
superior to others.

"Men please themselves with imagining

that they have made a deeper search, or wider survey, than
others"

(Rambler~,

9).

Because of the natural workings

of pride in the learned, scholars are especially subject
to this self-indulgence:
A man of learning has such frequent opportunities of comparing himself [to those engaged in
manual occupations]; and is so strongly incited,
by that comparison, to indulge the contemplation
of his own superiority; that it is not to be
considered as wonderful, that vanity creeps in
upon him; that he does not willingly withdraw
his imagination from objects that so much
flatter his passions, that he pursues the train
of thought, from one reflection to another,
places himself and others, in every situation,
in which he can appear with advantage in his own
eyes; rises to comparisons with still higher
characters, and still retains the habit of
giving himself the preference; and in all
disputable cases turns the balance in his own
favour, by super-adding, from his own conceit,
that wisdom, which by nature he does not
possess, or by industry he has not acquired
(Sermon~, 88) [See Rasselas, Chapter XL].
Here we see the debilitating effect of imagination acting
upon pride; the connection between pride and this kind of
imagination is clarified in those "men who have flattered
themselves into this opinion of their own abilities":
He that overvalues himself will undervalue
others, and he that undervalues others will
oppress them. To this fancied superiority it is
owing, that tyrants have squandered the lives of
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millions, and looked unconcerned on the miseries
of war (Sermon~, 68).
The danger of this self-delusion goes beyond its resulting
pride and the contempt of others.

The deceived imager

often exhibits the damning tendency to believe that his
life will be long and that his day of judgement will be
distant:
Of self-deceit, in the great business of our
lives, there are various modes. The far greater
part of mankind deceive themselves, by willing
negligence, by refusing to think on their state,
lest such thoughts should trouble their quiet,
or interrupt their pursuits . • . . Their mode of
self-deception which prevails most in the world,
and by which the greatest number of souls is at
last betrayed to destruction, is the art, which
we are all too apt to practise, of putting far
from us the evil day, of setting the hour of
death, and the day of account, at a great
distance (Sermon ..!...Q., 110-11) .
. . . nothing is more dangerous than spiritual
pride. The man that esteems himself a saint
will be in danger of relaxing his circumspection, of stopping in his progress of virtue,
and, if once he stops, of falling back into
those infirmities from which his imaginary
exemption made him presumptuous and supine
(Sermon 16, 175).
But whether idleness results from pleasing ourselves
that we need not labor or from an inability to fix upon a
project, this deficiency created by the imagination
clearly needs to be remedied.

Moreover, Johnson believed

that "the great business of our lives" (Sermon 10, 110)
was more than self-knowledge; rather, "the business of
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life is to work out our salvation; and the days are few,
in which provision must be made for eternity" (Sermon

1..2.,

161).
The third effect produced by the imagination in its
oppression of the will is to generate pointless desires
and subsequent discontent whether or not those desires are
satisfied.

As we have seen, man has an innate desire to

seek satisfaction.

The imagination functions as a kind of

goad to the faculty of the will, spurring it on to focus
on successive goals by promising inflated rewards from
reduced efforts.

To change metaphors, we could say that

the imagination amplifies the proposed pleasure fixed upon
by the will.

Johnson admonished man to place his trust in

God as the only source of complete happiness; yet he acknowledged that it was man's nature to seek various kinds
of temporal satisfaction.

The young, for example,

instead of founding happiness on the solid basis
of reason and reflection, they [the young] raise
an airy fabrick of momentary satisfaction, which
is perpetually decaying, and perpetually to be
repaired. They please themselves, not with
thinking justly, but with avoiding to think at
all, with a suspence of all the operations of
their intellectual faculties, which defends them
from remembrance of the past, or anticipation of
the future. They lull themselves in an enervate, and cowardly dissipation, and, instead of
being happy, are only indolent [emphasis mine]
(Sermon 14, 150).
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The great danger of the imagination, then, lies in
its capacity to create artificial or non-existent needs,
goals, and wants--so rapidly and continuously that man
cannot obtain them:

"It is impossible to supply wants as

fast as an idle imagination may be able to form them"
(Rambler 126, 319).
of satisfaction.

Man is therefore inevitably in want

Locke had pointed out that physical

desires caused men significant "uneasiness" by themselves,
but that when the desires of the imagination were added,
there was no time for a man to pursue real good:
If, besides accidental harms, we add the
fantastical uneasiness (as itch after honour,
power or riches, etc.) which acquired habits by
fashion, example, and education, have settled in
us, and a thousand other irregular desires,
which custom has made natural to us, we shall
find that a very little part of our life is so
vacant from these uneasinesses, as to leave us
free to the attraction of remoter absent good.
We are seldom at ease, and free enough from the
solicitation of our natural or adopted desires,
but a constant succession of uneasinesses out of
that stock which natural wants or acquired
habits have heaped up, take the will in their
turns; and no sooner is one action dispatched,
which by such a determination of the will we are
set upon, but another uneasiness is ready to set
us on work. (Locke, Essay, II.xxi.46).
What Locke ascribed to the "acquired habits" that fashion
and custom might dictate, William Law, in
To

~

~

Serious Call

Devout and Holy Life, connected to wilful human cul-

pability.

Law asserted that man had imagined himself into

unhappiness through his own fault by increasing his
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desires beyond the easily satisfiable requirements of
nature.

Man, he said, was "born with few wants, and into

a large world very capable of supplying them."

But man

will not be content with nature:
Though God, and nature, and reason, make human
life thus free from wants and so full of happiness; yet our passions, in rebellion against
God, against nature and reason, create a new
world of evils, and fill human life with
imaginary wants, and vain disquiets (A Serious
Call, 118).
In Sermon

!l,

Johnson seems to balance Locke and Law while

at the same time going on to imply rather darkly that our
imaginations will prevent us from ever being completely
happy.

"Works of absolute necessity are few and simple,"

he says, but we create further needs:
As we extend our pleasures, we multiply our
wants. The pain of hunger is easily appeased,
but to surmount the disgust of appetite vitiated
by indulgence, all the arts of luxury are
required, and all are often vain. When to the
enjoyments of sense, are superadded the delights
of fancy, we form a scheme of happiness that
never can be complete, for we can always imagine
more than we possess (Sermon !l, 132).
The hunger of the imagination is a striving to create
artificially both pleasures and satisfactions beyond those
of the real world, sometimes only elusively, but often
delusively.

The kingdom of imagination is the unreal and

the untrue, where the future may be arranged and
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rearranged, the present may be falsely perceived, and the
past may be erroneously remembered.

The imager believes

he can find happiness by allowing the imagination to focus
away from empirical truth and thereby escape the need to
deal with life's bitterness and vexations; but Johnson
believed that by doing so happiness and productivity would
be prevented.

He knew from his own experience during the

years after he left Oxford, when he struggled with selfdoubt and self-rejection, just how destructive the
imagination could be.
This personal struggle explains in large measure why
Johnson's general view of the imagination is so negative.
He often spoke of its "dangerous prevalence" and refers to
it as a "licentious and vagrant faculty."
constructive role mentioned earlier?

But what of the

Among the uses or

positive aspects Johnson ascribed to the faculty was, as
many critics have pointed out rather extensively, its role
in artistic creation, especially the composition of
poetry.34

More than this, however, Johnson believed that

the imagination does have uses in the lives of ordinary
34 See, for example, Jean Hagstrum, Literary
Criticism, 48-49, 89-92; W. R. Keast, "The Theoretical
Foundations of Johnson's Criticism," in Critics and
Criticism, ed. R. s. Crane (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1952), 389-407; Tommy G. Watson, "Johnson
and Hazlitt on the Imagination in Milton," Southern
Quarterly, 2 (1964), 123-33; Donald O. Rogers, "Samuel
Johnson's Concept of the Imagination," South Central
~ulletin, 33 (1973), 213-218.
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man.

Like man's desire, it is a faculty to be "regulated

rather than extinguished"

(Rambler~,

266), not simply

because extinguishing it would be impossible, but because
it has a certain positive potential:

"Since the mind is

always of itself shrinking from disagreeable images, it is
sometimes necessary to recall them" (Sermon 12_, 160).
Imagination, according to Johnson, can make us kinder
and more understanding toward others, as we think what
pains they may have; the feelings of sympathy and shared
joy are in fact "produced by an act of the imagination" as
we put ourselves fancifully into the circumstances of
those we see happy or sad and consider how we would feel
(Rambler 60, 318).

Imagination is an aid to religion by

helping to make "the future predominate over the present"
(Rambler

z,

37-9), so that we will forego expedient but

harmful pleasures in the hope of an ultimate reward later
on, and so that we will be willing to undergo hardships
for the sake of future blessings (Rambler 178, 174).

In

the funeral sermon for his wife, Johnson echoes these
ideas from his Rambler essays as he reminds the
congregation that there are some who refuse to engage
their imagination productively in the service of religion:
There were, doubtless, at all times, as there
are now, many • • . [who] had no regard to
distant events, but withheld their imagination
from sallying out into futurity, or catching any
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terror that might interrupt their quiet (Sermon
E' 262).
Finally, imagination, through hope, makes life
happier.

Hope elevates and makes delightful the life of a

man and is "necessary in every condition" (Rambler 67,
354).

Reasonably grounded or not, hope is "necessary to

the production of every thing great or excellent" (Rambler

_f, 12), for "where there is no hope, there can be no
endeavour" (Rambler 110, 221).

Our wants or desires--the

specific objects of pursuit upon which we have finally
fixed--become objects of anticipation, and because we
believe that their attainment will bring happiness, we
derive some happiness from the hope itself.

Consequently,

the imagination, if properly directed and regulated, will
allow a man to meditate on God until the divine presence
becomes a fixation of spiritual strength:
The man who has accustomed himself to consider
that he is always in the presence of the Supreme
Being . . . easily withstands those temptations
which find a ready passage into the mind not
guarded and secured by this awful sense of the
Divine Presence.
He is not enticed by ill examples, because
the purity of God always occurs to his imagination; he is not betrayed to security by solitude, because he never considers himself as
alone (Sermon 16, 174).
In Johnson's view, the benefits of the imagination are
relatively small when measured against its capacity to
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damage.

Johnson had a strong dialectical view of the

imagination.

He knew the contributions his imagination

made to his capacity to empathize with his fellow men as
they wrestled with the limitations of their nature.

At

the same time, he knew the power of the imagination to
drag him into the depths of self-delusion and despair.
so, the imagination for Johnson required eternal vigilance
and stern discipline:
Men are very seldom disappointed, except when
their desires are immoderate, or when they
suffer their passions to overpower their reason,
and dwell upon delightful scenes of future
honours, power, or riches, till they mistake
probabilities for certainties, or wild wishes
for rational expectations (Sermon 2, 58).
Reason is the lawful sovereign of the imagination,
designed to control and direct imagination's operations.
To resign oneself to the tyranny of the imagination is to
cast reason aside and to give up the necessarily painful
efforts at self-regulation and improvement.
Throughout the Sermons, Johnson exhorts us to keep
going forward despite fears and anxieties; yet he was
keenly aware that the world of the imagination is often a
self-centered one which can lead to madness or despair.
He strongly believed that the present state of man owed to
the future state an active striving for improvement and
not a stagnant self-indulgence.

Johnson steadfastly
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upheld man's obligations and ultimate accountability to
God.

Yet he recognized the dangerous propensity of human

nature to eschew this responsibility and to prefer "the
gay sallies of the imagination" (Sermon 20, 221) or to
"indulge any desire that happens to arise, with very
little resistance or compunction" (Sermon 10, 111) in a
futile attempt to fill the vacuity of existence.

Johnson

was never content to rest his observations on the nature
of man with theories on the consequences of original sin,
speculations about man's fallen and weak condition, or
with hypotheses concerning the operations of the will and
the imagination.

He wanted his ideas to be useful for the

practical improvement of man's present lot--to alleviate
the miseries caused by man's delusive imagination and
insatiable will, and to warn man of the dangers of
expecting his innate faculties to lead him to perfect
happiness in this life.

In the following chapter we will

see how Johnson, basing his argument on the observations
concerning the nature of man we have here developed,
persuades the auditors of his Sermons to examine the
reasonableness of religion's consolations for the vacuity
Of life.

CHAPTER THREE

JOHNSON'S SERMONS AND THE
CONSOLATION OF SALVATION

I

Modern scholars have of ten noted that Johnson viewed
reason as superior to imagination.1

Behind him was a long

tradition, ranging from classical figures like Boethius2
to contemporaries such as Isaac Watts, who wrote "let calm
and sedate reason govern and determine our opinions .
Fancy is the inferior faculty and ought to obey."3
Johnson believed that reason should discipline and direct
1 see, for example, Robert Voitle, Samuel Johnson the
Moralist {Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961-)-,23 ff; Sachs, Passionate Intelligence, xiv and 69-70;
Alken, Samuel Johnson and Moral Discipline, 65-80;
Sheridan Baker, "Rasselas: Psychological Irony and
Romance," Philological Quarterly, 45 {Jan. 1966}, 253.
2 For Boethius, human reason is classified as
inferior to divine thought but as above imagination and
wit [See, The Consolation of Philosophy, trans. Richard
Green {New York: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1962}, Book V,
Prose 2, 103-104]. Boswell mentions Johnson's unqualified
recommendation of and personal fondness for Boethius'
Consolation of Philosophy because it demonstrated the use
of man's reason as a source and method for the defense of
free will (Life, I, 139 and Sale Catalogue, entry 295).
3 Isaac Watts, Logick, 2!. the Right Use of Reason in
!he Enquiry after Truth (London: n.p., 1755), 186.
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human imagination which tends to lead one astray into
delusions and falsehood.

He says that

we can only, in whatsoever state we may be
placed, secure ourselves from disquiet and from
misery, by a resolute attention to truth and
reason (Sermon l, 13).
This chapter will seek to show that Johnson was not
the doctrinaire rationalist that he has sometimes been
made to appear.

Reason was not for him sufficient to

encompass the whole range of human experience.

Some

eighteenth century philosophers were dualists who
maintained a strict division between reason and emotion,
and between the mind and its objects in the external
world.

They were wrestling with what William Temple, late

Archbishop of Canterbury, once called "the Cartesian fauxpas."

Because of Johnson's common sense approach to life,

this problem was simply too abstract to trouble him
greatly.

In a celebrated gesture, he refuted Berkeley's

solipsism with a kick of the stone.

Johnson found his

mind engaged with the external world, not separated from
it.

Johnson viewed the nature of man as being engaged in

a process of integration; he explained man's nature in
terms which combined rather than dissected the faculties
into hierarchical categories.

One can see in Johnson's

Philosophy striking anticipations of the process philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead and the pragmatism of John
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Dewey.

Indeed, Johnson's theorizing was never far from

the practical experience of daily life which he believed
ought to be lived with common sense.
As we saw in Chapter Two, Johnson believed the
imagination was prone to extend our desires and to create
unrealistic hopes; it required the eternal vigilance of
reason in order to preserve sanity, virtue, and happiness.
However, Johnson's use of the term reason differs from
that of several of his contemporary theorists.
mean by the word what Locke, for example, meant:

He did not
an

abstract intellectual exercise governed by the rules of
logic with "truth" or "falsehood" determined by careful
intellectual analysis.
and more practical.

For Johnson, reason was broader

Throughout the Sermons, Johnson calls

for the exercise of practical reason, of a kind of commonsense and enlightened self-interest, to cope with the
concrete problems of life.

He was thoroughly familiar

with the process Freud was to call "rationalization"-using the ego to justify and defend what the id desires.
Indeed, Johnson made the same distinction that Freud made
between the "pleasure principle," which seeks immediate
gratification regardless of consequences, and the "reality
Principle," which defers immediate pleasure for the sake
of later and greater satisfactions:
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Every man is conscious, that he neither performs, nor forbears anything upon any other
motive than the prospect, either of an immediate
gratification, or a distant reward; that whether
he complies with temptation, or repels it, he is
still influenced by the same general regard to
his own felicity; but that when he yields to the
solicitation of his appetite, or the impulse of
his passions, he is overborne by the prevalence
of the object before him; and when he adheres to
his duty, in opposition to his present interest,
he is influenced by the hopes of future happiness (Sermon 14, 149).
He astutely acknowledged man's predilection for selfdelusion--man often does not use his reason to integrate
his appetites and passions for his long-term happiness.
Rather, he prefers the immediate gratification of his
desires or the chimeras created by his imagination.
Furthermore, in a similar context, we can recall Swift's
famous comment:
I have got materials towards a treatise, proving
the falsity of that definition animal rationale,
and to show it would be only rationis capax.
Upon this great foundation of misanthropy . . .
the whole building of my Travels is erected; and
I never will have peace of mind till all honest
men are of my opinion • . . . The matter is so
clear that it will admit of no dispute.4
In this letter, Swift suggests two broad views of reason
included in the legacy of philosophical debate on the
4 Letter to Alexander Pope, September 29, 1725,
quoted in Jonathan Swift, Gulliver's Travels and Other
Writings, ed. Louis A. Landa (Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1960), 494.
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nature of man.

His definitions--animal rationale and

yi.tionis capax--suggest the two traditions of reason we
will examine under the headings "peripatetic" and
"Lockean."
The first of these inherited concepts, drawn from the
developments of Renaissance psychology, argued that reason
was an independent faculty, able to derive truths from
innate ideas, apart from any reliance on data supplied by
the senses.

In Samuel Johnson the Moralist, Robert Voitle

has called this "Peripatetic Reason" (2), partly because
it was the more traditional and philosophical view,
holding that reason was our connection with God.

The

continental rationalists, like Descartes and Spinosa,
subscribed to this exalted view of reason.

Descartes, for

example, believed that reason was the "only valid criterion of truth,"5 and noted that using his reason in
everything was what pleased him most about his philosophical methodology.6

In his Discourse on Method, Descartes

described how reason alone was the source of all truth:
First, I tried to discover the general principles, or first causes, of all that is or can
be in the world, without for this purpose

York:

5 William S. Sahakian, History of Philosophy (New
Barnes and Noble, 1968), 133.

6 Rene Descartes, Discourse on Method, Optics,
and Meteorology, trans. Paul J. Olscamp (New
York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), 18.

~eometry,
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considering anything but God alone, its Creator,
and without deriving these principles from
anything but certain seeds of truth which are
naturally in our souls. After that, I examined
what were the first and most ordinary effects
that we could infer from these causes. And it
seems to me that I thereby discovered the skies,
the stars, and earth, and even, on the earth,
water, air, fire, minerals, and certain other
such things . . . (52).
This high view of reason was also embraced in England.

For example, the Deist Tindal insisted that the

priority of reason to revelation was proved either by
revelation's acknowledgment of that priority or by the
obvious falsity of a denial of man's rationality.

By

emphasizing reason, Tindal was also emphasizing the
sufficiency of natural theology; he made truth and
happiness the product of "right reason":
the happiness of all beings consists in the
perfections of their nature; and the nature of a
rational being is most perfect when it is perfectly rational; that is, when it governs all
its actions by the rules of right reason; for
then it arrives at the most perfect, and
consequently the happiest state a rational
nature can aspire to: and every deviation from
the rules of right reason, being an imperfection, must carry with it a proportionable
unhappiness; and a man's happiness and duty must
consist in the same things, since no one can be
obligated to do anything that does not some way
or other contribute to his happiness; and
consequently, according to the sense men have of
their own happiness, and of the means which will
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naturally procure it, they may assuredly attain
the knowledge of their respective duties.7
Tindal argued that religious revelation could offer man no
truths that he could not discover through his reason (78);
indeed, he believed that natural religion and revealed
religion were the same:
Whereas, if we allow the Light of Nature sufficient to enable us to judge rightly in these
matters, and consequently to distinguish truth
from falsehood, we must own since there can be
no disagreement in truth that there's an exact
conformity between internal and external
revelation, with no other difference but as the
manner of their being revealed (58).8
In similar fashion, William Wollaston, a natural religionist, defined religion as "an obligation to do .
what ought not to be omitted, and to forbear what ought
not to be done. 11 9

This religion is discoverable by reason

alone; it does not require any necessary reinforcement
7 Matthew Tindal, Christianity as Old as the Creation
(London, n.p., 1730), 25-26.
8 The general position of the Deists toward revelation is perhaps best illustrated by the full title to
Toland's influential work: Christianity Not Mysterious:
.Q.£ ~ Treatise Showing that there is Nothing in the Gospel
Contrary to Reason, nor above It, and that No Christian
Doctrine can be Properly Called~ Mystery (1718).
9 William Wollaston, The Religion of Nature
Delineated (1724; 8th ed., 1759), in British Moralists:
B~ing Selections from Writers Principally of the
Eighteenth Century, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1897), II, 374.

116
from an external source, such as divine revelation.
samuel Clarke also reflects the tradition of the continental rationalists when he asserts that
reason, which is the proper nature of man, can
never . . • lead man to anything else than
universal love and benevolence: and Wars,
Hatred, and Violence can never arise but from
extreme corruption.1 6
In spite of this high view of reason, Clarke recognized
that
the practice of Vice, is accompanied with great
Temptations and Allurements of Pleasure and
Profit, and the practice of Virtue is often
threatened with great Calamities, Losses, and
sometimes even with Death itself (34).
Therefore, "the eternal rule of right and equity" which is
discoverable by reason alone is not adequate for
motivating moral behavior.

Clarke believed if good and

evil were equally balanced in the world, each having
similar allurements and similar difficulties, then reason
would be able to choose virtue.

But the pleasure of vice

and the difficulty of virtue
alters the Question, and destroys the practice
of that which appears so reasonable in the whole
10 Samuel Clarke, ~ Discourse Concerning the
Unchangeable Obligations of Natural Religion, and the
Truth and Certainty of the Christian Revelation (London:
n.p., 1716), 107. Quinlan notes the indebtedness of
Clarke to Descartes (28).
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Speculation, and introduces a necessity of
Rewards and Punishments (34-35).
Nevertheless, Clarke believed that "love and benevolence"
were the products of right reason.
Johnson agreed with Clarke regarding the existence of
an indispensable relationship between reason and religion.
Indeed, Johnson pointed out that "religion is the highest
Exercise of Reason; let us not begin by turning all reason
out of Doors, 11 11 and he steadfastly maintained that
truth, indeed, is always truth, and reason is
always reason; they have an intrinsic and
unalterable value, and constitute that intellectual gold which defies destruction.12
Moreover, he frequently spoke "with great commendation of
Clarke's Universality • • . and seemed not disposed to
censure him for his Heterodoxy" (Life, IV, 524).

Specif-

ically, Johnson agreed with Clarke that reason can engage
man in ethical considerations--"he that thinks reasonably
must think morally. 11 13
11 K.
~Hester

I, 183.

Johnson accepted much of Clarke's

c. Balderston, ed., Thraliana, The Diary of
Lynch Thrale (Oxford:

Clarendon Press, 1951),

12 Samuel Johnson, Life of Cowley, in Samuel Johnson:
Oxford Authors, ed. Donald Greene (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1984), 695.

~

13 Samuel Johnson, Preface to Shakespeare, in The
Yale Edition of the Works of Samuel Johnson, ed. Arthur
Sherbo (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), VII, 71.
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traditional notion that reason is supreme in moral
_lllought.
Indeed, Johnson would not quarrel with the Deists in
their appeal to reason in matters of religion; however, he
believed that the Deists had not given certain proofs of
Christianity, such as Biblical revelation and miracles, a
fair examination:

"no honest man could be a Deist; for no

man could be so after a fair examination of the proofs of
Christianity" (Life, II, 8-9).

Johnson esteemed reason as

an important tool by which man ought to examine "the
proofs of Christianity" against the touchstone of daily
experience:
It is astonishing that any man can forbear
enquiring seriously, whether there is a God;
whether God is just; whether this life is the
only state of existence; whether God has
appointed rewards and punishments in a future
state; whether he has given any laws for the
regulation of our conduct here; whether he has
given them by revelation; and whether the
religion publickly taught carries any mark of
divine appointment. These are questions which
every reasonable being ought undoubtedly to
consider with an attention suitable to their
importance; and he, whom the consideration of
eternal happiness or misery cannot awaken from
his pleasing dreams, cannot prevail upon to
suspend his mirth, surely ought not to despise
others for dulness and stupidity.
Let it be remembered that the nature of
things is not alterable by our conduct. We
cannot make truth; it is our business only to
find it. No proposition can become more or less
certain or important, by being considered or
neglected. It is to no purpose to wish, or to
suppose, that to be false, which is in itself
true, and therefore to acquiesce in our own
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wishes and suppositions, when the matter is of
eternal consequence, to believe obstinately
without grounds of belief, and to determine
without examination, is the last degree of folly
and absurdity (Sermon 20, 222-223).
Moreover, in opposition to the Deists, Johnson refutes any
purely rational or moral doctrine that is
entirely abstracted from religion . . . . Men
left wholly to their appetites and instincts,
with little sense of moral or religious obligation, and with faint distinctions of right and
wrong, can never be safely employed or confidently trusted: they can be honest only by
obst~nacy
and diligent only by compulsion or
caprice. 4
Johnson recognized that, while man can use his reason to
discover moral principles, acting on the knowledge
supplied by his reason requires the motivation provided by
religion:
To subdue passion, and regulate desire, is the
great task of man, as a moral agent; a task, for
which natural reason, however assisted and
enforced by human laws, has been found insufficient, and which cannot be performed but by the
help of religion (Sermon 18, 193).
The great task of him, who conducts his life by
the precepts of religion, is to make the future
predominate over the present, to impress upon
his mind so strong a sense of the importance of
obedience to the divine will, of the value of
the reward promised to virtue, and the terrors
14 Samuel Johnson, "Review of [Soame Jenyns], A Free
Inquiry into the Nature and Origin of Evil," in Samue_l__
~ohnson:
The Oxford Authors, ed. Donald Greene (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1984), 528.
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of the punishment denounced against crimes, as
may overbear all the temptations which temporal
hope or fear can bring in his way, and enable
him to bid equal defiance to joy and sorrow, to
turn away at one time from the allurements of
ambition, and push forward at another against
the threats of calamity (~ambler 1, 37-38).15
Man's reason can discover morality, but only "the value of
the reward promised to virtue, and the terrors of the
punishment denounced against crimes" can supply him with
the motivating power to be moral.

Indeed, the motivating

power of "obedience to the divine will" allows man to
partially atone for his weak and corrupt nature and
anticipate the happy prospect of salvation:
He will naturally pour out his supplications to
the Supreme Being . . . for assistance and
protection . . . . and by recollecting His promises, [he] will confirm himself in the hope of
obtaining what he desires, and if . • . he
steadily practices the duties on which they
depend, he will soon find his mind stayed on
God, and be kept in perfect peace, because he
trusteth in him (~ermon 14, 157-158).
The pragmatic Johnsonian emphasis on obedience as
motivation for man's ethical conduct is generally lacking
in the doctrines of the Deists, the rationalists, and the
natural religionists.
Another important figure in this tradition which
exalted reason is William Law.

Indeed, the influence Law

15 For similar ideas see Rambler !1, 225, Rambler 78,
50; Sermons 2, 12, 14, 15,
, 28.
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exerted on Johnson is testimony to the rationality of
Johnson's own religious beliefs.16

The fact that Johnson

described Law as an "overmatch" for him (Life, I, 68) and
the serious Call as "the finest piece of hortatory
theology in any language" (Life, II, 122) makes an
examination of the book desirable.
The whole of the Serious Call to
~

~

Devout and Holy

might be described as an argument for an ordered,

deliberate, and above all a rational Christianity.

Reason

should guide men in everything:
All men . . . as men, have one and the same
important business, to act up to the excellency
of their rational nature, and to make reason and
order the law of all their designs and
actions.17
Reason is the great and distinctive force of humanity, so
that to deny it is to deny one's humanity:
16 The intellectual affinities between Samuel Johnson
and William Law have been examined extensively. Among the
studies noting parallels or influences are these:
Quinlan, 5-11; Katharine c. Balderston, "Dr. Johnson's Use
of William Law in the Dictionary," Philological Quarterly, 39, (July 1960), 379-388; Katharine C. Balderston,
"Doctor Johnson and William Law," Publications of the
Modern Language Association, 75 (Sept. 1960), 382-394;
Paul K. Alkon, "Robert South, William Law, and Samuel
Johnson," Studies in English Literature (Rice), 6 (Summer
1966), 499-528; James Gray, Johnson's Sermons, 50-85;
Bate, Samuel Johnson, 101-107; Sachs, Passionate Intelligence, 115.
17 William Law, A Serious Call to a Devout and Holy
Life (1728; rpt., New-York: Dutton,-r906), 109.~-
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If you live contrary to reason, you do not
commit a small crime, you do not break a small
trust; but you break the law of your nature
(100).

To avoid this, we must train the reason through the right
kind of schooling, since "the only end of education is to
restore our rational nature to its proper state" (231) in
order that we may learn to do everything "by strict rules
of reason and piety" (52).
Law sees religion not merely in harmony with reason,
but even to a large degree dictated by it, so that "true
religion is nothing else but simple nature governed by
right reason" (243).

The "reason and wisdom which He

[God] has implanted" in us are to be our guides and rulers
(124), and if we examine the situation closely, we will,
he says, discover that the demands of reason and the
duties of religion are the same (123-128).

Furthermore,

Law maintains that reason is God's unique gift to man and
is a kind of link with God since His primary attribute is
also reason.

To use one's reason or to follow the

dictates of "right reason" meant to discover the attributes of that celestial link.

It meant to recognize and

accept the Divine order of the universe.

Law observed

that reason was man's unique and identifying
characteristic; therefore, the famous dictum know thyself
ultimately meant that man was to know the qualities and
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content of "right reason" and so know his proper
relationship to God:
Now knowledge itself would be no excellence, nor
ignorance any reproach to us, but that we are
rational creatures. But if this be true, then
it follows plainly that knowledge which is most
suitable to our rational nature, and which most
concerns us, as such, to know, is our highest,
finest knowledge . . . . If, therefore, our
relation to God be our greatest relation, if our
advancement in His favour be our highest
advancement, he that has the highest notions of
the excellence of this relation . . . proves
himself to be master of the best and most
excellent knowledge (302).
Law felt that man's entire life should be devoted to God
in a way that translated itself into a strict daily
regimen of virtuous behavior and frequent selfexamination.

He believed that man's proper use of his

reason would provide him with the knowledge of his duties
towards God and neighbor.

Law's rules for self-

examination are rules for achieving the only kind of selfknowledge that he felt was necessary or worthwhile-knowledge of one's follies and sins.

Through such self-

examination, man will know not only his relationship to
God, a relationship of forgiveness and mercy on His part
and gratitude on ours, but also he will know his proper
relationship to other people, a relationship of tenderness
and compassion for follies and sins:
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Consider these great truths; that this mysterious redemption, all these sacrifices and
sufferings, both of God and man, are only to
remove the guilt of sin . • . you know more of
the folly of your own heart than you do of other
people's; and can charge yourself with various
sins that you only know of yourself, and cannot
be sure that other sinners are guilty of them .
. . . If you will deal justly, you must fix the
charge at home, and look no farther than yourself . . • . A serious and frequent reflection
upon these things will mightily tend to humble
us in our own eyes, make us very apprehensive of
the greatness of our own guilt, and very tender
in censuring and condemning other people (292295).

Law not only set the standards high but he felt that
salvation was achieved by a herculean struggle.

The great

business of man was to enter into that struggle and to
discipline his life into one of obedience to the commands
of God:
The salvation of our souls is set forth in
Scripture as a thing of difficulty, that
requires all our diligence, that is to be worked
out with fear and trembling . . . .Many will
miss of their salvation who seem to have taken
some pains to obtain it (21).
After Law set up perfect obedience as a standard, he faced
the obvious objection to it that it was impossible to
follow.

Law conceded that it was so; therefore, he

shifted his ground of argument from an insistence that man
~

his life in perfect obedience to the law of God to

man's sincere endeavor to be obedient.
best he knew how to so rule his life?

Was he trying the
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You perhaps will say, that all people fall short
of the perfection of the Gospel, and therefore
you are content with your feelings . . . . For
the question is not whether Gospel perfection
can be fully attained, but whether you come as
near it as a sincere intention and careful
diligence can carry you (21).
Thus, Law answered his critics by maintaining that man can
test his sincerity through the performance of virtuous
actions.
The problem Johnson found with a tradition which
maintained such an exalted view of reason was that it
tended to ignore human experience.

A basic assumption of

Tindal, Wollaston, Clarke and other natural religionists
was that man's nature was almost completely amenable to
the dictates of his reason.

However, Johnson observed

that man's nature reflected a predilection to rationalize
--to be guided not by evidence but by the vagaries of
imagination and desire.

Johnson saw man as a creature

prone to error because of his finite ability to use his
reason without self-delusion.

Moreover, unlike William

Law, Johnson did not understand human nature in terms of
static concepts of mind against body or in a hierarchy of
separate faculties of reason, instinct, will, and
imagination; rather, he described these attributes of
man's nature in terms of a process of integration.
recognized that the faculties of human nature were

He
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intimately connected and that it was the integration of
man's instincts, passions, desires, and imagination with
reason that created the possibility for reason to be in
command of human nature [Ramblers!, 41, 47].

Further-

more, Johnson understood the dictum "know thyself" as not
meaning primarily or exclusively a knowledge of one's
relationship to God but rather a knowledge of one's own
qualities and attributes--knowing the cause for one's
feelings of anxiety, depression, alienation and isolation.
Within the Sermons, Johnson demonstrates that a radical
~

of self-knowledge produces immature individuals who

remain alienated from others and experience a vacuous
existence:
We are lulled with indolence, we are seduced by
pleasure, we are perverted by bad examples, and
we are betrayed by our own hearts. No sooner do
we, in compliance either with the vanities or
the business of life, relax our attention, than
we grow cold and indifferent, dilatory and
negligent (Sermon 19, 204).
Johnson speaks of a morality which is not static, nor even
completely dependent on eternal commands, but rather
dynamic and almost evolutionary.

It looks forward toward

modern psychological conclusions regarding the
interrelationship between human attributes rather than
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backward to the hierarchical distinctions of the classical
and medieval philosophers.18
Johnson steadfastly maintained that reason was
extremely useful in regard to religion:
For the truths of religion are attested by
evidence, which must be yielded to as soon as it
is considered; and confirmed by proofs, which
nothing but inattention can resist. But to
consider, and weigh this evidence seriously and
impartially, the mind must be abstracted, in
some measure, from the objects that surround us;
objects that strike us strongly, not because
they are great, but because they are near; while
the views of futurity affect us but faintly, not
because they are unimportant, but because they
are distant (Sermon 16, 176-177).
He believed that man must carefully examine the remedies
suggested by religious revelation in order to determine
their suitability for dealing with the realities of human
experience:
When revelation is consulted, it appears that
such a state is really promised, and that, by
the contempt of worldly pleasures, it is to be
obtained. We then find, that instead of lamenting the imperfection of earthly things, we have
reason to pour out thanks to him who orders all
for our good, that he has made the world, such
as often deceives, and often afflicts us; that
the charms of interest are not such, as our
frailty is unable is resist, but that we have
such interruptions of our pursuits, such languor
in our enjoyments, such pains of body and
18 See, w. J. Bate, The Achievement of Samuel
Johnson, 93-94, for Bate's perceptive observation that
Samuel Johnson anticipates many of Freud's insights on
human nature.
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anxieties of mind, as repress desire, and weaken
temptation (Sermon 11_, 135).
As we have seen, the natural religionists argued that
reason seemed to render divine revelation unnecessary for
salvation.

Johnson disapproved of their failure to use

reason to objectively examine the claims of religious
revelation:
The prevailing spirit of the present age seems
to be the spirit of skepticism and captiousness,
of suspicion and distrust, a contempt of all
authority, and a presumptuous confidence in
private judgement; a dislike of all established
forms, merely because they are established, and
of old paths, because they are old (Sermon 7,
77).
Johnson's methods for validating the truth of revelation
are the pragmatic ones of appealing to the authority of
common testimony and of demonstrating that the events
narrated in Scripture are relevant to human experience:
The Christian religion has very strong evidences.
It, indeed, appears in some degrees
strange to reason; but in History we have
undoubted facts against which reasoning ~ priori
we have more arguments than we have for them;
but then testimony has great weight and casts
the balance" (Life, II, 398).
It is clear that all arguments of the natural religionists
seemed to Johnson less important than the testimony of
ancient authority which tended to establish revelation
itself as grounded in the facts of history.

For example,
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William Windham asked for Johnson's opinion of "natural"
and "revealed" religion.

Johnson bypassed the traditional

arguments and artificial distinctions of the natural
religionists and chose to discuss "revealed" religion
only:
For revealed religion there was such historical
evidence as, upon any subject not religious,
would have left no doubt . . . . With respect to
evidence, Dr. Johnson observed that we had no
such evidence that Caesar died in the Capitol,
as that Christ died in the manner related.19
For Johnson, then, a reliable way to examine the truth of
revelation is to appeal to the authority--to the calleetive reason--of the ancients:
The oral doctrines and occasional explications
of the apostles would not be immediately
forgotten in the churches to which they had
preached, and which had attended to them with
the diligence and reverence which their mission
and character demanded • • . . Thus, by consulting first the holy Scriptures, and next the
writers of the primitive church, we shall make
ourselves acquainted with the will of God; thus
shall we discover the good way, and find that
rest for our souls which will amply recompence
our studies and enquiries . . . (Sermon
83).

z,

On another occasion, speaking of those who denied the
truth of revealed religion, Johnson said:
It is always easy to be on the negative side.
If a man were now to deny that there is salt
19 Johnsonian Miscellanies, Vol. II, 384.
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upon the table, you could not reduce him to an
absurdity. Come, let us try this a little
further. I deny that Canada is taken, and I can
support my denial by pretty good arguments. The
French are a much more numerous people than we;
and it is not likely that they would allow us to
take it. "But the ministry have assured us, in
all the formality of the Gazette, that it is
taken." Very true! But the ministry have put
us to an enormous expense by the war in America,
and it is their interest to persuade us that we
have got something for our money. "But the fact
is confirmed by thousands of men who were at the
taking of it." Aye, but these men have still
more interest in deceiving us. They don't want
that you should think the French have beat them,
but that they have beat the French. Now suppose
you should go over and find that it is really
taken, that would only satisfy yourself; for
when you come home we will not believe you. We
will say, you have been bribed. Yet, Sir,
notwithstanding all these plausible objections,
we have no doubt that Canada is really ours.
such is the weight of common testimony. How
much stronger are the evidences of the Christian
religion! (Life, I, 428).
We may conclude, then, that Johnson's esteem for man's
reason made him as wary of unprovable assumptions in
religion as in other branches of human inquiry.

Unlike

the natural religionists, however, Johnson believed that
man should use his reason to objectively examine religious
revelation against the touchstone of human experience and
the testimony of authority.
The Vision of Theodore is the locus classicus for the
Johnsonian conception of the relation of reason to
religion.

It is written in the form of a moral allegory

Which describes man's difficult journey up the Mountain of
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Existence.

In the allegory, Theodore, Hermit of

Teneriffe, observes some travellers struggling up the
mountain; they graduate from Education's care into the
protection of "two powers of superior aspect 11 20--Reason
and Religion.

As one of the two superior powers on the

Mountain of Existence, properly directed Reason safely
guides the traveller to the truth of Religion:
I am Reason, of all subordinate beings the
noblest and the greatest; who, if thou [a
traveller] wilt receive my laws, will reward
thee like the rest of my votaries, by conducting
thee to Religion (169).
In the allegory, Reason watched Religion's steps "with the
most anxious attention, and was visibly confounded and
perplexed if ever she suffered her regard to be drawn
away" (169).

Early in the journey, some travellers became

literally perplexed--entangled in Habit's chains--and
fell; now, about half-way up the mountain, Reason is
described as becoming philosophically perplexed without
Religion's constant attendance.
As the journey continues, Theodore, rewarded for his
obedience to Reason, meets Religion and chooses her for
his guide.

Again, he observes travellers struggling with

Habits; they attempt two opposite strategies to defeat
20 Samuel Johnson, The Vision of Theodore, in Samuel
!l_ohnson: The Oxford AuthOrs, ed. Donald Greene (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1984), 169.
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them:

either loosening Habit's chains one by one or

bursting out suddenly.

Theodore learns that the first

strategy, of retreating "by the same degree as they
advanced" (171) into Habits' chains, is inadequate.

The

second strategy exhausts the fugitive, weakening him into
renewed susceptibility to the next attack.

Having reached

an impasse where neither alternative works, some of the
travellers fail to recognize the need for outside help.
unaided, they founder.

A few, recognizing their need,

address Reason; these choose less wisely than their
fellows who, like Theodore, address Religion:
Reason counselled them, at their first entrance
upon her province, to enlist themselves among
the votaries of Religion; and informed them that
if they trusted to her alone, they would find
the same fate with her other admirers, whom she
had not been able to secure against Appetites
and Passions, and who, having been seized by
Habits in the regions of Desire, had been
dragged away to the caverns of Despair (169).
The Vision of Theodore uses the term reason in the
sense of abstract logic; as such, it leaves the pilgrims
perplexed and lost.

Indeed, Theodore's Reason was what

Kant would later call "Pure Reason;" it lacked the conunonsense wisdom of "Practical Reason."

What "Pure Reason"

lacks, despite theoretical rigor and adherence to
intellectual demands, is the ability to direct the will to
virtuous behavior.

Pascal sagely recognized this truth in
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his well-known aphorism:

Le coeur

!?ison ne connait point.

Both Theodore and Johnson found

~

ses raisons que la

reason wanting in its abstract and theorizing sense; it
required the assistance of religion to guide men along the
path of virtue.
The second concept of reason developed from seventeenth-century influence was what is sometimes called
Lockean reason.

Alexander Campbell Fraser defines it in

these terms:
[Reason] signifies the inferential faculty, or
power of drawing conclusions, either demonstratively, by deduction from self-evident
principles, or inductively, on grounds of
probability. It is thus synonymous with
reasoning.21
Here, reason is not a "bloodless, cock-sure rationalism,"
but a "particular way of reasoning" based on a "deductiveempirical analysis" [emphasis mine).22
Locke believed in the power and limits of reason.
He, like Johnson, saw reason as an inferential mode of
thinking.

Locke asserted that it is proper for man to use

.
21 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Htunan Understanding, ed. Alexander Campbell Fraser (1894; rpt., New York:
Dover Publications, 1959), II.385n [note to IV.xvii.l of
the Essay).
22 Franklin L. Ford, "The Enlightenment: Towards a
Useful Redefinition," in Studies in the Eighteenth
£entur~:
Papers Presented at the David Nichol Smith
~ernorial Seminar, Canberra, 1966, ed. R. F. Brissenden
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968), 26-27.
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his reason to examine and judge the truths of revelation,
where such truths can be known through our own ideas
(IV. xviii. 4, 8).

Moreover, we are not "obligated" to

believe any statement in religion which is distinctly
contrary to reason (IV.xviii.6).

Reason, however, is not

opposed to faith:
faith is nothing but a firm assent of the mind:
which, if it be regulated, as is our duty,
cannot be afforded to anything but upon good
reason; and so cannot be opposite to it
(IV.xvii.24).
But again, reason is limited because of certain inhibiting
factors beyond man's control.

Personifying reason, Locke

says that:
Reason, though it penetrates into the depths of
the sea and earth, elevates our thoughts as high
as the stars, and leads us through the vast
spaces and large rooms of this mighty fabric,
yet it comes far short of the real extent of
every corporeal being. And there are many
instances wherein it fails us (Essay,
IV .xvii. 9).
Among the instances Locke catalogues are the lack of ideas
(the material of reasoning) to work with, obscure or
imperfect ideas (such as the concept of infinity or a tenthousand-sided figure), an inability to see the connection
between two ideas (as in premise and conclusion), and the
use of unclear terms.

More importantly for our purposes,

Locke asserted that man must provide his reason with the
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empirical data necessary for it to determine the validity
of religion (Essay, IV.xvii.6).
An early eighteenth-century representative of the
Lockean tradition of reason is Berkeley, whose philosophy
Johnson and Boswell occasionally discussed (Life, I, 471;
IV, 27).

Like Johnson, Berkeley ranked reason above

imagination,23 and said that "upon all subjects of moment
. . . a man ought to use his reason," (Alciphron, III,
251) which is "the principle part of our nature"
(Alciphron, III, 86).

Reason is an important regulator:

It is highly needful that all the motions,
and passions of the soul should be under the
regulation and influence of Reason, whose off ice
it is to see they are placed on proper
objects.24
However, like Locke (though with more of a specifically
religious emphasis), Berkeley believed that reason
sometimes leads us "into uncouth paradoxes, difficulties,
and inconsistencies 11 25 because we too often begin with
23 George Berkeley, Alciphron: or, the Minute
Philosopher, in The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of
Cloyne, ed. A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop, 9 vols. (London:
Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1950), Vol. III, 85-86.
24 Berkeley, Sermon II, "On Religious Zeal," in The
Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne, ed. A. A. Luce
and T. E. Jessop (London:
Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1950),
Vol. VIII, 16.
25 Berkeley, ~ Treatise Concerning the Principles of
!!.uman Knowledge (1710), in Works, Vol. II, 25.
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false principles.

He noted that some people attribute too

much to reason while others attribute too little
(~lciphron,

III, 182).

Reason is "a faculty of such

mighty extent and power, especially towards mischief"
(Alciphron, III, 207) that conscience and religion are
necessary to keep it in line with good.

Thus, a

"Christian, indeed, is for confining reason within its due
bounds; and so is every reasonable man'' (Alciphron, III,
182).
Joseph Butler, in his Analogy of Religion,26 while
providing a reasoned defense of Christianity, extended
Locke's arguments and concentrated on proving reason to be
mysterious in its operation and inconclusive in its findings.

He says, "reason gives us the advantage and super-

iority over 11 27 the animal kingdom, and yet it imperfectly
comprehends many of the truths of nature (Analogy, 223).
Reason, according to Butler, can guide us along the way to
faith, but cannot discover all truth:
By reason is revealed the relation, which God
the Father stands in to us. In Scripture are
revealed the relations, which the Son and Holy
26 Johnson's exposure to Butler's Analogy of Religion
can be demonstrated from Christie's Sale Catalogue to
Johnson's personal library. Butler's work is listed as
entry 250.
27 Joseph Butler, The Analogy of Religion to the
£onstitution and Course of Nature (1736ff; rpt., 3rd ed.,
Philadelphia:---:1. B. Lippincott, 1860), 119.
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Spirit stand in to us . . . . God is the governor of the world, upon the evidence of reason;
that Christ is the mediator between God and man,
and the Holy Ghost our guide and sanctifier,
upon the evidence of revelation . . . [emphasis
mine] (Analogy, 194).
Reason is to be a judge of revealed religion:

"Reason

can, and it ought to judge, not only of the meaning, but
also of the morality and the evidence of revelation"
(Analogy, 220), even though in spiritual and revelatory
matters it is limited to examining proofs and evidence and
cannot discover the benefits or consequences of faith,
which is a matter for experience (Analogy, 197).

Like

Locke, Butler believed that reason was by itself incapable
of establishing a full moral system, especially one
uncomplicated by superstition, so that revelation was
necessary for the completion and perfection of morality
just as it was for religion (Analogy, 186-7).
Two main characteristics of the Lockean tradition of
reason--(1) that it is a process, and (2) that it makes
use of experimental data--are important for understanding
Johnson's view.

In the Dictionary, he defines reason as

"the power by which man deduces one proposition from
another, or proceeds from premises to consequences; the
rational faculty."
With process:

This faculty or power he associates
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Few men have been made infidels by argument and
reflection; their actions are not generally the
result of their reasonings, but their reasonings
of their actions. Yet these reasonings, though
they are not strong enough to pervert a good
mind, may yet, when they coincide with interest,
and are assisted by prejudice, contribute to
confirm a man, already corrupted, in his
impieties, and at least retard his reformation,
if not entirely obstruct it (Sermon 2, 54).
Reason is not an automatic faculty which can issue truths
at will; it is a kind of mental tool which man must
energetically manipulate to produce either virtuous or
sinful results.
Further, Johnson frequently associated reason with
experiment or experience--reason needs the data of the
external world to function properly.

An example from

Richard Hooker in the Dictionary shows that "reason is the
director of man's will, discovering in action what is
good; for the laws of well-doing are the dictates of right
reason."
discovery.

Without action there can be no rational
Because Johnson invariably regarded reason as

operating upon an "empirical collection of materials, 11 28
he was not, as Arieh Sachs has claimed, "doomed in his
commitment to the kind of faith which could afford him no
comfort at all. 11 29

Rather, in his Sermons, Johnson

28 Jean Hagstrum, "The Nature of Dr. Johnson's
Rationalism," English Literary History, 17 (1950), 194.
29 "Reason and Unreason in Johnson's Religion,"
M.odern Language Review, 59 (1964), 522.
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consistently maintained that the comfort provided by
religious faith was associated with its capacity to deal
effectively with the actualities of human nature and the
pragmatic problems of this life:
The love of God will engage us to trust in his
protection, to acquiesce in his dispensations,
to keep his laws, to meditate on his perfection,
and to declare our confidence and submission, by
profound and frequent adoration, to impress his
glory on our minds by songs of praise, to
inflame our gratitude by acts of thanksgiving,
to strengthen our faith, and exalt our hope, by
pious meditations, and to implore his protection
of our imbecillity, and his assistance of our
frailty, by humble supplication: and when we
love God with the whole heart, the power of
godliness will be shewn by steadiness in
temptation, by patience in affliction, by faith
in the divine promises, by perpetual dread of
sin, by continual aspirations after higher
degrees of holiness, and contempt of the pains
and pleasures of the world, when they obstruct
the progress of religious excellence (Sermon 13,
145).
~
Far from being spun out of the innate materials of one
person's mind, the products of reason are an aggregate of
cumulative human experience.

Reason must combine with

experience to make virtue or truth a reality:
But though we should suppose, what reason and
experience disprove, that poverty and ignorance
were calamities to those only on whom they fall,
yet surely the sense of their misery might be
sufficient to awaken us to compassion [emphasis
mine] (Sermon 19, 213).
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Johnson's position concerning reason is broader than
either the Peripatetic or the Lockean understanding we
have sketched in the preceding pages.

Johnson insists

that man is a co-agent in his own salvation and that his
will is free; however, Johnson also argues that man cannot
by his own devices, not even with his rational faculty,
manage the integration of his reason with his imagination,
emotions, passions and desires.

Man cannot, unaided by

religion, escape from his present state of vacuity.
Johnson's view of reason as the controlling faculty in
man's nature is more comprehensive than that of many of
his contemporaries; moreover, it is an aspect of his
thought that has been neglected by most modern critics.
Two examples from the Dictionary, under his
definition of reason, testify to Johnson's awareness that
others held a narrower view of reason than his own.

One

illustration is taken from Dryden's Religio Laici:
Dim, as the borrow'd beams of moon and stars
To lonely, weary, wand'ring travellers,
Is reason to the soul: and as on high,
Those rowling fires discover but the sky,
Not light us here; so reason's glimmering ray
Was lent, not to assure our doubtful way,
But guide us upward to a better day.
For Dryden, reason plays only a preparatory role, like the
Greek pedagogue who accompanied the young scholar from
home to school, providing protection and guidance but not
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education.

The dim and borrowed light cannot truly

illumine and fulf .ill but only "guide us upward to a better
day."

The other example, from Swift's Miscellanies,

combines the ideas of a reason "true and just" yet limited
both in religious matters and in our general lives:
It would be well, if people would not lay so
much weight on their own reason in matters of
religion, as to think every thing impossible and
absurd, which they cannot conceive: how often
do we contradict the right rules of reason in
the whole course of our lives? Reason itself is
true and just, but the reason of every particular man is weak and wavering, perpetually swayed
and turn'd by his interests, his passions and
his vices.
Johnson himself sometimes remarks on the various
limitations of reason.

For example, reason is frequently

incapacitated by a simple lack of knowledge or time with
which to work.

Without properly established conditions,

reason is further limited and may not be able to function:
Not only knowledge, judgement, and experience,
but uninterrupted leisure and retirement are
necessary, that the chain of reasoning may be
preserved unbroken, and the mind perform its
operations, without any hindrance from foreign
objects (Sermon 1, 81).
Occasionally we will be able to discover some knowledge,
but because it is only partial or because we insist upon
considering only one aspect of it, we might form a wrong
judgment on the issue (Life, II, 131).
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Even with all necessary information present, however,
reason still

doe~

not always prevail.

Sometimes the

emotions or the violence of the passions overpower reason
and cause us to act against what we have calmly thought
out and know to be right:
Men are very seldom disappointed, except when
their desires are immoderate, or when they
suffer their passions to overpower their reason,
and dwell upon delightful scenes of future
honours, power, or riches, till they mistake
probabilities for certainties, or wild wishes
for rational expectations [emphasis mine]
(Sermon ~' 58) .
Moreover, many times the strength of reason is not sufficient to overcome the impressions of our senses, so that,
for example, someone who strikes us as "void of pity" can
never appear merciful afterwards, however much our reason
may tell us that he is (Sermon!, 41).
Some people purposefully "lay their reason asleep"
(Rambler

~'

288) when they know that its conclusions

would be opposite to their desires, for we do not always
want to do what reason informs is right.

We are like

those engaged
in shew, in merriment and noise [who] please
themselves, not with thinking justly, but with
avoiding to think at all, with a suspence of all
the operations of their intellectual faculties,
which defends them from remembrance of the past,
or anticipation of the future (Sermon 14, 150).
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often we do not refuse to hear reason altogether, but we
manipulate it for our own ends:
Such men suffer frequent disturbance from the
remonstrances of reason, and the reproaches of
conscience, and do not set reason, or conscience, at defiance, but endeavour to pacify
them with assuasive promises of repentance and
amendment (Sermon.!.?_, 162-3).
when this manipulation of reason has continued long
enough, we become a slave to our desires and our willingness to be ruled by reason is weakened.

We resign our

reason to empty expectations for happiness and thus pay
little or no attention to the problems of our current
state (Sermon 15, 163).

Reason then is prevented from

warning us of approaching calamity, and has become a
distorted, if not useless, faculty.

A man sunk into

corruption has so diligently and effectively ignored his
reason that:
he is indeed not easily to be reclaimed; his
reason, as well as his passions, is in
combination against his soul, and there is
little hope, that either persuasion will soften,
or arguments convince him (Sermon!, 41).
However, Johnson steadfastly maintained that reason
was extremely useful in regard to religion.

Johnson's

astute observations on human nature--man's dangerous
Propensity to eschew moral responsibility and to prefer
"the gay sallies of the imagination" (Sermon l.Q., 221) or
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to "indulge any desire that happens to arise, with very
little resistance or compunction" (Sermon 10, 111) in a
futile attempt to fill the vacuity of life--reflect his
belief that man is susceptible to self-indulgence and
self-delusion.

Indeed, it is not easy to tell how

blinding such pleasant arts of self-delusion can be but we
receive some indication from those who are in love, where
we see "how much a secondary passion can cloud our
judgment" (Rambler 28, 152).

True self-knowledge comes

only through the correcting lens of reason which allows us
to
controul all those emotions, which comparison
produces: he will not consider himself as made
poorer by another's wealth, or richer by
another's poverty; he will look, without
malignity, upon superiority, either external or
intellectual; he will be willing to learn of
those that excel in wisdom, and receive
instruction with thankfulness; he will be
willing to impart his knowledge, without fearing
lest he should impair his own importance, by the
improvement of his hearer (Sermon 1J:., 121).
He frequently remarked on the delusion which results when
man fails to use his reason to examine the data of
concrete experience or to yield to the weight of authority
in his search for the stability of truth:
Some of the philosophers, indeed appear to have
sought a nobler, and a more certain remedy, and
to have endeavoured to overpower the force of
death by arguments, and to dispel the gloom by
the light of reason. • • . It is plain, that the
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constitution of mankind is such, that abstruse
and intellectual truths can be taught no otherwise th.an by positive assertion, supported by
some sensible evidence, by which the asserter is
secured from the suspicion of falsehood (Sermon
25, 263-265).

Furthermore, Johnson maintained that we are
blessed with a clearer light, and taught to know
the will of our Maker, not from long deductions
from variable appearances, or intricate disquisitions of fallible reason, but by messengers
inspired by himself . • . (Sermon!, 40).
We can see, then, that Johnson's view of reason is
strikingly original.

He relied on some concepts of

traditional Christian theology as well as on contributions
of the secular philosophers.

However, he selected from

the sources what he saw as cogent and persuasive; he left
behind what simply did not make sense to him.

Johnson

could not ascribe such lofty powers to reason as the
rationalists had conferred on it, but neither could he
dismiss reason as merely a slave to the passions as Luther
and others had argued.

Johnson stressed consistently

personal moral responsibility and the importance of choice
in which practical reason plays its part.

However,

Johnson recognized that even practical reason is weakened
by the rationalizing and self-delusive capacity within
man's nature to think up arguments which justify whatever
he desires.
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Johnson, then, is no irrationalist, no mechanistic
determinist, like Hobbes; neither is he a rigorous
rationalist, like Locke, believing reason capable of
leading man to full understanding and control over his
life.

Johnson recognized that the mind and will

cooperate in shaping man's life by a series of choices-some of which spring from non-rational sources.

Religion

supplies a practical guide partly because it is based upon
divine revelation, but partly also because it is true to
human experience.

Religion provides pragmatic

consolations for the problems caused by man's weak and
self-delusive nature.

II
The substance and depth of Johnson's religious
beliefs has been carefully examined and analyzed by a
number of contemporary critics.30

These same critics have

also detailed the background of Johnson's faith in the
30 See, for example, Chester F. Chapin, The Religious
Thought of Samuel Johnson (Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan--Press, 1968), esp. Chapters v, VI, and VII;
Charles E. Pierce, Jr., The Religious Life of Samuel
~ohnson (London:
The Athlone Press, 1983); Voitle, Samuel
Johnson the Moralist, Chapters VI and VII; Maurice J.
Qu~nlan,--simuel Johnson:
~Layman's Religion (Madison:
University of Wisconsin Press, 1964), esp. Chapters III
through VIII; Richard B. Schwartz, Samuel Johnson and the
!:_roblem of Evil (Madison: University of Wisconsin PresS:1975), 3-7, 22-59; James Gray, Johnson's Sermons: A Study
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), 131-166.
-
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popular doctrines and controversies of the eighteenth
century which surrounded him; arguments over Deism,
whether truth beyond sense data and reason could be known,
the freedom of the human will, and other issues, some of
which has been touched on above.31

Johnson's serious

interest in these matters is reflected in his library,
which at the time of his death contained books by more
than eighty theologians, almost three hundred books and
the largest category in his collection.32
In the previous chapter, we examined Johnson's
steadfast belief that one of the most important inferences
to be drawn from the free agency of man was the relevancy
of Christianity for man's nature.

Without the inescapable

teaching of personal moral responsibility supplied by
religion, and without the invigorating power supplied by
the idea of future rewards and punishments, Johnson
believed that few would struggle with themselves very
long.

Instead, a kind of psychological defense mechanism

would cause them to project the blame for unhappiness onto
.

31 See, for example, Meyrick Carre, Phases of Thought
Clarendon Press, 1949), 292-342;
Sahakian, History of Philosophy, Chapter IX; David
Daiches, ~ Critical History of English Literature, 2nd ed.
(London: Secker and Warburg, 1969), Vol. III, 766-776;
Chapin, The Religious Thought of Samuel Johnson, 82-91.

,!!! England (Oxford:

32 Donald J. Greene, Samuel Johnson's Library: An
b_nnotated Guide (Victoria, B.C.: University of Victoria,
1975), 14.
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other people or onto some external circumstances.

Then, a

world of delusion and wrong perceptions would be created;
this self-delusion would reconcile what they wanted to
believe with what actually is.

Johnson says that "on many

occasions we make the musick which we imagine ourselves to
hear" (Rambler

~,

136) and we constantly practice many

"arts of voluntary delusion" (Rambler 146, 15) which are
intended to reconcile us to our vices and which effectively keep us from inquiring into our true state.
If we refuse to recognize that "the limits of human
enjoyment" are fixed "by immoveable boundaries" (Rambler
178, 173) and allow our desires to increase, to fix on
earthly objects, to inflame the imagination with wild
hopes, pain is inevitable:33
We fail of being happy because we determine to
obtain felicity by means different from those
which God hath appointed (Sermon~' 58).
Johnson reasons to the relevancy of religion by
demonstrating its pragmatism--the motivation provided by
religion fits man's frail and self-delusive nature.
Lacking such motivation, a man will be totally at the
mercy of his animal drives:
.
33 See, for example, The Vanity of Human Wishes; The
Vision of Theodore; Rasselas; sermons 10, 12, 14, 15, 18,
.fQ, 25;""Rambler 2, 13; Rambler 106, 20Q; Rainblers 67, 101,
116,-and 123.
~-
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A man whose attention is disengaged, who is
neither stimulated by hope, nor agitated by
fear, is wholly exposed to the tyranny of his
appetites(Sermon 26, 282).
Nothing is worthy of our ardent wishes, or
intense solicitude, that terminates in this
state of existence; those only make the true use
of life, that employ it in obtaining the favour
of God, and securing everlasting happiness
(Sermon ~' 54).
Moreover, in the Dictionary, the very definition of
religion is "virtue, as founded upon reverence of God, and
expectation of future rewards and punishments."

These

"future rewards and punishments" are the only complete
fulfillment for man; indeed, Johnson stresses that
to live religiously, is to walk, not by sight,
but by faith; to act in confidence of things
unseen, in hope of future recompense, and in
fear of future punishment (Sermon lQ, 110).
Hope itself, then, can be a great blessing and source of
happiness to man but, since it is subject to the misdirections of desire and the wrong expectations of
imagination, it must be regulated by the pragmatic demands
of religion:
He that hopes to find peace by trusting in God,
must obey him; and when he has at any time
failed in his obedience, which amongst the best
men will be very frequent, he must endeavour to
reconcile God to him by repentance. He may then
find another occasion of exercising his trust,
by assuring himself, that "when the wicked
forsakes his way, and the unrighteous man his
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thoughts, and returns unto the Lord, he will
have mercy upon him, and abundantly pardon"
(Sermon 14, 157).
Furthermore, about one-third of the examples Johnson gives
for hope in the Dictiona_ry refer to the fulfillment of
man's hope in religion's promise of eternal life.

A

typical selection is a quotation from Davies:
When in heav'n she shall his essence see,
This is her sov'reign good, and perfect bliss;
Her longing, wishings, hopes, all finish'd be;
Her joys are full, her motions rest in this.
If man does not hope in the promises of God as contained
in revelation, but hopes in the assurances of men, his
hope will be fallacious and great unhappiness will result.
A practical consolation of religion, then, is that it
supplies man with the motivating power to lead an ethical
life.

It is the emphasis on future rewards and

punishments which supplies religion with the remedies
required for man's weak nature.

This is the reason, as

James Gray says, for "religion and morality being
inextricably united" (150); and, in the words of Robert
Voitle, "morality must ultimately be based on religion"
(180).
Johnson follows the tradition, going back at least to
the Restoration, of seeing immortality as the distinctive
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feature of Christian religion.3 4

Boswell once remarked

that "the great article of Christianity is the revelation
of immortality" and Johnson "admitted it was" {Life, III,
188).

While the Deists maintained that they could arrive

at the truth of immortality through deduction, Johnson
appeals to the authority of "the preachers of Christianity" to support his belief:
that any man could be a Jew, and yet deny a
future state, is a sufficient proof that it had
not yet been clearly revealed, and that it was
reserved for the preachers of Christianity to
bring life and immortality to light. In such a
degree of light they are now placed, that they
can be denied or doubted no longer, but as the
gospel, that shews them, is doubted or denied.
It is now certain that we are here, not in our
total, nor in our ultimate exist.e'Ilce, but in a
state of exercise and probation, commanded to
qualify ourselves, by pure hearts and virtuous
actions, for the enjoyment of future felicity in
the presence of God; and prohibited to break the
laws which his wisdom has given us, under the
penal sanction of banishment from heaven into
regions of misery (Sermon 10, 108-109).
The writers of antiquity, Johnson maintains, had no true
knowledge of immortality:
34 Robert south, for instance, states that the
distinctive motivating power of religion is based on the
revelation of immortality. south observes that "the
discriminating excellency of Christianity consists not so
much in this, that it discovers more sublime truths, or
indeed more excellent precepts than philosophy • . . as
that it suggests more efficacious arguments to enforce the
performance of those precepts, than any other religion or
institution whatsoever" (Sermon V [second series], on
Titus 1.1, Sermons, V, 81).
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The ancient heathens, with whose notions we are
acquainted, how far soever they might have
carried their speculations of moral or civil
wisdom, had no conception of a future state
(Sermon 10, 107).
It is this ignorance of futurity which explains their
eager pursuit of temporal happiness and their recommendation of that pursuit to others:
The darkness and uncertainty through which the
heathen were compelled to wander in the pursuit
of happiness, may, indeed, be alleged as an
excuse for many of their seducing invitations to
immediate enjoyment, which the moderns, by whom
they have been imitated, have not to plead. It
is no wonder that such as had no promise of
another state should eagerly turn their thoughts
upon the improvement of that which was before
them; but surely those who are acquainted with
the hopes and fears of eternity, might think it
necessary to put some restraints upon their
imagination (Rambler 29, 158).
The ultimate consolation which religion offers man
for the vacuity of life is the possibility of personal
salvation through "obedience to the divine will" (Rambler

z,

37).

Indeed, the crux of Johnson's position in the

Sermons rests on his observation that man's experience of
vacuity in this life argues for the experience of satiety
in the next life.

For Johnson, salvation simply means a

state of eternal happiness after death.
ary, his only

In the Diction-

definition for salvation is "preservation

from eternal death; reception to the happiness of heaven."
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He uses the word synonymously with "eternal bliss,"
"heaven," "eternal happiness," and "future happiness."
There can be no doubt that Johnson regards the attainment
of this state as the only proper goal of human existence.
saving one's soul is "the business of life" (Sermon

1...2.,

161) and "the object of greatest importance" (Life, IV,
417).

The problem of how salvation is attained by man is

"the important question, which it becomes every human
being to study from the first hour of reason to the last"
(Sermon 28, 302).
Indeed, the question of how salvation could be
attained--specifically, the role of good works or morality
and the role of faith--was a matter of considerable debate
between the Evangelicals and the Anglicans in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

Both factions agreed

that works without faith were vain; however, the Evangelicals accused the Anglicans of over-emphasizing morality at
the expense of saving faith.

The Evangelicals feared that

such emphasis created the erroneous belief that the
performance of good works was sufficient for salvation.
For example, William Law, in his Serious Call To

~

Devout

b.n.Q. Holy Life, answered the question of how salvation is
attained by emphasizing the fact that man must struggle to
perform good works:
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Weak and imperfect men shall, notwithstanding
their frailties and defects, be received as
having pleased God if they have done their
utmost to please Hirn . . . • We cannot off er to
God the service of angels; we cannot obey Hirn as
man in a state of perfection could; but fallen
men can do their best, and this is the perfection that is required of us; it is only the
perfection of our best endeavours, a careful
labor to be as perfect as we can (66-67).35
On the other hand, the Evangelical's overwhelming
emphasis on faith and on the utter inadequacy of good
works opened them up to the accusation of abandoning
morality totally.36

The Evangelical position was

popularized by George Whitefield and John Wesley.

For

example, Wesley insisted that man's good works amounted to
nothing without faith.

Indeed, Wesley maintained that man

possessed "a present inward-light, a saving faith" and
that salvation was offered gratuitously through Christ's
universal sacrifice for mankind:
For there is nothing we are, or have, or do,
which can deserve the least thing at God's hand
. • . . Wherewithal then shall a sinful man
35 Similar passages are found in Samuel Clarke,
Sermon l, I, 2.
36 John Calvin's first and most important dogma in
his Institutes of the Christian Religion is that God is
totally sovereign; man is totally depraved (II, 68). In
this concept of God's omnipotence and man's complete
depravity are implied the doctrines of predestination
(election and reprobation}, the lack of freedom of the
Will, and the limited atonement (Christ died only to save
the elect. Calvin's beliefs in election and limited
atonement denied the efficacy of good works.
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atone for any the least of his sins? With his
own works? No! Were they ever so many or holy,
they are not his own, but God's.37
wesley did admit that there was some room for human volitions in the appropriation of divine grace, but he
stressed that man ultimately relied on the gratuitous
nature of Christ's grace:
a full reliance on the blood of Christ; a trust
in the merits of His life, death and resurrection; a recumbency upon him as our atonement and
our life, as given for us, and living in .!:!.§.; and
in consequence hereof, a closing with him, and
cleaving to him (V, 9).
The well-known Evangelical clergyman William Romaine,
whose work Miss Hill Boothby recommended to Johnson,38
wrote that saving faith is an inward experience; it needs
no support from human experience or from the general
testimony of man:
And whoever has received these ordinary operations of the Holy Spirit, has in his own heart
clear and full testimony of the Godhead, and
almighty power of the blessed Spirit. He wants
no outward miracles. This great inward work is
to him complete evidence; and he is able to rest
his salvation with as full trust and confidence
upon it, as if he had seen the apostles exert
their miraculous gifts and graces • • . . We
37 John Wesley, The Works of the Reverend John
ed. John Telford--(New York: n.p:-;-1835),

~esley, ~ !1.:_,
7•

v,

38 Hill Boothby, An Account of the Life of Dr. Samuel
ed. Richard Wright {London:---ri'.P:-:-180S-)-,-100-102.

~ohnson,
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must plead and intreat, and importune you to
seek his assistance, but the success must come
from him. The word itself is but a dead letter,
unless he animate it; and therefore the preaching of it can have no power, unless he accompany
it. We may plant and water, but he must give
the increase.39
In similar fashion, in his Sermon on "The Parable of the
Ten Virgins," Tillotson warns against the danger of
emphasizing the efficacy of virtuous actions without
faith:
Some have proceeded to that height, as if they
could drive a strict bargain with God for
eternal life and happiness; and have treated him
in so insolent a manner, by their doctrine of
the merit of their devotions and good works, as
if God were as much beholden to them for their
service and obedience, as they are to him for
the reward of them (Sermon l1_, II, 551).
All this Johnson understood and his praise for the works
of Wesley and Whitefield was sincere but qualified (Life,
I, 458; III, 409).

Indeed, there were some things about

the Evangelical position of which he was severely
critical.

The "inner light of grace," he told Maxwell,

seemed to him a vicious principle because it was neither
reasonable nor natural based on his observations of human
nature:
39 William Romaine, "A Discourse on the Benefit Which
the Holy Spirit of God Is of to Man, in his Journey
through Life," Works (London:
n.p., 1821), Vol. IV, 275;
288-289.
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Speaking of the inward light, to which some
Methodists pretended, he [Johnson] said, it was
a principle utterly incompatible with social or
civil security.
If a man pretends to a principle of action of which I can know nothing,
nay, not so much as that he has it, but only
that he pretends to it; how can I tell what that
person may be prompted to do? When a person
professes to be governed by a written ascertained law, I can know where to find him! (Life,
II, 126).
-Perhaps Johnson's most characteristic religious
assumption is that salvation is offered not gratuitously
but conditionally:
Trust in God, that trust to which perfect peace
is promised, is to be obtained only by
repentance, obedience, and supplication, not by
nourishing in our own hearts a confused idea of
the goodness of God, or a firm persuasion that
we are in a state of grace; by which some have
been deceived, as it may be feared, to their
destruction. We are not to imagine ourselves
safe, only because we are not harassed with
those anxieties about our future state, with
which others are tormented; but which are so far
from being proofs of reprobation, that though
they are often mistaken by those that languish
under them, they are more frequently evidences
of piety, and a sincere and fervent desire of
pleasing God. We are not to imagine, that God
approves us because he does not afflict us, nor,
on the other hand, to persuade ourselves too
hastily that he afflicts us, because he loves
us. We are, without expecting any extraordinary
effusions of light, to examine our actions by
the great and unchangeable rules of revelation
and reason, "to do to others as we would that
they should do to us," and to love God with all
our heart, and express that love by keeping his
commandments (Sermon 14, 156-157).
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Christ's sacrifice has merited salvation but only for
those who fulfill the conditions under which it is
offered.

Johnson's Sermons reflect his understanding of a

God who is closely associated with human experience:
It is just that we should consider every opportunity of performing a good action, as the gift
of God, one of the chief gifts which God bestows
upon man, in his present state, and endeavour to
improve the blessing, that it may not be withdrawn from us, as a talent unemployed; for it is
not certain, that he, who neglects this call to
his duty, will be permitted to live, till he
hears another (Sermon 19, 212).
For Johnson, God does not justify or sanctify man without
man's co-operation in this process as a free and responsible moral agent.

As Jean Hagstrum has pointed out, this

"belief in conditional salvation" constitutes one of the
"main features" of Johnson's Christianity.40

Johnson

warns against allowing faith in salvation to obscure the
fact that there are still terms to be fulfilled:
Yet let us likewise be careful, lest an
erroneous opinion of the all-sufficiency of our
saviour's merits lull us into carelessness and
security. His merits are indeed all-sufficient!
But he has prescribed the terms on which they
are to operate (Sermon 28, 304).

40 Jean H. Hagstrum, "On Dr. Johnson's Fear of
Death," Journal of English Literary History, 14 (1947),
314.
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The Evangelicals in general and the Calvinists in
particular were absolutely insistent on salvation by grace
alone.

Nonetheless, they placed great stress on the

importance of virtue and good works not as a means of
gaining salvation but as a sign that one is of the elect.
If one believed himself to be saved and continued to live
a life of wickedness, he would be deceived because no man
truly saved by divine grace could continue in such a life.
The Calvinists, therefore, had the strongest motivation to
manifest good works--not as a means of earning their
salvation (for such is clearly impossible) but rather as a
means of displaying their membership in the elect.

The

Evangelicals in practice tended to place greater stress on
holiness of living and personal virtue than did the
Anglicans, who were, again in practice, somewhat more
relaxed about individual morality.

Consequently, Johnson

never challenged the orthodox position of salus sola
gratia but his practical nature advocated the necessity of
maintaining moral standards given the weakness of human
nature.

He found it understandably difficult to see how

man could be genuinely "saved" and still lack personal
virtue.

The Calvinists agreed.

semantic one.

The only difference was a

Johnson spoke of good works as a condition

Of salvation, while the Puritans and the Methodists called

good works a manifestation of salvation.
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Johnson was fearful of a failure to manifest
sufficient virtue, whether it be called a condition or a
sign of salvation, and this anxiety led to his almost
pathological fear of death.41

He was skeptical of the

!!Ssurance of salvation felt by the followers of Wesley and
Calvin, remarking to Boswell that "the most rational .
look upon salvation as conditional; and as they never can
be sure that they have complied with the conditions, they
are afraid" (Life, IV, 278).

Johnson obviously included

himself among "the most rational" group.

Boswell reported

a similar remark made during a visit to Oxford during the
same year:
• . . as I cannot be sure that I have fulfilled
the conditions on which my salvation is granted,
I am afraid I am one of those who may be damned
(looking dismally). DR. ADAMS: What do you mean
by damned? JOHNSON: (passionately and loudly)
Sent to Hell, Sir, and punished everlastingly!
(Life, IV, 299).
Not many critics who have given attention to
Johnson's religious beliefs have paid sufficient attention
to the fact that his fear of death is above all a logical
and natural extension of his conviction that holy fear is
necessary for virtuous living and hence for eternal
41 For an excellent analysis of the intellectual
foundation for Johnson's fear of death see Jean Hagstrum's
article, cited above. Hagstrum's fine study makes some of
my points redundant.
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happiness.42

He envied those who were so very sure they

were saved but his common sense told him that such
assurance was highly questionable.

Far from being

something to be ashamed of, the fear of death, in
Johnson's view, is the mark of a good and pious man.

When

Boswell observed that William Dodd, the convicted forger,
seemed unafraid at his hanging, Johnson replied:
Sir,
legs
more
view

Dr. Dodd would have given his hands and
to have lived. The better a man is, the
afraid he is of death, having a clearer
of infinite purity (Life, III, 154).

In Sermon 14, Johnson reminds his readers that
those anxieties about our future state . . . far
from being proofs of reprobation . • . are more
frequently evidences of piety, and a sincere
and fervent desire of pleasing God (157).
The fear of death is actually man's anxiety over not
having fulfilled the conditions necessary for salvation;
hence, it is a fear of what might follow death--hell.

As

such, it is something to be desired and cultivated, not
something to be avoided.43

No other reason can account

42 See, for example, Quinlan, Samuel Johnson:
Layman's Religion, 127, 135-136; Hagstrum, "On Dr.
Johnson's Fear of Death,'' 308-319.

A

43 For additional evidence of Johnson's belief that
the fear of what follows death positively influences man's
moral conduct, see Johnsonian Miscellanies, I, 223-234,
227, II, 16; Life, II, 298, IV, 278, v, 180; Thraliana, I,
203; Samuel Johnson, The Letters of Samuel Johnson, col.
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for his general lack of reticence about his own fears or
for having the face of his watch inscribed in Greek with
the words of the New Testament--"the night cometh [when no
man can work]" (Life, II, 57).
Johnson believed that the practice of virtue would
yield remedies for the vacuity of life because virtuous
actions help to alleviate the miseries and problems of
daily living and partially contribute to man's hope for
eternal salvation.

For example, he states that

the terms, upon which we are to hope for any
benefits from the merits of Christ, are faith,
repentance, and subsequent obedience (Sermon 9,
104).44
Even though a man does not know if these conditions have
been met in his life, he must strive to live ethically.
In his statement of purpose for Sermon 28, Johnson names
the same three virtues:
and ed. R. W. Chapman (Oxford:
III, 143.

Clarendon Press, 1952),

44 The use of all three designations was perhaps not
as common as simply "repentance and faith" or "faith and
obedience," though the meaning was the same no matter what
combination was used. For example, Archbishop Secker
employs the same categories as Johnson in his popular
Lectures on the Catechism of the Church of England (1769):
Now these Conditions, or Obligations, on our
Part, are three: that we renounce what God
forbids: that we believe what he teaches, and
do what he commands; or, in other words,
Repentance, Faith, and Obedience (17-18).
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Salvation is promised to us Christians, on the
terms of faith, obedience, and repentance. I
shall therefore endeavour to shew how • . . we
may exert faith, perform obedience, and exercise
repentance, in a manner which our heavenly
Father may, in his infinite mercy, vouchsafe to
accept [Johnson's own emphasis] (Sermon 28,
303).
By faith, first of all, Johnson signifies a firm
belief in Christian doctrine.

For instance, faith is

defined as:
a full and undoubting confidence in the declarations made by God in the holy Scriptures, a
sincere reception of the doctrines taught by our
blessed Saviour, with a firm assurance that he
died to take away the sins of the world, and
that we have, each of us, a part in the boundless benefits of the universal sacrifice (Sermon
28, 303-304).
Also, the first definition of faith in the Dictionary is
simply "belief of the revealed truths of religion."

This

notion of faith is woven throughout Johnson's discussions
of the topic in the Sermons.

For example, in Sermon]_, "a

well-grounded belief" is equated with "a firm and settled
persuasion of the fundamental articles of our religion"
(83).

The person who lacks faith possesses
a mind restless and undetermined, continually
fluctuating betwixt various opinions, always in
pursuit of some better scheme of duties, and
more eligible system of faith, eager to embrace
every new doctrine, and adopt the notions of
every pretender to extraordinary light (Sermon
]_, 83).
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The truths which are the proper objects of belief
include all of divine revelation--"the declarations made
bY God in the holy Scriptures .

the doctrines taught

by our blessed Saviour" (Sermon 28, 303-4).

Of course,

some of these truths and doctrines are more important than
others.

Sermon 22 contains a brief list of truths to be

believed:
we must then endeavour to invigorate our faith
by returning frequently to meditate upon the
objects of it, our creation, our redemption, the
means of grace, and the hope of glory (Sermon
22, 235).
As we have already seen, it is the last item on this list
which Johnson seems to have considered the most useful-the one most likely to prompt the performance of virtuous
activity.
Faith, then, provides some practical consolations for
the vacuity of life.
happiness in eternity.

First, it teaches us to seek our
The Sermons are filled with

references to the preparatory nature of this life for the
life of the world to come, with the relative
insignificance of what happens to us now except as it
relates to what we shall be in the hereafter, and with the
great blessing of Christianity in bringing immortality to
light [Sermons~, 10, 25].

Religion offers man "a
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reasonable expectation of a more happy and permanent
existence" (Sermon 4, 44).
second, and somewhat paradoxically, this very focus
on eternal happiness brings some degree of happiness or at
least contentment to this life.

Most of our unhappiness

is caused by some "fictitious good" (Adventurer 111, 451),
so that when we focus on eternity and give up our
desperate grasping after worldly things, we begin to grow
happier, not only because of our future hope but also
because, by reducing and devaluing our earthly wants, we
grow less anxious about them.

Here religion serves as a

regulator of desire, keeping us from fixating upon every
worldly object as some new thing necessary for happiness,
and thereby allowing a natural happiness to rise up in the
soul:45
The consideration of the vanity of all human
purposes and projects, deeply impressed upon the
mind, necessarily produces that diffidence in
all worldly good, which is necessary to the
regulation of our passions, and the security of
our innocence. In a smooth course of
prosperity, an unobstructed progression from
45 Johnson repeatedly stresses the healing benefits
of recognizing our weak condition in the light of
eternity. See, for example, The Vanity of Human Wishes,
Idler 37, 116, Adventurer 67,~7-389, AdVenturer 119,
461-468";" Rambler 8, 40-46,~ambler 17, 92-97, Rambler 28,
156, Rambler 58, 309-313, Sermon 15-,-112, Sermon 18, 193.
Other Christian writers also emphasized the practical
benefits of frequently focusing on our eternal destiny.
See, for example, William Law, A Serious Call, 116, 122,
133-147, 268.
--
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wish to wish, while the success of one design
facilitates another, and the opening prospect of
life shews pleasures at a distance, to conclude
that the passage will be always clear, and that
the delights which solicit from far, will, when
they are attained, fill the soul with enjoyments, must necessarily produce violent desires,
and eager pursuits, contempt of those that are
behind, and malignity to those that are before.
But the full persuasion that all earthly good is
uncertain in the attainment, and unstable in the
possession, and the frequent recollection of the
slender supports on which we rest, and the
dangers which are always hanging over us, will
dictate inoffensive modesty, and mild benevolence (Sermon ]d, 134).
This process of a "backward transfer" of happiness from
futurity to present is made clearest when Johnson considers the comforts of the dying:
To afford adequate consolations to the last
hour, to cheer the gloomy passage through the
valley of the shadow of death, and to ease that
anxiety, to which beings, prescient of their own
dissolution, and conscious of their own danger,
must be necessarily exposed, is the privilege
only of revealed religion (Sermon 25, 261).
Elsewhere he says, "Piety is the only proper and adequate
relief of a decaying man" (Rambler 69, 367).

To recognize

a secure future in the face of death is certainly a source
of happiness in this life; so that sick or well, anyone
who contemplates his end with a focus on his eternal
reward should derive some comfort from it.

Yet, Johnson

remained terrified at the prospect of death because
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experience had taught him that the conditions of salvation
were extremely difficult to fulfill.
Johnson's understanding of faith as a means to salvation, and hence as a consolation for the vacuity of life,
derives not from what faith is but from what it does--it
produces obedience and repentance.

Faith that does not

produce these attributes is not true faith.

Johnson makes

this very clear when he asserts that those whose faith is
not productive of good works will be consigned to
everlasting flames:
Those who contented themselves with believing,
and professing Christianity, without obeying its
precepts; those, who while they call the Author
of our faith, the Lord, their Master, and their
God, and yet neglect his precepts and work
iniquity, will be rejected by him at the last
day, as those whom he has never known; those to
whom his regard never was extended; and, notwithstanding the confidence with which they may
claim his intercession, will not be distinguished by any favour from other sinners (Sermon

11,

156).

To have the same opinions naturally produces
kindness, even when these opinions have no
consequence; because we rejoice to find our
sentiments approved by the judgment of another.
But those who concur in Christianity, have, by
that agreement in principle, an opportunity of
more than speculative kindness; they may help
forward the salvation of each other, by counsel
or by reproof, by exhortation, by example; they
may recall each other from deviations, they may
excite each other to good works (Sermon 11, 122123).
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Faith, the cause of obedience, is also considered an act
of obedience, a virtue, a good work.
Johnson's morally pragmatic view of religion is
demonstrated by the fact that he places less emphasis on
faith than on obedience and repentance--virtues which are
intrinsically linked to authority.

It is not faith, not

the intellectual assent to theological propositions, which
is central for Johnson but rather repentance and obedience.

Indeed, the references to faith in his works and

conversations are minimal.

Boswell reports only one

statement regarding faith (Life, IV, 123); virtue, by
contrast, appears nineteen times in the index to the Life.
Moreover, in the periodical essays, Johnson never
discusses faith as such, though several explicitly treat
religious subjects and though Rambler 110 is entirely
devoted to the topic of repentance.

Most of the explicit

references to faith occur in the Sermons; indeed, Sermons

i,

z,

10, 14, and 28 contain substantial discussions of

the topic.

Finally, in Johnson's prayers and diaries,

where obedience and repentance are a constant theme, there
are no more than sixteen uses of the word faith or its
synonyms.46
46 see, for example, pages 64, 66, 76, 79, 106, 124,
130, 140, 144, 162, 262, 293, 302, 363, 369, 378 in Samuel
Johnson, Diaries, Prayers, and Annals, ed. E. L. McAdam,
Jr., with Donald and Mary Hyde. Vol. I of The Yale
~dition of the Works of Samuel Johnson (New Haven:
Yale
University Press, 1958).
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Indeed, it is not faith but the second virtue-obedience--which receives the heaviest emphasis in the
Johnsonian scheme of religion.

For Johnson, the

performance, in obedience to divine law, of virtuous acts
is the practical manifestation of religion.

As we may

recall, the very definition of religion in the Dictionary
is "virtue, as founded upon reverence of God, and
expectation of future rewards and punishments."

Johnson

asserts that tranquility can be found only by the man who
realizes that he is "a being sent into the world only to
secure immortal happiness by his obedience to those laws
which he has received from his Creatour" (Sermon.§., 63).
Rambler l designates "the perpetual renovation of the
motives of virtue" as "the end for which all the rites of
religion seem to be instituted" (40).

In Sermon 1 1 the

salvif ic necessity of good works is forcefully asserted:
The Bible tells us, in plain and authoritative
terms, that there is a way to life, and a way to
death; that there are acts which God will
reward, and acts that he will punish. That with
soberness, righteousness, and godliness, God
will be pleased; and that with intemperance,
iniquity, and impiety, God will be offended; and
that of those who are careful to please him, the
reward will be such, as eye hath not seen, nor
ear heard; and of those who, having offended
him, die without repentance, the punishment will
be inconceivably severe, and dreadful (Sermon 3,
29-30).

-

170

clearly, this constitutes an extraordinarily simple and
logical understanding of the Christian gospel; it reflects
Johnson's pragmatic belief in a God who is intimately
associated with human experience.

Indeed, the belief that

salvation is partially the reward of virtue is completely
typical of Johnson's Sermons.
It is here, however, that a contradiction seems to
arise.

In the previous chapter, we examined Johnson's

firm conviction that man's nature is weak, constantly
prone to temptations, and morally corrupt.

Nevertheless,

the eternal destiny of this weak creature is dependent
upon his fulfillment of extremely exacting divine
precepts.

Johnson, however, avoids this contradiction by

mitigating the demands of divine righteousness.

So,

though it is true that man's eternal happiness hinges
chiefly on obedience, it is also true that man often fails
to be obedient.

God in his mercy requires only that man

do his best, and he graciously accepts man's "best
endeavours" as if they were truly meritorious.
Given man's natural weakness, it would be quite
unreasonable for God to do otherwise.

Indeed, claims

Johnson, reason itself tells us that if God did insist on
perfect obedience, man's worship would be vain:
If God were a power unmerciful and severe, a
rigid exacter of unvaried regularity and
unfailing virtue; if he were not to be pleased
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but with perfection, nor to be pacified after
transgressions and offenses; in vain would the
best men endeavour to recommend themselves to
his favour; in vain would the most circumspect
watch the motions of his own heart, and the most
diligent apply himself to the exercise of virtue
. . . . God would not be to be served, because
all service would be rejected . • . (Sermon 2,
18).

-

God in his mercy therefore requires only sincere
obedience.

As long as the attempts to obey him are

heartfelt and earnest, he will overlook the inevitable
shortcomings.

This kind of God, writes Johnson, is not

vainly worshipped:
It is reasonable, that we should endeavour to
please him, because we know that every sincere
endeavour will be rewarded by him; that we
should use all the means in our power, to
enlighten our minds, and regulate our lives,
because . . • our conduct, though not exactly
agreeable to the divine idea of rectitude . . .
will not be condemned by that God, who judges of
the heart, weighs every circumstance of our
lives, and admits every real extenuation of our
feelings and transgressions (Sermon 2, 19).47
The final virtue of repentance is best viewed as an
extension of this divine leniency.

Though the believer

can be assured that God will automatically overlook his
errors and shortcomings as long as they are unintentional,
some provision must also be made for deliberate transgressions.

Repentance supplies this need.

Even "those that

47 For similar statements, se~ Sermon ~, 72; Sermon
~, 304-305.

2, 98; Sermon
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have polluted themselves with studied and premeditated
wickedness" are "not for ever excluded from his favour"
because repentance gives them the
means by which pardon may be obtained, and by
which they may be restored to those hopes of
happiness, from which they have fallen by their
own fault (Sermon l, 19).
Without the benefit of repentance, men could only languish
hopelessly in their sins and the "progress of life could
only [be] the natural descent of negligent despair from
crime to crime" (Rambler 110, 221).
In the Dictionary, Johnson defines repentance as
"sorrow for sin, such as produces newness of life, penitence."

However, his pragmatic attitude towards religion

is again demonstrated through his emphasis of reform over
contrition in the practice of repentance.

Sorrow is a

necessary constituent, but the sinner
is only to expect mercy upon his reformation.
For reformation is the chief part of repentance;
not he that only bewails and confesses, but he
that forsakes his sins, repents acceptably to
God (Sermon l, 21).
Rambler 110 stresses a similar point:
Repentance is the relinquishment of any practice, from the conviction that it has offended
God. Sorrow, and fear, and anxiety, are
properly not parts, but adjuncts of repentance
(Rambler 110, 223).
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The mere intention of reforming is sufficient only
when the time or opportunity for reformation is denied.
such is the situation addressed in Sermon 20.

The

Reverend William Dodd, a popular preacher, convicted of
forgery and sentenced to capital punishment, appealed to
Johnson for help.

Johnson assented and sought to gain a

pardon, but without success.

Johnson then wrote Sermon

28, which was to be preached by the soon-to-be-hanged
clergyman before the other prisoners at Newgate.

The

sermon promotes repentance with a gallows urgency:
God will consider that life as amended, which
would have been amended if he had spared it.
Repentance in the sight of man, even of the
penitent, is not known but by its fruits: but
our Creator sees the fruit, in the blossom, or
the seed (Sermon 28, 308).
Repentance, if done properly, has wonderful efficacy; it
brings forgiveness, reconciliation, and a renewed hope of
eternal blessedness.

Even a lifelong course of sin will

not condemn a man who repents in time:
Yet shall no man be excluded from future
happiness . • . even by long habits of
intemperance, or extortion. Repentance and new
life will efface his crimes, reinstate him in
the favour of his judge, restore him to those
promises which he has forfeited, and open the
paths to eternal happiness (?ermon l.f., 232).
Indeed, a man killed in the very commission of a crime can
be saved if he truly repents:
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BOSWELL: When a man is the aggressor, and by
ill-usage forces on a duel in which he is
killed, have we not little ground to hope that
he is gone into a state of happiness? JOHNSON:
Sir, we are not to judge determinately of the
state in which a man leaves this life. He may
in a moment have repented effectually, and it is
possible may have been accepted by GOD (Life,
IV, 212).

This belief necessarily implies a less comforting idea-the failure to repent can condemn a sinner to eternal
punishment.

For repentance is not just one way of

abolishing past sin; it is the only way.
That Johnson himself felt strongly about the efficacy
and necessity of repentance is especially indicated by its
dominance as a theme throughout his prayers and
meditations.

The majority of his prayers, for instance,

contain a plea for assistance in repenting.

The birthday

prayer of 1758 is typical:
Almighty and most merciful Father, who yet
sparest, and yet supportest me, who supportest
me in my weakness, and sparest me in my sins
. . . enable me to improve the time which is yet
before me to thy glory and my own salvation.
Impress upon my soul such repentance of the days
misspent in idleness and folly, that I may
henceforward diligently attend to the business
of my station in this world, and to all the
duties which thou hast commanded (65).
The focus here is also typical--not on contrition but on
amendment of life.

Johnson's minute examination of his

failings is not at all unusual in the Christian tradition.
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for example, Donald J. Greene refutes the charge of "marbidity" in Johnson's "Prayers and Meditations" and he
suggests that their emphasis on self-condemnation fits
into the Anglican tradition of the General Confession.48
If sorrow is mentioned in his prayers, it is usually in an
appeal that it might be productive of reformation, as in
this prayer of 1754:
Almighty God vouchsafe to sanctify unto me the
reflections and resolutions of this day, let not
my sorrow be unprofitable; let not my resolutions be vain. Grant that my grief may produce
true repentance (55).
As this quotation also indicates, Johnson's famous
resolutions, so often made and so often broken, cannot
really be understood apart from his practice of repentance.

True contrition brings forth resolutions which, in

turn, ought to bring forth amendment.

For example, on the

anniversary of his mother's death, Johnson writes:
I am sorrowful, o Lord; let not my sorrow be
without fruit. Let it be followed by holy
resolutions and lasting amendment (66).
Although repentance clearly has an eminent role in
Johnson's understanding of religion, it nevertheless
occupies a subordinate position to obedience.

As Johnson

48 Donald J. Greene, Samuel Johnson (New York:
Twayne Publishers, Inc., 1970), 116-117.
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told Mrs. Knowles, the terms of salvation are first of all
obedience, and "where obedience has failed, then, as
~uppletory

294).

to it, repentance" [emphasis mine] (Life, II,

Not only is repentance subordinate to obedience, it

is, to some degree, itself a form of obedience.

First of

all, if, as Johnson believes, repentance consists chiefly
of reformation or amendment, then repentance could also be
defined simply as the resumption of obedience.

Of course,

repentance has other elements but the return to obedience
seems paramount.

Second, Johnson describes repentance,

like faith, as a duty (Sermon

l

1

an act of religious obligation.

26)--in other words, as
Hence, although Johnson

usually prefers to treat repentance and obedience as
fairly distinct categories, there does appear to be
considerable overlap.
That it is possible to be saved by the practice of
faith, obedience and repentance presupposes that certain
provisions have been made for man's weak, sinful and
corrupt nature.

Salvation would not be possible without

Christ's satisfaction for sin.

Man's sin required a

"propitiation," which, among other things, compensated for
"the imperfections of our obedience and the inefficacy of
our repentance" (Life, IV, 129).

It is Christ's "merits"

Which supply "what is deficient in our endeavours" (Sermon

1§., 304), allowing God to accept imperfect instead of
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perfect obedience.

While the Redemption renders man's

good works acceptable to God, it is grace that gives
sinful man the power to perform them.
By grace in the religious sense, Johnson almost
always signifies divine assistance in the form of direct
influence or inspiration; in Roman Catholic theology this
is called "actual grace."49

Grace gives the Christian

both the desire and the power to obey God; indeed, no good
work is possible without divine assistance.

In his Easter

Eve prayer of 1757, Johnson prays for "that grace without
which I can neither will nor do what is acceptable to
thee" (63).

In a prayer of 1750, Johnson wrote that "by

Grace whatever I have thought or acted acceptable to
Thee has been inspired and directed" (42).50

Furthermore,

grace is especially needed for the exercise of repentance:
But as this reformation is not to be accomplished by our own natural power, unassisted by
God, we must, when we form our first resolutions
of a new life, apply ourselves, with fervour and
constancy, to those means which God has prescribed for obtaining his assistance (Sermon~'
24).51
49 Though grace is the word Johnson commonly uses to
refer to divine help and influence, it should be noted
that Holy Spirit is employed in the same sense almost as
often.
50 For similar usage of the term grace, see Samuel
Johnson, Diaries, Prayers, and Annals, 70, 96, 118.
51 For Johnson's prayers for assistance in repenting,
see Diaries, Prayers, and Annals, 46, 69, 92.
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As this quotation suggests, divine aid does not come
unbidden to the needy believer; it must be sought for,
chiefly in prayer but also in the Eucharist, which imparts
"the supernatural and extraordinary influences of grace"
(Sermon]!, 90).

"We must," adds Johnson in the passage

from Sermon 2 noted above, "implore a blessing by frequent
prayer, and confirm our faith by the holy sacrament"
(Sermon£, 24).

Acquiring grace, furthermore, requires

more than ordinary effort.

It requires not only "fervour

and constancy," but in the performance, "our utmost
natural powers" because "God only co-operates with the
diligent and the watchful" (Sermon]!, 101).

In other

words, God gives grace not gratuitously but in response to
human effort.
This is not to suggest, however, that Johnson
believes that men can be saved by good works.

Not only

does he recognize the insufficiency of human obedience,
which God mercifully accepts instead of true
righteousness, but he insists upon the necessity of grace
for all worthy human actions.

Though Johnson's

gualif ication of the efficacy of good works does not
constitute a denial of the salvific value of works, it
clearly defines that value in negative terms.

Works are

not that .Qy which we shall be saved but that without which
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we shall not be saved.

They are necessary but not

necessarily sufficient for salvation.

Man cannot save

himself; he must rely on divine assistance for every good
work.

Indeed, in all of Johnson's Sermons, especially in

the conclusions, we find requests for the grace needed to
obey and repent.

Johnson's position throughout his

sermons is that the Christian co-operates with the grace
of God in attaining eternal happiness.52
Johnson cannot escape the orthodox dictum that no man
is worthy of salvation or able to earn it; yet, Johnson
cannot accept a concept of salvation which is barren of
good works.

His ambivalence and restless efforts to

reconcile his pragmatic moral sense with accepted
Christian doctrine make him somewhat unique in eighteenth
century thought.

Few critics of Johnson's religion have

paid sufficient heed to this uniqueness.
Johnson, then, believes in a religion which elevates
man--not to the level assigned him by the Deists, rationalists, or natural religionists certainly, for man remains
52 Though Johnson would deny the Roman Catholic
notion that divinely-inspired good works have merit, his
conception of the relationship between obedience and grace
bears a striking resemblance to the doctrine of justification promulgated by the catholic Church at the
Council of Trent, in opposition to Protestant teaching.
See, for example, Karl Rahner and Herbert Vorgrimler,
"Justification," Theological Dictionary, 247-248; and P.
De Letter, "Justification," New Catholic Encyclopedia (New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), VIII, 77-92.
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weak and imperfect--but at least to a level where he can
exercise some moral freedom and thus bear responsibility
for his actions.

As we have seen, man is not perceived by

Johnson as merely the passive object of divine favor, but
as the co-agent of his own eternal happiness.

Man has the

ability and the freedom to co-operate or not to co-operate
with divine grace, and he will be rewarded or punished
accordingly.

So, despite man's limitations, weaknesses,

and his need for divine leniency and assistance, he still
retains some measure of prelapsarian freedom and dignity.
It is clear from Johnson's Sermons that his understanding of religion is not one which stresses the utter
inability of man to contribute to his own salvation or
which stresses the totally gracious nature of God's gift
of eternal life.

Instead, he emphasizes moral endeavor as

a remedy for the vacuity of life and as an indispensable
requirement for the consolation of eternal happiness.
Though Johnson apparently considers repentance and faith
as necessary for eternal happiness, obedience is the
paramount condition.

As we have seen, his understanding

of faith and repentance is so moralistic that there does
not seem to be much difference between his asserting that
eternal happiness depends on obedience or virtue.
the Sermons, repentance essentially means renewed

Within
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obedience, and faith 1 s value for eternal happiness seems
to derive chiefly from its being the cause of obedience.
Consequently, the reasons for religion's great
consolation for the vacuity of life is its pragmatism; it
provides solutions for the problems caused by man's frail
and self-delusive nature.

It provides not just emotional

stability (Adventurer 107, 445), but a standard of
judgment by which to evaluate things of this world; it
allows us
to proceed with our eyes open, and to see our
state; not as hope or fancy may delineate it,
but as it has been in reality appointed by
divine Providence (Sermon 15, 160).
Whenever our passions become clouded by some new wish or
some wonderful idea, when reason grows confused about the
goodness or possibility of the wish or idea, religion
supplies man with the proper fixed goals for the life,
together with the motives for action and the standard for
measuring those actions.

Throughout his Sermons, Johnson

asks the question of how man was to be consoled for the
misery of living and he answers it by belief in salvation
through Christ.

Yet, his answer is always framed by a

Practical, secular, and psychological understanding of
human nature.
Johnson's Sermons show man how to alleviate the
vacuity of his existence in a variety of ways.

One can
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integrate his reason with his desires, his instincts and
his passions; he can cultivate a mature and realistic
self-understanding, including social relationships; and he
can extend the benefits of his own experience to others
according to the rule of social benevolence.

It is not

simply a matter of looking to Christ as an ideal example
to be followed, but an assiduous and constant pursuit of
maturity and the emotional integration of one's whole self
that is necessary to ease the feeling of vacuity.

Since

by nature we are creatures of the future where imagination

and desire range "in quest of future happiness" (Rambler
~'

25), religion supplies man's reason, imagination, and

desires with the proper fulfillment for their cravings in
its promise of salvation.53

So, the emptiness is filled.

For Johnson, then, religion "appears, in every state of
life, to be the basis of happiness" (Sermon 1

1

15).

53 see, for example, Rambler 203, 291-294; Rambler ~,
10; Rambler 41, 221; Sermons
14, 15, 20, and 25.
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CHAPTER FOUR

JOHNSON'S SERMONS AND
ENGLISH SERMON STYLE

I

While the sermon appears to have lost much of its
eminence as a literary form in modern times, it is
important to remember that Johnson considered it a
significant part of English literature.

He makes this

clear in a conversation concerning the posthumous sale of
the Honorable Topham Beauclerk's library.

Wilkes remarks

on the irony that Beauclerk, a renowned rake, should have
owned.so many volumes of sermons:
Mr. Beauclerk's great library was this season
sold in London by auction. Mr. Wilkes said, he
wondered to find in it such a numerous collection of sermons; seeming to think it strange
that a gentleman of Mr. Beauclerk's character in
the gay world, should have chosen to have many
compositions of that kind. JOHNSON: Why, Sir,
you are to consider that sermons make a considerable branch of English literature; so that
a library must be very imperfect if it has not a
numerous collection of sermons: and in all
collections, Sir, the desire of augmenting it
grows stronger in proportion to the advance in
acquisition (Life, IV, 105-106).
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Johnson applies literary criteria to the sermon genre when
he states that a thorough study of English letters,
including sermons, yields riches in all areas of learning.
He boasts that the English language is fabulously rich in
"treasures of theological knowledge," surpassing all other
vulgar tongues not only quantitatively but qualitatively
as well.

Moreover, Johnson observes that the English are

blessed with a multitude of divines who are "learned,
elegant and pious" (Idler 91, 283-284).
Johnson's various remarks on the English sermon
reveal his sensitivity to both the homiletic and the
literary traditions of the genre. 1

For example, Hugh

1 w. Fraser Mitchell, English Pulpit Oratory from
Andrewes to Tillotson (New York, 1962), traces the
development of the English sermon from a homiletic or
didactic form to a literary form (133-343). Like Johnson,
Mitchell suggests that the didactic and literary
dimensions of the sermon were not mutually exclusive
considerations for the sermon writer in the eighteenth
century. He describes the sermon's evolution:
from a period when its form and content
were governed by certain rhetorical and
homiletic ideals to a period when it becomes almost a province of literature, in
so far as conformity to the prevailing literary standards was required also from the
preacher. Its subject-matter underwent an
equally important transformation, and the
attempts early in the eighteenth-century by
Steele and Addison to draw men off from
strife and faction in politics, by insisting on a wide range of common interests,
found a counterpart in the choice of noncontroversial subjects, often of a strongly
ethical character, noticeable in the work
of dissenters and churchmen alike (136).
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Blair is the sermonist whom Johnson most frequently
praises for his fidelity to the didactic or homiletic end
of the sermon genre, as well as for the artistic
excellencies of his sermons.

His spontaneous remarks on

Blair can be seen as a reflection of those principles
which he considers important for a good sermon; as such,
they can be broadly understood as Johnson's "standards"
for the genre.2

Moreover, an examination of the

vocabulary which Johnson uses to describe Blair's
excellencies suggests Johnson's sensitivity to the oral,
written, homiletic and literary dimensions of the sermon
tradition.
on the publication of Blair's first sermon, Johnson
writes to his printer, William Strahan, "I have read over
Dr. Blair's first Sermon, with more than approbation, to
say it is good is to say too little" (Letter 505.1).

Two

2 When Boswell requests a list from Johnson of "the
best English sermons for style" (Life, III, 247-248), the
order of the sermonists is imposed by Boswell's suggestions and only towards the end of the list does Johnson
make his own nominations. Approving or disapproving of a
writer suggested by someone else is quite different from
spontaneously selecting a sermonist for praise or blame.
It is unfortunate that the catalogue requested by Boswell,
from the sheer statistical weight of the many names it
includes, is sometimes given such emphasis as an indication of Johnson's taste in sermons. See, James Gray,
Johnson's Sermons: ~ Study (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1972), Chapter Two. Actually, it is a misleading piece of
evidence when considered alone. Hugh Blair is a figure
who does not appear in the catalogue at all.
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months later he brings up the sermon in a letter to
Boswell, when he describes it as "excellently written both
as to doctrine and language" (Letter 507).

In May, he

again compliments Boswell on his countryman's skill,
"Please to return Dr. Blair.

Thanks for his sermons.

scotch write English wonderfully well" (Letter 515).

The
By

November, Blair seems to have made a reputation for
himself, for Johnson writes to Boswell that "Dr. Blair's
sermons are now universally commended, but let him think
that I had the honour of first finding and first praising
his excellencies" (Letter 565).

Johnson admired Blair's

measured sentences and his meticulously selected phrases
as models of sermon style.

In 1778, for example, Johnson

offers glowing praise for Blair's ability to write sermons
directed, not to the emotions, but to man's reason.
Johnson says that Blair's "doctrine is the best limited,
the best expressed:

there is the most warmth without

fanaticism, the most rational transport.

I wish Blair

would come over to the Church of England" (Life, III,
339).

Johnson has found in Blair a sermonist whom he can
praise for both literary and homiletic skills.

Not only

does he appeal to Johnson's sense of propriety by fitting
his subject matter to his audience, but he does so in a
disciplined and restrained way--his warmth is without
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fanaticism, and his transport is rational.

Johnson is not

toying with oxymorons; he is merely pointing to the
careful control which he feels Blair shares with literary
masters.

Moreover, Johnson's conunents reflect some of the

principles which he considers important for the genre.
One of the first requirements of a good sermon is
sensitivity to the audience, that is, the fitness of the
subject matter developed within the sermon to the
pragmatic moral and religious needs of the congregation to
whom it is addressed.

Blair has the skill to "limit" his

doctrine or to select subjects that are appropriate for
the flock he is addressing.

In another conversation,

Johnson expresses his dissatisfaction with Zachariah Mudge
for attempting more than what his hearers could comprehend
and hence for accomplishing nothing.

Moreover, after

expressing his dissatisfaction with Mudge, he praises
Blair again, as if reminded of his success by Mudge's
failure:
Mudge's Sermons are good, but not practical. He
grasps more sense than he can hold; he takes
more corn than he can make into meal; he opens a
wide prospect, but it is so distant, it is
indistinct.
I love Blair's Sermons. Though the
dog is a Scotchman, and a Presbyterian, and
everything he should not be, I was the first to
praise them.
Such was my candour! (Life, IV,
98) •
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Johnson's metaphors here are vivid and exact.

Gathering

more corn than can be made into meal conjures up a
wondrously lively picture of superfluity and excess-characteristics which Johnson consistently opposed.
Nowhere is Johnson more the hardheaded and practical
realist than in the criticism of his own church.

To

succeed a sermon must reach its audience--a much less
sophisticated audience than the relatively intellectual
elite who might read a volume of printed sermons.
Although he does not lower his high literary standards
when judging a sermon, he is concerned with how the
sermon, as a dramatic and public form of rhetoric, can
make religion personal and immediate to the congregation.
Indeed, Johnson's own Sermons often reflect an uneasy
balance between his strict sense of literary propriety and
the pragmatic objectives of the genre.
The chief purpose of a sermon, after all, is to
persuade those who hear it to commit themselves to a
change of life.

A sermon must not simply effect a bland

act of intellectual assent; rather, it must engage man's
mind, heart, and will with the practical concerns of
personal reformation.

This makes the genre different from

ordinary essays, even theological ones.

There is a

dialectical tension between the pulpit and the pew with
the preacher striving for nothing less than the conversion
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and salvation of his auditors.

Thus, Johnson manifests an

ambivalence about the preaching of the Evangelicals and
Methodists.

He admires the fervor and zeal of their

preaching; yet, he remains suspicious of an unchecked and
undisciplined appeal to the emotions--of a style that is
primarily hortatory with little literary grace or
theological substance.

He specifically cautions against

the abuse of oratorical techniques:
Whether action may not be yet of use in
churches, where the preacher addresses a mingled
audience, may deserve inquiry. It is certain
that the senses are more powerful as the reason
is weaker; and that he whose ears convey little
to his mind, may sometimes listen with his eyes
till truth may gradually take possession of his
heart. If there be any use of gesticulation, it
must be applied to the ignorant and the rude,
who will be more affected by vehemence than
delighted by propriety. In the pulpit little
action can be proper, for action can illustrate
nothing but that to which it may be referred by
nature or by custom. He that imitates by his
hand a motion which he describes, explains it by
natural similitude; he that lays his hand on his
breast when he expresses pity, enforces his
words by a customary allusion. But theology has
few topicks to which action can be appropriated;
that action which is vague and indeterminate
will at last settle into habit, and habitual
peculiarities are quickly ridiculous (Idler 90,
280-201).
~
Johnson had a strong distaste for anything that smacked of
the demagogic; he consistently praises and admires
moderation and restraint.

Describing the Reverend

Zachariah Mudge's style of delivery, Johnson commended him
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for being "forcible • . . [but) not turbulent; disdaining
anxious nicety of emphasis, and laboured artifices of
action."

Moreover, Mudge's style showed "natural

dignity''; it did not direct attention to the speaker at
the cost of the content (Life, IV, 77).
Johnson seems to be counseling an avoidance of the
artificial or contrived in sermon delivery and insisting
instead on a degree of naturalness.

Johnson approved of

those techniques which allowed the preacher to naturally
and easily stress a point with a gesture or a change of
tone or volume or pace.

However, when the preacher calls

such attention to himself that his auditors are diverted
from what he is saying to the way in which he is saying
it, then clearly, the bounds of propriety have been
surpassed.
Johnson's loyalty to the established church does not
prevent him from criticizing the Anglican clergy for their
failure to touch "the common people":
He observed that the established clergy in
general did not preach plain enough; and that
polished periods and glittering sentences flew
over the heads of the common people, without any
impression upon their hearts. Something might
be necessary, he observed, to excite the
affections of the common people, who were sunk
in languor and lethargy, and therefore he
supposed that the new concomitants of methodism
might probably produce so desirable an effect.
The mind, like the body, he observed, delighted
in change and novelty, and even in religion
itself, courted new appearances and
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modifications. Whatever might be thought of
some methodist teachers, he said, he could
scarcely doubt the sincerity of that man, who
travelled nine hundred miles in a month, and
preached twelve times a week; for no adequate
reward, merely temporal, could be given for such
indefatigable labour [emphasis mine) (Life, II,
123).
-Johnson was enormously impressed by the sincerity of the
Methodist preachers.

He attributed the success of these

preachers to their expressing themselves "in a plain and
familiar manner, which is the only way to do good to the
common people" (Life, I, 459).

The learned and brilliant

clergymen of the established church should, in Johnson's
view, follow suit:
To insist against drunkenness as a crime,
because it debases Reason, the noblest faculty
of man, would be of no service to the common
people: but to tell them that they may die in a
fit of drunkenness, and show them how dreadful
that would be, cannot fail to make a deep
impression (Life, I, 459-460).
Johnson frankly admitted that practical moral principles
were "better taught in English sermons than in any other
books ancient or modern" (Idler 91, 283).

Indeed,

Johnson's own practice as a sermon writer reflects his
sensitivity to the didactic objective of the genre.

When

we examine his Sermons, we discover that the elegant and
restrained Rambler style predominates; only occasionally
does he express himself in the "plain and familiar manner"
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of the Methodists.

It must be remembered, however, that

Johnson's Sermons were not intended for an uneducated
congregation of lower class parishioners; rather, most of
his Sermons were written for John Taylor's congregation of
middle class merchants, landowners, shopkeepers and
bankers.
Johnson's Sermons are couched in terms designed to
appeal to common sense; they generally avoid making
emotional appeals of a purely hortatory kind.

Johnson was

aware of the dramatic situation of the sermon and he
recognized the skilled use made of emotional appeal by the
Evangelicals; however, he remained suspicious of such
appeals perhaps because of his own fears regarding the
insatiable nature of man's desires and the tyranny of his
imagination.

Johnson feared the loss of rational control

over the imagination and the will; an excess of emotion
was simply in violation of the dictates of common sense
and decorum which called for moderation, balance and
discipline.
Johnson noted several principles of propriety for a
sermon writer to observe as he strove to direct his
hearers towards religious commitment and proper moral
activity--the fitness of the subject matter to the
audience, the disciplined and restrained use of emotional
appeal, gesture and intonation.

Indeed, Johnson was
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poignantly aware of the didactic nature of the sermon
genre.

Unlike an essay which seeks primarily intellectual

persuasion and affirmation, he recognized that the sermon
sought to change some practical behavior patterns in human
nature.
Johnson also subjects the sermon to the same
standards of diction, structure, and decorum that he uses
in evaluating drama and poetry.3

We have already

discussed the homiletic elements which Johnson singles out
3 The close connection between the development of
English prose style in general from the seventeenth to the
eighteenth centuries and sermon composition in particular
has been astutely noted by Mitchell:
That in the end preaching and prose could
be judged by the same standards is itself
evidence of the closeness of their connection, for taste in so large measure depends
on what is most widely disseminated, that
but for the reformation and simplification
of the pulpit-address it is almost certain
there would have been no simplification of
English prose; or, at least, such simplification as might have resulted from the
influence of the Court, and the growth of
scientific enquiry, would never have been
universally accepted and applauded as that
which the example and influence of the
preachers brought about.
If Elegance of
Style, according to Hughes' quaint simile,
is 'like a coy Mistress,' in England, it
may be said, she was first wooed by the
divines and given a place in the Temple,
where men at rare intervals learned to
revere her, and heard from her lips the
musical and luminous utterance towards
which in their best literary efforts they
laboured ever afterwards to approach
(Mitchell, 396).
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for praise in Blair.

Let us now attempt to uncover some

of those elements in the style of Blair's Sermons for
which Johnson admires him.
Blair's

l, which Johnson praises on three

~ermon

occasions, discusses the unity of piety and morality; it
is a relationship essential to Johnson's own concept of
Christian ethics.

Blair treats the complementary nature

of prayer and good works--a pragmatic religious principle
which Johnson firmly espouses.4
sermon l

The topic sentence of

illustrates some elements in his style for which

Johnson praises him:
It is to the conjunction of prayer and alms,
that I purpose now to direct your thoughts, as
describing the respectable and amiable character
of a man, as forming the honour and the blessedness of a true Christian; piety joined with
charity, faith with good works, devotion with
morality (Sermon l, 3).5
Blair's use of parallelism is clear--it is extended,
4 As early as 1766, Johnson expresses his commitment
to an active social religion rather than passive and selfcentered devotion: "It is our first duty to serve
society; and, after we have done that, we may attend
wholly to the salvation of our own souls. A youthful
passion for abstract devotion should not be encouraged"
(1,lli, II, 10).
5 Hugh Blair, Sermons (London: n.p., 1790).
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complex, and varied just enough to prevent monotony.6
There is a valid distinction between "respectable" and
"amiable," between "honour" and "blessedness."

The pairs

are not merely synonyms marshalled together to swell the
sentence.
Blair's diction relies on a vocabulary of general
terms.

For example, Blair writes his Sermon 1 with

universal applicability:
Cast your eyes over the whole earth.
Explore
the most remote quarters of the east or the
west. You may discover tribes of men without
policy, or laws, or cities, or any of the arts
of life: But no where will you find them
without some form of religion (Sermon 1, 5).
The apparent redundancy in the example cited above is
actually a stylistic echo of the philosophical outlook
being presented:

man is everywhere the same, so

descriptions of human nature throughout the world ought
not to vary.
6 A schematic representation of the parallelism in
this sentence shows that there is one pair of parallel
phrases with four points of parallelism, and a triplet of
parallel phrases with two points of parallelism. The
deviations from perfect parallelism are in parentheses:
as describing/the respectable/and amiable (character)/
of a man
as forming/the honour/ and (the blessedness)/
of a (true) Christian
piety (joined)/with charity
faith
/with (good) works
devotion
/with morality
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Besides using a style which Johnson finds agreeable,
Blair adapts the traditional formal structure of the
sermon.

Blair's sermon is organized around a point-by-

point outline introduced early in the sermon and followed
with varying degrees of diligence and strictness.

Blair's

outline, however, is so graceful that it actually enhances
the sermon while serving as an organizing device:
I shall first endeavour to show you, that alms
without prayers, or prayers without alms,
morality without devotion, or devotion without
morality, are extremely defective; and then
shall point out the happy effects of their
mutual union (Sermon l, 3).
The ease with which Blair dignifies the outline's
utilitarian purpose with his meticulously selected phrases
would have appealed to Johnson as a model of graceful
sermon prose.
For Johnson, then, the great appeal of Hugh Blair is
his ability to integrate both the homiletic and literary
dimensions of the sermon; such integration makes his
Sermons successful instruments of moral persuasion as well
as works distinguished by their artistic merit.

Indeed,

the Johnsonian "standards" for an effective sermon which
we have isolated and examined--the fitness of the subject
matter to the audience; disciplined and restrained use of
emotional appeal, gesture and intonation; the stylistic
characteristic of parallelism; the controlled use of
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repetition and figurative devices; sensitivity to a choice
of diction which stresses universal concepts over
particular ones; and attentiveness to formal structuring
techniques within the sermon tradition--reveal his
sensitivity to the sermon as "a considerable branch of
English literature" (Life, IV, 105).

However, it must not

be asswned that those elements which Johnson singled out
for praise in Blair are to be automatically found in his
own Sermons.

Though Johnson's Sermons bear the mark of

his own distinctive style, they were strongly influenced
by the English homiletic tradition from the middle of the
sixteenth until the middle of the eighteenth century.7
Indeed, further examination of Johnson's Sermons will
reveal some important deviations from those characteristics which he found so praiseworthy in Blair's works.

All

these variations suggest Johnson's efforts to test the
truth of religious revelation against the reality of hwnan
experience and to blend gracefully the homiletic and the
literary dimensions of the sermon genre within his own
Sermons.8
7 James Gray, Johnson's Sermons, 48. James Gray
locates and examines Johnson's Sermons within the English
homiletic tradition. See, for example, chapters 2 and 3
for a comprehensive comparison of the themes found in
Johnson's Sermons with the English pulpit tradition.
8 In Johnson's Sermons, James Gray notes that both
the literary and the homiletic dimensions of the sermon
tradition are reflected in stylistic differences--in
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It is important to examine the homiletic and literary
characteristics of the English sermon as Johnson
understood them in order to appreciate the significance of
his specific deviations from the tradition.
~

Indeed, in

Achievement of Samuel Johnson, Walter Jackson Bate

astutely notes:
The self-protective, insomnia-like need to
anticipate and be awake to every qualification
is able, in his other thinking, to unite with
the equally powerful need to extract stable
meaning, and to "surmount" the clutter of
conflicting reactions. But the absolute
criteria of religion represented another sort of
finality, different from that he was accustomed
to struggle up to empirically, and one in which
so much had to be taken, as it were, on trust.
There is no reason to think that Johnson's
general habit of "incredulity," which once led
Boswell to say that he came "near Hume's
argument against miracles," could be wholly
anesthetized, or put as it were in cold storage,
the minute he approached religion (168-169).

separate "voices"--within Johnson's Sermons. Gray's
critical terminology, in "The Form and Style of the
Sermons" (chapter 4), is one of dichotomy;
he speaks of
the "Rambler voice" and the "Preacher voice" (192) in the
Sermons. Gray observes that Johnson's sermon style
"occasionally takes on a regularity close in manner to
that of the Psalms and Proverbs of the Old Testament;" at
other times, it is "intellectual and poetic"--more
reflective of the Rambler and Rasselas style (207-208).
However, Gray notes that there is no tension between these
"two voices"; nonetheless, he is conscientious enough to
observe that perhaps there ought to be. He points out
that Johnson had always been uneasy at the thought of a
combination of religion and rhetoric, reminding us that
(to use Johnson's own words) "the good and evil of
eternity are too ponderous for the wings of wit'' (230).
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specifically, the Sermons reflect a struggle between the
validity and sufficiency of two authorities:

(1) the

ability of revealed Christian religion to address the
limitations of man's weak nature--prone to the delusions
of the imagination, to the insatiable desires of the will,
and to temptations of every kind; (2) the reliability of
human experience to address these same limitations.

This

tension between Johnson's fundamental and pragmatic
adherence to the validity of human experience and his
belief in Scriptural revelation propels much of the
argument in each of his Sermons; it also reflects his
primary deviation from a tradition which tended to accept
revelation without critical examination.9
When Boswell requests a list of "the best English
sermons for style," Johnson judges two authors, Tillotson
and South, solely on the merits of their style.

Regarding

Jeremiah Seed, however, he discusses both style and
content:

"Seed has a very fine style; but he is not very

theological."

He reverts to pure literary criticism in

his commentary on John Jortin, whom he describes as "very
9 William R. Siebenschuh makes explicit the tension
between human experience and Biblical revelation in
Johnson's Sermons, a tension tentatively suggested by
James Gray in Johnson's Sermons (see especially, Chapter
Four). Siebenschuh argues that this tension indicates the
strength of Johnson's religious faith. See, "On the Locus
of Faith in Johnson's Sermons." Studies in Burke and His
!._ime, Vol. 17 (Spring, 1976), No. 2, 103-117.
~- ---
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elegant," and on William Sherlock, who is "very elegant,
though he has not made it his principal study."

However,

in the case of Samuel Clarke, Johnson's disapproval of his
theology prevents him from wholehearted literary
endorsement:

"I should recommend Dr. Clarke's sermons,

were he orthodox."

Even though Boswell phrases his

question in specific literary terms, Johnson feels the
necessity of including commentary on doctrine as well
(Life, III, 247-248).
Although Johnson comments on both style and content,
it must not be concluded that he confuses the two or
allows his sympathy for an author's views to influence his
evaluation of the literary quality of the work.

w.

Fraser

Mitchell's description of post-Restoration critics who
recognized the integral relationship between English prose
style in general and effective sermon style in particular
fits Samuel Johnson's critical awareness perfectly:
The earlier critics had been content to attack
their theological rivals and to denounce their
style as out of keeping with what they believed
to be the sacred aim of pulpit-oratory. But the
later critics of the post-Restoration period
were concerned not only with the abuses which
had taken possession of the sermon, but desired
a reform of pulpit style as a step towards the
simplification of style in general.
Perverted
and ill-applied rhetoric came to be condemned,
not because particular preachers or their
parties did not approve of its use, but as being
inherently unsuitable to the sermon and offensive to cultivated taste.
In this way the two
strains of criticism--what may be described as
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hermeneutic criticism and literary criticism-combined, and the dramatists, the poets, and the
essayists found an ally in the preacher, who had
come to desire, quite as much as they, an
elegance and unaffected ease of manner. The
pulpit, consequently, which for long had been
the last refuge of antiquated modes of rhetorical expression, and a prime corrupter of style,
not only assented to a reform too frequently
attributed solely to the Court acting under the
French influence and the growing exigencies of
natural science, but was itself a pioneer in the
movement for a simplification of style (emphasis
mine] (Mitchell, 401-402).
In his Pref ace to the English Dictionary, Johnson reveals
his sensitivity to the union of hermeneutic and literary
criticism--to the integral connection between general
developments in English prose style and homiletic
practice.

For example, Richard Hooker, sermonist and

stylist, is mentioned with approval in the same breath as
the Bible, Bacon, Raleigh, Spenser, Sidney, and
Shakespeare:
But as every language has a time of rudeness
antecedent to perfection, as well as of false
refinement and declension, I have been cautious
lest my zeal for antiquity might drive me into
times too remote, and crowd my book with words
now no longer understood. I have fixed Sidney's
work for the boundary beyond which I make few
excursions. From the authors which rose in the
time of Elizabeth, a speech might be formed adequate to all the purposes of use and elegance.
If the language of theology were extracted from
Hooker and the translation of the Bible; the
terms of natural knowledge from Bacon; the
phrases of policy, war, and navigation from
Raleigh; the dialect of poetry and fiction from
Spenser and Sidney; and the diction of common
life from Shakespeare, few ideas would be lost

202
to mankind for want of English words in which
they might be expressed.lo
Johnson's analyses of particular sermonists must be taken
at face value--explicit approval of style cannot be
construed to include approval of content, nor can a
negative opinion of style be extended to include a
condemnation of the author's views.
In his observations on the English sermon genre,
Johnson almost completely ignores all pre-Restoration
preachers.

As far as we know, the prominent Renaissance

preachers, such as John Donne and Lancelot Andrewes, had
no impact on him because he makes no mention of their
sermons.

Moreover, Johnson's attitude toward metaphysical

wit, such as Donne and Andrewes employed in their sermons
and devotional writings, was such that he would have been
unlikely to imitate it.

Although he nowhere directly

attacks the wit found in many pre-Restoration sermons,
neither does he praise the metaphysical word-play,
convoluted arguments or speculations about theological
paradoxes of its practitioners.11
10 Samuel Johnson, "Preface to the English
Dictionary." In The Oxford Authors: Samuel Johnson, ed.
Donald Greene (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984),
319-320.
11 w. Fraser Mitchell's analysis of the English
sermon tradition offers some possible insight into
Johnson's almost complete disregard of the sermon writers
before the Restoration. Mitchell presents the earlier
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A crucial exception to Johnson's disregard of sermon
writers before the Restoration period is Jeremy Taylor.12
If we take Taylor as a representative of seventeenth
century style, a comparison of his style with Johnson's
makes it clear why Johnson did not value pre-Restoration
sermon writers.

Excerpts from Taylor's sermons show that

seventeenth-century preachers as the beginning steps in
the evolutionary process of which the Restoration
preachers, with their plain style, were the final result:
Eloquence, it is obvious, was valued, but it was
to be eloquence expressive of reason and which
had shed pedantry and the ingenious quibbling of
the 'metaphysical' preachers (336).
Furthermore, in the Life of Cowley, Johnson expresses his
well-known disdain for the heavy imagery and fine distinctions of the metaphysical poets. He would have found such
embellishments even more inappropriate for the sermon
because they distract from the didactic purpose of that
genre. Moreover, unlike the "metaphysical" sermonists,
there is no dwelling on the physical symbol as an embodiment of spiritual truth--almost no theological sacramentalism--in Johnson's Sermons. Indeed, the use of imagery
with "its parts yoked violently together" is as foreign to
Johnson's sermon style as to any stylistic expression that
he employed or admired.
12 Mitchell calls Taylor one of the two seventeenthcentury masters of elegant English prose (242). We know
that Johnson is familiar with Taylor's work because he
quotes him on the folly of lashing up unnecessary fear
within one's soul (Rambler 29, 162) and cites Taylor in
the Dictionary under charitY-and love. That Johnson knows
Taylor's Sermons is evident from his statement that, in
his Sermons, Taylor "gives very good advice: never lie in
your prayers; never confess more than you really believe;
never promise more than you mean to perform" (Life, IV,
294-295). Furthermore, the works of Jeremy Taylor are
listed as entries 213, 351, and 477 in Christie's sale
catalogue for Johnson's personal library. [Mr. Christie.
~ Catalogue of the Valuable Library of Books, of the late
learned Samuel Johnson (London: n.p., 1785)).
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he could not be farther removed from Johnson in terms of
style.

Perhaps the most prominent element of Taylor's

style is a love of imagery so rich that it borders on the
baroque.

A fair example of Taylor's taste for rich

figurative language is this simile based on God's
displeasure with insincere prayer:
cold prayers are not put into the account in
order to effect an acceptation, but are laid
aside like the buds of roses which a cold wind
hath nipped into death and the discoloured tawny
face of an Indian slave.13
The combination of blasted roses and a tawny face is
almost surrealistic in its incongruity.

In another

sermon, after a meditation on the external manifestations
of sin, Taylor draws this memorable picture:
We have already opened this dunghill covered
with snow, which was indeed on the outside white
as the snow of leprosy, but it was no better;
and if the very colours and instruments of
deception, if the fucus and ceruse be so spotted
and sullied, what in the corrupted liver, and in
the sinks of the body of sin? (Sermon 20, 247).
Taylor has succeeded in portraying with vivid detail the
repulsiveness of sin.
At the risk of oversimplification, we may say that
Taylor's style is essentially synthetic; he rejoices in a
13 Jeremy Taylor, Whole Works, ed. Charles Page Eden
(London: n.p., 1850), IV, 65-66.
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profusion of images without questioning the relationship
between parts.

The stylistic implications of a synthetic

approach are apparent in Taylor's description of the final
judgment:
God is pleased to compare Himself to a lion; and
though in this life He hath confined Himself
with promises and gracious emanations of an
infinite goodness, and limits Himself by conditions and covenants, and suffers Himself to be
overcome by prayers, and Himself hath invented
ways of atonement and expiation; yet when He is
provoked by our unhandsome and unworthy actions,
He makes sudden breaches, and tears some of us
in pieces; and of others He breaks their bones
or affrights their hopes and secular gaieties,
and fills their house with mourning and cypress
and groans and death: but when this Lion of the
tribe of Judah shall appear upon His own mountain, the mountain of the Lord, iQHis natural
dress of majesty, and that justice shall strike,
and mercy shall not hold her hands; she shall
strike sore strokes, and pity shall not break
the blow; and God shall account with us by
minutes, and for words, and for thoughts: and
then He shall be severe to mark what is done
amiss; and that justice may reign entirely, God
shall open the wicked man's treasure, and tell
the sums and weigh grains and scruples (Sermon

l, 23).

Taylor's metaphor of the leonine character of the Almighty
is powerfully vivid and dramatic.

However, Taylor fails

to apply the scene he describes to the concrete experience
of his congregation--what specific acts of his flock will
warrant such severity from the Almighty?
Johnson's extreme caution when using and analyzing
imagery is in direct opposition to Taylor's exuberant
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employment of a multitude of images which may be only
tenuously related to each other.

For Taylor, the

multiplication of images adds the type of complexity and
richness he prefers in his sermons.14

For Johnson, always

aiming at accuracy in the expression of complex relationships, lavish imagery can confuse things.

Ornate or

excessive imagery can call attention to itself as a
figurative device and distract from the subject matter;
moreover, it can blur distinctions while it stresses
similarities.
Johnson is extremely cautious in the use of
figurative language, avoiding the practice of piling
images on top of one another.

When he does resort to

metaphor, he is at great pains to explain even the
simplest image, fearful that it might be misunderstood.
For instance, when he expounds on the Scriptural
quotation, "As you sow, so shall you reap," he observes
that
To sow and to reap are figurative terms. To
sow, signifies to act; and to reap, is to
receive the product of our actions. As no man
can sow one sort of grain, and reap another, in
the ordinary process of nature; as no man
gathers grapes of thorns or figs of thistles, or
when he scatters tares in the furrows, gathers
14 Mitchell points out that Taylor's sermons also
include a fine plain style (253), but this fact does not
change the overall impression of confused but lavish
imagery.

207

wheat into his garners; so, in the final dispensations of providence, the same correspondence
shall be found in the moral system (Sermon 10,
115).
~
Johnson is pragmatic in his approach to life and his
sermon style reflects that ruling principle.

In his view,

a sermon should be a practical discourse having an
immediate and important application to the purposes of
life (Life, I, 459).

There are only subtle differences

between Johnson's moral essays and his Sermons.

Johnson's

moral essays are more discursive, while his Sermons are
more didactic.

The essays, though often introduced with

quotations, are not rigidly bound to them as are the
Sermons.

James Gray observes that "the paradox, the

neatly turned conceit, the convoluted symbol, the farfetched analogy" are all "conspicuously absent" from
Johnson's sermon style (Johnson's Sermons, 49).

In a

critical assessment even more severe than Gray's, Jean
Hagstrum characterizes Johnson's Sermons as "colorless"
because

11

his religion gave him no symbol, no ritual, no

mythological machinery, no epic or tragic personages, no
pageantry. 11 15

Johnson's Sermons, however, are not

completely colorless.

Such imagery that is found in the

Sermons is often overlooked because it lacks detail.

When

Johnson seeks to illustrate an abstraction, he is careful
15 Samuel Johnson's Literary Criticism, 66-68.

208

to use images that are exceptionally clear and appropriate.

For example, describing the universal indifference

to the inevitability of death in Sermon ..!_Q_, he marvels:
Nor is it true only of men, who are engaged in
enterprise of hazard, which restrain the
faculties to the utmost, and keep attention
always upon the stretch. Religion is not only
neglected by the projector and adventurer, by
men, who suspend their happiness on the slender
thread of artifice, or ?tand totterinsJupon the
point of chance . . . . There is no interest so
small, nor engagement so slight, but that if it
be followed and expanded, it may be sufficient
to keep religion out of the thoughts . . . . But
let them not be deceived, they cannot suppose
that God will accept him, who never wished to be
accepted by him, or made his will the rule of
action [emphasis mine] (Sermon ..!_Q_, 110-111).
The abstract terms of artifice and chance are encased in
two separate and parallel metaphors no less effective for
the absence of specific visual detail.

Yet, as Hagstrum

and Gray suggest, Johnson's imagery has a tendency to sink
into the background of his Sermons; indeed, it is
overshadowed by the more obvious and dominant elements of
his Sermon style--the carefully graduated sentence,
parallelism, antithesis, and subordination achieved mainly
through the use of noun clauses.
Johnson's sentences exhibit a strong sense of
artistic control; they tend to be long, logical and
rhythmic.

For example, the following passage from
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Johnson's Sermons approaches the length of Taylor's
sentence constructions:
That society is necessary to the happiness of
human nature, that the gloom of solitude, and
the stillness of retirement, however they may
flatter at a distance, with pleasing views of
independence and serenity, neither extinguish
the passions, nor enlighten the understanding,
that discontent will intrude upon privacy, and
temptations follow us to the desert, every one
may be easily convinced, either by his own
experience, or that of others (Sermon l, 3).
If a major phrase is deleted from Johnson's sentence, the
parallelism, antithesis, and rhythm are upset to such an
extent that the omission is felt immediately.

However, in

the sample sentence from Taylor's Sermon .f., entire "subsentences" can be removed without raising the reader's
attention because there is no controlled rhythm to
disturb.

Johnson always seeks out logical, causal, or

antithetical relationships through syntax.

Such stylistic

techniques help to mirror his view of the complex nature
of man.

Taylor, on the other hand, uses fifteen "and"

clause connectives for the mere combination of ideas; he
uses only three connectives ("yet," "but," "then") to
impose a more sophisticated relationship on the sentence
parts.

Nevertheless, Taylor's method of composition still

demonstrates a regularity, a grace, a sonorousness which
is close in manner to the rhythm of the Psalms:
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Things are so ordered by the great Lord of all
the creatures, that whatsoever we do or suffer
shall be called to account, and this account
shall be exact, and the sentence shall be just,
and the reward shall be great; all the evils of
the world shall be amended, and the injustices
shall be repaid, and the divine providence shall
be vindicated, and virtue and vice shall forever
be rewarded by their separate dwellings and
rewards (Sermon 1, 9).
Johnson's omission of Taylor from his catalogue of
English sermon stylists, then, can possibly be traced to
certain elements in Taylor's style--elaborate and complex
imagery, and simple, casual syntax--which are directly
contrary to Johnson's precise imagery and his controlled
and complex syntax.
With the major exception of Taylor and a few other
seventeenth century divines,16 Johnson's observations on
16 Another pre-Restoration preacher with whom Johnson
reveals familiarity is Richard Baxter, a Puritan; however,
he mentions Baxter's Sermons only once. In addition to
this singular reference to Baxter's Sermons, Johnson
refers to Baxter's spiritual autobiography, Religuiae
Baxterianae, on two consecutive days in his journal. [See
Diaries (March 29 and 30, 1766), 106-108]. Moreover,
Christie's sale catalogue for Johnson's personal library
lists Baxter's works as entries 113, 360, 510, 527, and
597. Johnson's mention of Baxter's Sermons occurs in this
exchange with Sir Joshua Reynolds:
Sir Joshua once observed to him, that he had
talked above the capacity of some people with
whom they had been in company together. "No
matter, Sir," (said Johnson); "they consider it
as a compliment to be talked to, as if they were
wiser than they are. So true is this, Sir, that
Baxter made it a rule in every sermon that he
preached, to say something that was above the
capacity of his audience" (Life, IV, 185).
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the sermon begin with the Restoration preachers.

Robert

south, Johnson says in his attempt to list the great
sermon stylists for Boswell, is "one of the best, if you
except peculiarities, and his violence, and sometimes
coarseness of language" (Life, III, 248).

Explaining that

the church leader need not "speak and exhort" in his own
person, South says "it is not the gift of every Person,
nor of every Age; to harangue the multitude, to Voice it
high and loud."17

"To Voice it high and loud" is, at the

very least, an inelegant description of a method of
preaching.

South calls men's consciences "Hell and

Damnation-proof" (15).

Johnson would probably have

This rule is highly uncharacteristic of Baxter, whose
plain style resulted from his desire to be comprehensible
to all members of his audience:
That his plainness is directly attributable to
Baxter's desire to make his meaning clear to the
most ignorant of his auditory is beyond doubt,
and that he was practical rather than speculative is due to the same cause (Mitchell, 270).
Johnson's remark, "above the capacity of his audience,"
would have to stand out in bold relief from the plain
style characteristic of Baxter in order to be effective.
In addition to Taylor and Baxter, Christie's sale
catalogue records that Johnson owned the works of two
other pre-Restoration preachers: Lancelot Andrewes'
Sermons (entry 214) and Hugh Latimer's Sermons (entry
628). However, we have no record of Johnson himself
making any reference to the sermons of either Lancelot
Andrewes or Hugh Latimer.
17 Robert South, Sermon Preached at Lambeth-Chappel
£!:!the 28th of November (Savoy: n.p., 1666), 8.
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regarded this as unnecessary coining, which could be
avoided by more disciplined sentence construction.

Other

colloquialisms occur in South's description of a person
tempted to be profane:
tacitly to approve, and strike in with the
scoffer, and go sharer both in the Mirth and
Guilt of his prophane Jests (30).
south, on occasion, violates the stylistic requirements of
decorum and consistency of diction, but these violations
are not frequent enough to prevent Johnson from general
approval of his sermon style.
Johnson expresses some reservations regarding the
style of Archbishop John Tillotson, whose popularity
flourished far into the eighteenth century.

W. Fraser

Mitchell offers the following assessment of the influence
of Tillotson's homiletic style:
The type of sermon to which he [Tillotson] set
the seal of his approval consists in the
statement of a general proposition arising out
of the text, treated of under three or four main
aspects, which lead naturally to a conclusion
corresponding with the proposition. The thought
of each sermon is consequently very easy to
follow, and, as the illustrations are all
strictly pertinent--no extraneous ornament being
added--the syntax natural, and the diction such
as was ordinarily employed by educated men, the
general effect is one of the greatest possible
lucidity and charm . . . . Tillotson's architectonic ability in designing a sermon, the
propriety of his examples, and the uniform
dignity yet simplicity of his diction was
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appreciated well into the eighteenth century
(Mitchell, 337).
when Boswell asks Johnson for a list of his favorite
sermon stylists, Boswell immediately suggests Tillotson as
the first possibility:
Boswell: Tillotson?
Johnson: Why, not now. I should not advise a
preacher at this day to imitate Tillotson's
style; though I don't know; I should be cautious
of objecting to what has been applauded by so
many suffrages (Life, III, 247-248).
Johnson hesitated about recommending Tillotson's sermons
as models for style, although he admired them for their
emphasis on what was pragmatic in religion, for their
carefully controlled arguments, and for their lack of
affectation.

Archbishop Tillotson's sermons are direct

and practical; however, they are also deficient in graceful stylistic embellishment.

Indeed, after Tillotson, the

plain but well-modulated style could go no farther; the
maintenance of that approach without sinking to the level
of the merely commonplace was exceedingly difficult.
Nevertheless, many eighteenth-century preachers pushed the
"plain style" of Tillotson to its extreme by removing
almost all emotional appeal from their sermons.

Perhaps,

this was in reaction to the over-abundance of emotion in
the preaching of the Evangelicals.

It may have been in

reaction to the Anglican emphasis on ritual as the central
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act of worship--an emphasis which tended to relegate the
sermon to a position of minor importance.

The result was

that many sermons which attempted to imitate Tillotson's
style became dull and ponderous.

In his own sermon

compositions, Johnson avoided the excessive austerity of
the imitators of Tillotson's style; he went back to
Tillotson himself in his search for the practical and
unadorned expression of theological truth and added to it
his own restrained stylistic embellishments.
Another Restoration sermonist who enjoyed widespread
popularity in the eighteenth century was William Sherlock.
Johnson remarked that Sherlock's "style too is very
elegant, though he has not made it his principal study"
(Life, III, 248).

However, Sherlock's most popular work

was a religious tract not intended for oral delivery and
it is the one to which Johnson almost certainly
Practical Discourse Concerning Death.
into its twenty-fourth edition.

refers--~

By 1743 it had gone

Sherlock's work runs well

over three hundred pages, whereas most printed sermons
contemporary to his are about twenty pages long.

However,

Sherlock is consciously writing in the tradition of the
literary sermon or religious tract; he makes this clear in
a preface to his former congregation, the Masters of the
Bench:
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One reason of Publishing this Plain Discourse
is, because I cannot now preach to you as
formerly I have done, and have no other Way left
of discharging my Duty to you, but by making the
Press supply the Place of the Pulpit.18
The Discourse is organized around the traditional outline
form of the sermon, with one chapter devoted to each
topic:
I shall, 1. Consider what Death is, and what
Wisdom that should teach us. 2. The certainty
of our Death . . . 3. The Time of our Death;
it must be once, but when, we know not. 4. The
natural Fears and Terrours of Death, or our
natural Aversions to it, and how they may be
allayed and sweeten'd (3).
Sherlock's outline does not promise much original thought,
but it does show why the Discourse appeals to Johnson, who
spends a lifetime preparing for death and attempting to
deal with his fear of death.

However, to understand

Johnson's opinion of Sherlock's style, we must examine
excerpts from the Discourse itself.

One selection will

show what is "very elegant" about Sherlock:
First then, let us consider Death only as our
leaving this World; a very delightful Place,
you'll say, especially when our Circumstances
are easy and prosperous: Here a Man finds
whatever he most naturally loves, whatever he
takes Pleasure in; the Supply of all his Wants,
the Gratification of all his Senses, whatever an
earthly Creature can wish for or desire (5).
18 William Sherlock, A Practical Discourse Concerning
Death (London: n.p., 1743), ix.
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The style of this passage gives the general impression of
amplification rather than multiplication; that is, it
reworks one set of relationships rather than attempting to
cover a great number of concepts.

However, Sherlock

lapses into casual structure and vocabulary, such as "a
very delightful Place, you'll say."

Such an easy style,

rather than a studied one like Johnson's, suggests
Sherlock's sensitivity to and accommodations of the oral
dimension of the sermon genre.
The three remaining sermonists included in Johnson's
answer to Boswell's question are eighteenth-century
figures.

Describing Jeremiah Seed, Johnson says, "Seed

has a very fine style, but he is not very theological"
(Life, III, 248).

Johnson's objections are probably based

on Seed's sermons concerning the Trinity, in which he
states that belief in the Trinity is a matter of personal
conscience.

However, many of Seed's sermons deal with

general moral issues which do not involve controversy:
It is a common Observation, that however forward
Men may be to repine at the unequal Portion
which God has allotted them of worldly Blessings; yet they are generally well satisfied with
their Share of inward Endowments:
it being as
hard to meet with a Person, who humbly thinks he
has too little Sense and Merit, as it is to find
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one, who fancies he has too great Riches and
Honour.19
This opening sentence of Seed's Sermon

l, on pride,

demonstrates his mastery of general terminology and
careful parallelism.

The theme of pride is grounded in

seed's general observations on human nature and in the
immediacy of the situation being addressed by the sermon.
Another sermonist whose work Johnson describes as
"very elegant" (Life, III, 248) is John Jortin.
excerpt from Sermon

1.2

1

An

on the fear of God, is

representative of Jortin's style:
If we believe God's government over his subjects
to be such as in any other being we should call
arbitrary, founded upon mere will and pleasure
and over-ruling power:
if we fancy that he is
provoked at such things as would of fend no good
man, and is to be pacified again by such homage
and such services as no wise man would accept;
that is, if we clothe him with our infirmities,
and make him in some respects weaker than some
of ourselves are, these unworthy apprehensions
must raise in our minds an abject and servile
dread of him, and produce a religion overrun
with terror and superstition.20
Although this type of statement alternates in Jortin's
Sermons with many shorter and simpler sentences, as in the
case of Tillotson and Taylor, the more complex and

1757)

19 Jeremiah Seed, Eight Sermons (London:
I
II, 2.

n.p.,

20 John Jortin, Sermons on Different Subjects
(London:
n.p., 1826), I, 194-.-
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extended sentences are those which are more typical.
While precise parallelism in which three or four elements
are repeated in successive phrases does not appear in
Jortin's Sermons, the overall effect of his style is one
of parallelism.

For example, in the selection cited

above, three out of four of the clauses are conditional.
The elaboration or rephrasing of one central thought is
probably what Johnson considers "very elegant" in Jortin.
The final critical comment in Johnson's list for
Boswell is revealing precisely because it tells so little
about a figure who so greatly influenced Johnson's
religious attitudes--Samuel Clarke.

Johnson probably read

Clarke oftener than any other sermonist--at least he makes
more frequent notations about reading him than any other
sermonist.

In his Diaries, Johnson records six occasions

on which he reads from Clarke's sermons.21

Yet, in his

catalogue for Boswell, he praises Clarke in the most
qualified way:
I should recommend Dr. Clarke's sermons, were he
orthodox. However, it is very well known where
he is not orthodox, which was upon the doctrine
of the Trinity, as to which he is a condemned
heretick; so one is aware of it (Life, III,
248) .

21 (March 28, 1766), 105; (May 7, 1769), 122; (April
14, 1770), 129; (April 15, 1770), 132; (April 9, 1773),
155; (April 14, 1781), 305.
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Johnson was so persuaded of the practical value of
orthodox Christian doctrine that he had a horror of
heresy.

It seemed to him that heresy would undermine the

assurance of salvation, the promise of life after death.
As we have seen, Johnson had a pathological fear of dying
and the "true faith" gave him solace which enabled him to
endure.

If the "hereticks" were right, who knows what one

might face after death?

Clarke himself remained within

the Church of England but insisted that the doctrine of
the Trinity was an optional belief for the individual
Christian.
In the previous chapter, we observed that Clarke
differs from many other natural religionists in the
limitations of his rationalism.

Once skepticism on the

major points of doctrine has been satisfied, he advises
that the Christian should believe, without rigorous
examination, the minor points of doctrine:
To sincere Believers, . . . being once satisfied
in the main and great Truths of Religion, they
suffer not themselves to be moved, and their
Faith in this great point shaken, by naive and
uncertain disputes about particular Questions of
less moment (Sermon 1, 23).22
Indeed, Clarke recognizes the fundamentally non-rational
nature of faith itself:
22 Samuel Clarke, Sermons On Several Subjects
(London: n.p., 1820).
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Faith is that firm belief of things at present
not seen: Because it is an Act, not of the
Understanding only, but also and chiefly of the
Will (Sermon 1, 3).
Clarke did not consider natural religion to be an attack
on Christianity; rather, he viewed it as preliminary to
the truth of religious revelation:
Natural Religion is the best Preparative for the
reception of the Christian. The Love of Truth
and Virtue in general, is the Dispensation of
the Father; And the Doctrine of the Gospel in
particular, is the Dispensation of the Son
(Sermon 1, 9).
Finally, the nature of the conversation in which
Johnson gives Boswell his list of preachers must be
remembered--Boswell begins by suggesting his own
candidates and Johnson merely approves or disapproves.
This format is partly responsible for Clarke's lowly
position on the list.

Moreover, Johnson does not confuse

artistic criteria with religious considerations.

The

distinction remains quite clear--approval of Clarke's
style but disapproval of one point in his theology.
This survey of Johnson's opinions about particular
sermonists reveals a significant catholicity in taste.
Although he slights the early sermonists with the
exception of Taylor, he appreciates the wide range of
styles represented by many post-Restoration preachers:
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All the latter preachers have a good style.
Indeed, nobody now talks much of style:
everybody composes pretty well. There are no
such unharmonious periods as there were a
hundred years ago (Life, III, 248).
In his own sermon compositions, Johnson avoided the
rhetorical excesses of Taylor and the extreme austerity of
expression found in many of the imitations of Archbishop
Tillotson's plain style.

Moreover, while he always points

out deviations from orthodoxy, he does not limit his
praise to those who propound his own theological beliefs.
Johnson recognizes that even those whose doctrine may be
questionable, like Clarke, may nonetheless manifest
homiletic and literary skills which must be acknowledged.

III
In a letter to the Reverend Charles Lawrence, a young
clergyman apprehensive about the duty of preaching to his
congregation, Johnson offers very practical insights on
how to compose a good sermon.

Lawrence had been adapting

material taken from other divines for his own sermons.
Johnson encourages him to attempt an original sermon on
occasion and he concludes his letter by attempting to
soothe the young man's fears with a description of the
easy, almost mechanical, aspects of sermon composition
based on the outline form:
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Your present method of making your sermons
seems very judicious. Few frequent preachers
can be supposed to have sermons more their own
than yours will be. Take care to register,
somewhere or other, the authors from whom your
several discourses are borrowed; and do not
imagine that you shall always remember, even
what perhaps you now think it impossible to
forget.
My advice, however, is, that you attempt,
from time to time, an original sermon; and in
the labour of composition, do not burthen your
mind with too much at once; do not exact from
yourself at one effort of excogitation, propriety of thought and elegance of expression.
Invent first, and then embellish. The production of something, where nothing was before, is
an act of greater energy than the expansion or
decoration of the thing produced. Set down
diligently your thoughts as they rise, in the
first words that occur; and, when you have
matter, you will easily give it form: nor,
perhaps, will this method be always necessary;
for, by habit, your thoughts and diction will
flow together.
The composition of sermons is not very
difficult: the divisions not only help the
memory of the hearer but direct the judgment of
the writer; they supply sources of invention,
and keep every part in its proper place (Life,
III, 437).
An examination of Johnson's Sermons, however, shows that
his advice to Lawrence is deceiving in its simplicity.
In this letter, Johnson professes his fidelity to the
rather formal and traditional outline structure of the
sermon.

However, in his own use of the outline, Johnson

is an innovator.

His greatest deviation from the tradi-

tional sermon structure is in his position of the outline.
He frequently delays the outline until one-fourth of the
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sermon has been spent on a general and discursive consideration of the sermon topic.

Common practice is to

begin the sermon with the outline so that the structure is
clear from the outset.

Johnson, however, frequently

begins with a leisurely unfolding of the general topic and
then introduces the outline.

This practice de-emphasizes

the outline and makes it less restricting; indeed, by its
very position, it usually does not affect one-fourth of
the sermon.23
Although this may seem insignificant, it demonstrates
Johnson's acute sensitivity to public taste--to his
audience and to their pragmatic concerns.

In the

seventeenth century, congregations seemed to possess an
insatiable appetite for preaching; they listened for hours
to sermons placed end to end.24

such congregations did

23 An extreme example of Johnson's delay in
introducing the traditional homiletic outline is Sermon
14. This sermon is ten pages in length; the outline
occurs on the sixth page after Johnson has already made
his strongest points.
24 According to Mitchell, at no time in the world's
history had preaching played so important and disproportionate a part in political and social life as it did in
England during the seventeenth century. Never before had
such numbers of sermons been delivered on public or
private occasions, and never before had such quantities of
sermons and religious treatises come from the press. For
example, allowing for the fact that the Westminster
Assembly was a gathering of clergymen, still there is
something abnormal about a day spent as was Monday,
October 16, 1643. According to the Rev. John Lightfoot,
the occasion was a solemn fast:
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not need much enticement to enter a sermon, so the
preacher could plunge into the outline, confident that his
listeners were receptive.

In the eighteenth century,

First Mr. Wilson gave a picked psalm, or
selected verses of several psalms, agreeing to
the time and occasion. Then Dr. Burgess prayed
about an hour: after he had done, Mr. Whittacre
preached upon Isa. xxxvii. 3, "This day is a day
of trouble," etc. Then, having had another
chosen psalm, Mr. Goodwin prayed; and after he
had done, Mr. Palmer preached upon Psal. xxv.
12. After whose sermon we had another psalm,
and Doctor Stanton prayed about an hour; and
with another psalm and a prayer of the prolocutor [i.e. Dr. Twisse], and a collection for the
maimed soldiers . . . we adjourned till tomorrow
morning. [The Whole Works of the Rev. John
Lightfoot, D.D., ed. Rev. John Rogers Pitman
(London: n.d., 1825), 13 vols. Volume 13
contains "The Journal of the Proceedings of the
Assembly of Divines, from January 1, 1643, to
December 31, 1644." As cited by Mitchell, 256).
According to Mitchell, the conditions which we
glimpse behind these facts were hardly calculated to
produce pulpit oratory of a highly finished type.
Political prejudice, religious enthusiasm and the necessity of meeting the exigencies of the moment influenced
what was delivered. The prevailing tone of such sermons
is one of gloomy dogma (Mitchell, 255-257). However,
Mitchell's assessment is not wholly true. Dreary as such
a day may appear to the modern reader, it is important to
recall several factors. The age was one in which drama
and other forms of light entertainment were illegal.
Listening to sermons was a popular form of public activity, providing the occasion for social interaction.
Moreover, the political and social issues of the day were
closely intertwined with theological importance. A kind
of theocracy was beginning to take root.
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however, the sermon is no longer so universally
esteemed. 25
Johnson reveals his awareness of the decline in
enthusiasm for the sermon through his defense of the
subject matter frequently treated in sermons.
example, in

~ermon

1

1

For

he apparently feels susceptible to

attack on the grounds that marriage is a frequent topic
among sermon writers.

So, he defends himself by

asserting:
It is, therefore, no obligation to the propriety
of discoursing upon them [the duties of marriage], that they are well known and generally
acknowledged; for a very small part of the
disorders of the world proceed from ignorance of
the laws by which life ought to be regulated;
nor do many, even of those whose hands are
polluted with the foulest crimes, deny the
reasonableness of virtue, or attempt to justify
their own actions. Men are not blindly betrayed
into corruption, but abandon themselves to their
passions with their eyes open; and lose the
direction of truth, because they do not attend
to her voice, not because they do not hear, or
do not understand it. It is, therefore, no less
useful to rouse the thoughtless than instruct
the ignorant; to awaken the attention than
enlighten the understanding (Sermon 1 1 5).

25 In The English Church in the Eighteenth Century
(London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1878), c. J. Abbey
and J. H. Overton note a decline in the quality and
quantity of sermons after the Restoration (II, 37).
However, they list Sherlock, Smalridge, Waterland, Seed,
Ogden, Atterbury, Mudge, and Butler as outstanding sermon
writers (II, 37). In general terms, Johnson's taste in
sermons is within the mainstream of eighteenth-century opinion.
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Johnson feels that he must capture the congregation's
interest.

He therefore often postpones the outline and

begins with a defense of the topic.

For example, in

sermon 1.1, this defense of the sermon's subject-matter
immediately precedes and introduces the formal outline:
Since, therefore, the pursuit of perfect peace
is the great, the necessary, the inevitable,
business of human life; since this peace is to
be attained by trust in God, and by that only;
since, without this, every state is miserable,
and the voluptuous and the busy are equally
disappointed; what can be more useful, than
seriously to enquire, First, what is meant by
this trust in God, to which perfect peace is
promised? and, Secondly, by what means this
trust in God is to be attained? (Sermon 14, 154155).
Placing the defense just before the formal outline,
Johnson softens the blow; he emphasizes the importance of
the subject matter before the sermon begins in earnest.
The subject matter Johnson selects for his Sermons
demonstrates his pragmatic attitude towards religion:
marriage, the necessity of repentance, lying, fraud,
charity, good government, the vanity of human life.

Even

his discussion of God's attributes leads to a practical
application--if God is merciful, we may repent; if God is
just, we must reform.
Johnson's most frequent method of beginning a sermon
is to write a paragraph on some general phase of human
existence which the congregation has experienced and with
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which they can empathize.

For instance, Sermon 1 begins

with a comment on man's essentially social nature:
That society is necessary to the happiness of
human nature, that the gloom of solitude, and
the stillness of retirement, however they may
flatter at a distance, with pleasing views of
independence and serenity, neither extinguish
the passions, nor enlighten the understanding,
that discontent will intrude upon privacy, and
temptations follow us to the desert, every one
may be easily convinced, either by his own
experience, or that of others (Sermon 1, 3).
Clear parallels exist between this paragraph and Johnson's
writing techniques in the Rambler essays.
noticeable similarity is that of style:

The most
the extended,

frequent sets of parallels, the careful balance, the
preponderance of abstract nouns and noun clauses, the
"consensus" phrase.

Furthermore, in imitation of the

Rambler style, sixteen of the sermon introductions are
marked by a series of parallel noun clauses which lead to
a short and rather anticlimactic verbal phrase.26
26 For example, six of Johnson's Sermons begin with
a noun clause introduced by that [Sermons 1, 2, 7, 12, 23
and 24. Moreover, nine othersermons have-noun clauses-rn
the first paragraph [Sermons l, 2 1 ~' 1Q, 11, 1!, 15, 1.1.
and 20]. Sermon 25 begins with a series of infinitives,
so the first word-rs to, but otherwise the formula of noun
clause preceding and dominating the verb applies:
To afford adequate consolations to the last
hour, to cheer the gloomy passage through the
valley of the shadow of death, and to ease that
anxiety, to which beings, prescient of their own
dissolution, and conscious of their own danger,
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Several of the Rambler and the Sermon introductions,
besides sharing stylistic similarities, evoke a similar
mood of melancholy over the miseries of life.27

Moreover,

Johnson's religious and secular writings on the vacuity of
human life generally conclude in pragmatic exhortations to
strive for the improvement of the situation.

Although the

Rambler essays stop short of an explicitly religious
answer to the problem of life's emptiness, their analysis
of the problem, as far as it goes, is similar to the
introductions of Sermons

§., .!..f, 12., .fl.

These four sermons open on a note of melancholy with
Johnson describing either the vanity or the misery of
human existence.

For example, Sermon 5 considers the

literary treatment of human misery:
There is nothing upon which more writers, in all
ages, have laid out their abilities, than the
miseries of life, and it affords no pleasing
reflection to discover that a subject so little
agreeable is not yet exhausted (Sermon§., 53).
must be necessarily exposed, is the privilege only of
revealed religion (Sermon 25, 261).
W. K. Wimsatt, in The Prose Style of Samuel Johnson,
analyzes Johnson's wide use of parallelism and balance in
his great moral essays; he does not examine Johnson's
Sermons. More specifically, Wimsatt notes Johnson's
characteristic use of noun clauses to illustrate complex
relationships through his sentence construction in the
Rambler essays (15-23).
27 See, for example, Ramblers 2, 6, 13, 16, 20, 31,
53, 61, 66, 87, 96, 106, 114, 127, and-176; Sermons §_-,-12,
15, and TI.
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sermon 12 begins with a recognition that man will not
admit the obvious but disagreeable truth that all human
desires and actions are vain:
That all human actions terminate in vanity, and
all human hopes will end in vexation, is a
position, from which nature withholds our
credulity, and which our fondness for the
present life, and worldly enjoyments, disposes
us to doubt, however forcibly it may be urged
upon us, by reason or experience (Sermon 12,
127).

In Sermon 15 Johnson dwells on the ubiquitous nature of
man's misery.

He chooses as his text Job--the prototype

of questioning but submissive endurance to the human
condition:
The position, contained in this sentence,
neither requires, nor admits proof or
illustration; being too evident to be denied,
and too clear to be mistaken. That life is of
short continuance, and is disquieted by many
molestations, every man knows, and every man
feels; and the complaint, attributed to Job, in
the history that is supposed to be the oldest
book of which mankind is in possession, has been
continued, and will be continued, through all
human generations with endless repetitions
(Sermon 15, 159).
The opening paragraph of Sermon

.fl

is a survey of the

various responses to the inescapable fact of human misery:
That the life of man is unhappy, that his days
are not only few, but evil, that he is surrounded by dangers, distracted by uncertainties,
and oppressed by calamities, requires no proof.
• . . Accordingly we find the miseries of our
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present state lamented by writers of every
class, from the inspired teachers of religion,
who admonish us of our frailty and infelicity,
that they may incite us to labour after a better
state, where "there is fullness of joy, and
pleasures for evermore," to the vainest and
loosest author, whose design is to teach
methods, not of improving, but of wasting time,
and whose doctrine St. Paul, speaking in a
borrowed character, has well expressed in one
short sentence, "Let us eat and drink, for tomorrow we die" (Sermon £l, 237-238).
This repeated theme of the misery of human existence is
grounded in Johnson's general observations on human nature
and in the immediacy of the particular situation being
addressed by the sermon.

Indeed, the examples taken from

these four Sermons indicate Johnson's sparse usage of
Biblical parallels for the particular contemporary
situation he is examining.

Johnson does not seem to be

interested in relating the Biblical text closely to
practical human experience.

He manifests a distinct

preference for describing the nature of man in
contemporary terms, for clothing misery in contemporary
garb, and for using Biblical parallels almost
incidentally.

Johnson's limited usage of Scripture is

again indicative of the pragmatic religious perspective of
a layman.

Some sermon writers would stretch Scripture to

surprising lengths to make it "fit" a particular
situation, but Johnson was not one of them.

He was never

concerned with providing an apologia for the Bible but
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rather with offering helpful guidance to human beings
wrestling with th.eir daily problems.

Where a Biblical

text is useful, Johnson will take it up in his Sermons;
however, he is at no pains to find Biblical justification
for his presentations.

Moreover, the delay of the formal

outline in his Sermons reserves the consolations provided
by Scriptural revelation until one-fourth of the sermon is
completed; it allows Johnson first to test the validity of
human experience for addressing the vacuity of existence
and only then to bring consolation from the Divine Word to
a problem clearly grounded in the direct experience of his
auditors.

As we observed earlier, many sermon writers

address their own situations and problems through their
sermons.

Insofar as the experience of the sermon writer

matches that of his audience, his sermons will be
effective.

Insofar as his experience is unique, his words

will fail to move the congregation to reform.

In his

Sermons, Johnson is eager to reach the Taylor, Dodd, or
Aston congregations with the practical issues they
struggle with in their daily lives.
Another bond between the Rambler and the Sermon
introductions is the surprising prevalence of secular
vocabulary.

Nineteen of Johnson's Sermons open on a

secular note; they have no religious terminology in the
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first paragraph.28

Sermon.£!, for example, proposes that

a good government must be led by individuals concerned
with the common good.

The first sentence deals with a

generally accepted secular principle; that is, government
has been perverted from its original aim:
That the institutions of government owe their
original, like other human actions, to the
desire of happiness, is not to be denied; nor is
it less generally allowed, that they have been
perverted to very different ends from those
which they were intended to promote. This is a
truth, which it would be very superfluous to
prove by authorities, or illustrate by example
(Sermon.£!, 249).
For the most part, Johnson uses religious terms when he is
writing about a divine attribute such as mercy (Sermon
or justice (Sermon

l>,

£)

or when he discusses a particular

phase of the liturgy, such as communion (Sermons 9 and
22).

For all other subjects, particularly those which

deal with human behavior and relationships, he begins on
the secular level and gradually moves into a religious
context.

The usual progression in his discussions of

human vacuity is obvious--if everything in this life
results in emptiness, man should shift his attention to
the next life.
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By having first disarmed his congregation with a
secular approach, Johnson is in effect easing his auditors
into a consideration of religious material.

That Johnson

extends the secular introduction into the majority of his
sermons is significant because it illustrates his
religious pragmatism in addressing the increased
secularism around him.

The use of such non-traditional

introductions in his Sermons also reflects Johnson's
belief in the validity of human experience to suggest some
strategies for coping with the vacuity of human nature.
Sometimes Johnson begins his sermons by attempting to
give the congregation a historical perspective on the
Scriptural text.

For instance, in Sermon £, he outlines

Solomon's credentials as a sage:
The writings of Solomon are filled with such
observations upon the nature and life of man
because they were the result of long experience
assisted with every advantage of mind and
fortune. An experience that had made him
acquainted with the actions, passions, virtues,
and vices of all ranks, ages, and denominations
of mankind, and enabled him, with the Divine
assistance, to leave to succeeding ages, a
collection of precepts that, if diligently
attended to, will conduct us safe in the paths
of life (Sermon£, 65).
Sermon 11 is based on 1 Peter 3: 8:

"Finally, be ye all

of one mind, having compassion one of another, love as
brethren, be pitiful, be courteous."

To show the
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importance of this list of Christian virtues, Johnson
explains the situation in which it was given:
The apostle, directing this epistle to the new
converts, scattered over the provinces of Asia,
having laid before them the great advantage of
the religion which they had embraced, no less
than the salvation of their souls, and the high
price for which they were redeemed, the precious
blood of Christ, proceeds to explain to them
what is required by their ~ profession (Sermon
g, 117).
He begins Sermon 13 with an analysis of the ambiguous
text:

"Having the form of godliness, but denying the

power thereof" (2 Tim. 3: 5):
When St. Paul, in the precepts given to Timothy
for his instruction how to regulate and purify
the conversation of the first Christians,
directed him to take care that those men should
be avoided, as dangerous and pestilent, who,
having the form of godliness, denied the power;
it is reasonable to believe, that he meant, in
his direct and irrunediate intention, to awaken
his caution against gross hypocrites; such as
may easily be supposed to have appeared too
of ten in the most early seminaries of Christianity; who made an appearance of righteousness
subservient to worldly interest; and whose
conversion, real or pretended, gave them an
opportunity of preying upon artless simplicity,
by claiming that kindness which the first
believers showed to one another; and obtaining
benefactions which they did not want, and eating
bread for which they did not labour (Sermon 13,
137) .
Johnson feels the text should be placed in its original
context because he chooses to interpret Paul's warning as
applying to a different type of hypocrite--more prevalent
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in Johnson's day than gross pretenders to Christianity-namely, the man who obeys the external religious forms but
who is internally unclean.

Johnson apparently feels that

the new application is justified by the changes which
history has worked on the size and status of the church;
as a respecter of tradition and history, he must explain
that his application is new.
These few instances of Scriptural commentary, however, are contrary to Johnson's usual Sermon introductions, which, as we have seen, serve several rhetorical
purposes:

(1) they capture the auditor's attention more

effectively through their universal concerns and general
application than would an outline of the sermon's
contents; (2) they ease the secular mind into a serious
consideration of the relevance of religion's answers to
human questions--an approach the modern theologian Paul
Tillich describes as "the method of correlation"; (3) they
emphasize Johnson's religious pragmatism by first
examining human experience--thereby delaying the
traditional appeal to religious revelation--to find
consolations for the vacuity of life.
Moreover, these methods of bending the traditionally
rigid outline form of the sermon reflect Johnson's concern
for propriety; that is, the sermon's subject matter ought
to address the particular concerns of the audience in
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order for the sermon to be a successful persuasive device.
Johnson also reflects this pragmatism in his layman's
approach to Biblical quotations.

He does not choose a

text for interesting syntactical problems or alternate
translations, as several of the scholar-clergy had done.29
Nor does he buttress his arguments with excessive and
eclectic quotations, like the Latitudinarians.

Moreover,

he does not attempt to awe his congregation with his
knowledge of esoteric vocabulary.

On rare occasions

Johnson goes into what may be called Scriptural exegesis,
which for him consists of an attempt to resolve possible
ambiguity in the literal meaning of the quotation.

In

Sermon 11, which considers the Scriptural text, "Finally,
be ye all of one mind, having compassion, one of another,
love as brethren, be pitiful, be courteous" (I Peter 3:
8), Johnson explains:
The word which is rendered having compassion,
seems to include a greater latitude of signification, than the word compassion commonly
obtains. Compassion is not used, but in the
sense of tender regard to the unhappiness of
another. But the term used by Saint Peter may
29 William Laud, for instance, writes a sermon [A
Sermon Preached before his Majestie at Wansted (London:
n.p., 1621)] examining all possible syntactic relationships in the text: "Pray ye for the peace of Jerusalem:
May they prosper who love thee! I Peace be within thy
ramparts, Prosperity within thy palaces!" {Psalm 121: 67). Laud comments, "I have now done with Rogate pacem,
pray for peace, but that Jerusalem is come again in my
way. But it is a strange Jerusalem'' (23).
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mean mutually feeling for each other, receiving
the same impressions from the same things, and
this sense seems to be given it by one of the
translators [Castalia) (Sermon 1.1, 119).
Later in the same sermon, Johnson gives two alternative
translations, but since no choice is necessary in terms of
his discussion, he carries the exegesis no further:
In pursuance of his injunctions to be of one
mind, and to sympathize one with another, he
directs them, to love as brethren, or to be
lovers of the brethren [Hammond] (Sermon 11,
121-122).

Similarly, in Sermon

~,

Johnson comments on a possible

misunderstanding of the Scriptural command--"But thou,
when thou givest alms, let not thy left hand know what thy
right hand doth" (Mt. 6:3):
By this precept it is not to be understood, that
we are forbidden to give alms in publick, or
where we may be seen of men; for our Saviour has
also commanded, that our "light should so shine
before men, that they may see our good works,
and glorify our Father which is in heaven." The
meaning, therefore, of this text is not that we
should forbear to give alms in the sight of men,
but that we should not suffer the presence of
men to act as the motive to our charity, nor
regard their praise as any object to our wishes;
a precept surely reasonable; for how can that
act be virtuous, which depends not upon our own
choice, but upon that of others, and which we-should not have performed, if we had not
expected that they would have applauded it?
(Sermon 19, 210).
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Johnson thus aptly states the practical effect of the
Biblical text by demonstrating its insight into human
motivation.
Johnson usually writes from a text which is perfectly
clear on its literal level.

For him, a quotation is

merely a springboard for a discussion of a particular
dilemma drawn from human experience.

Indeed, Johnson's

use of Scriptural revelation in his Sermons suggests that
it possessed a status of theory rather than of empirical
truth--a theory, which like any other, had always to be
put to the test of human experience.

As a record of

religious revelation, Scripture is historical; Johnson's
Sermons suggest that revelation is not its own sufficient
judge and that to scrutinize it with the aid of pragmatic
human experience does not invalidate that revelation.

For

example, his Scriptural texts are those which the average
churchgoer already knew; yet, he proposes to look at their
concrete implications for daily life more carefully than
his listeners would have had the inclination to do before.
In Sermon 15, his text is "Man that is born of woman, is
of few days, and full of trouble" (Job 14: 1).

He divides

the sermon into two parts, one a consideration of the
shortness of life, the other, of its miseries:
But since the mind is always of itself shrinking
from disagreeable images, it is sometimes
necessary to recall them; and it may contribute
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to the repression of many unreasonable desires,
and the prevention of many faults and follies,
if we frequently, and attentively consider,
First, that "man born of a woman is of few
days. 11 And, Secondly, "that man born of a woman
is full of trouble" (Sermon ];2, 160-161).
In this case, Johnson grounds the Biblical quotation
directly in the general experience of his auditors.
In its use of quotations, Sermon

1 is unique among

Johnson's Sermons; yet, its technique is also highly
characteristic of Johnson's attitude towards the sermon
form.

The general topic of this sermon is the nature and

obligations of marriage, and the Scriptural text is
"Therefore shall a man leave his father, and his mother,
and shall cleave unto his wife'' (Genesis 2: 24).

He

chooses one of the most familiar descriptions of marriage
in the Bible; its literal meaning leaves little doubt or
ambiguity.
itself.

Yet, the text does not shape the sermon

To describe the nature of matrimony, Johnson

compares it to friendship.

The comparison is in the form

of a series of adages about friendship; Johnson simply
applies these dicta to marriage as well.
In a sense, Johnson is following the Latitudinarian
practice of buttressing his arguments with quotations from
the ancients, but there is an important difference in the
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way Johnson uses quotations.30

Although "He that hath

friends, has no friend" has a Greek origin, and "Friendship amongst equals is the most lasting" was first written
in Latin, Johnson places the emphasis on the simple folkwisdom underlying the precepts:
It has long been observed that friendship is to
be confined to one; or that, to use the words of
the axiom, "He that hath friends, has no
friend" . . . . It is remarked, that "Friendship
amongst equals is the most lasting" (Sermon 1,
9-10).

-

This technique is unusual for Johnson because he rarely
uses so many quotations in a single sermon.

However, he

finds in these adages words that square with human
experience; they have an almost axiomatic status.

Johnson

buttresses his argument, not with his usual appeal to
authority, but with an appeal to coromon sense, which is
perhaps the strongest support of all.
Sometimes, he repeats the text, or parts of it, in
order to impose unity on the sermon.

For example, Sermon

}, is based on this Biblical text:

30 For the reader, the original quotations are
available in footnotes; for the listener, the impression
is created that Johnson is dealing in the same intellectual currency and experience to which the congregation has
access. Strict friendship "is to have the same desires
and the same aversions," Johnson observes; the explanation
is in a footnote, "An observation of Catiline in Sallust"
(Sermon 1_, 11).

241
Thus
see,
good
rest
walk

saith the Lord, Stand ye in the ways, and
and ask for the old paths, where is the
way, and walk therein, and ye shall find
for your souls. But they said, We will not
therein (Jer. 6:16) (Sermon 2, 75).

Halfway through the sermon, when he describes modern
intellectuals, Johnson again manifests his religious
pragmatism in his blending of Biblical revelation with
human experience:
They seem, even when considered with the utmost
candour, to have rather consulted their own
imaginations, than to have asked for the old
paths, where is the good way (Sermon 2, 81-82).
The Scriptural text which introduces Sermon l is taken
from Proverbs 28: 14--"Happy is the man that feareth
always:

but he that hardeneth his heart shall fall into

mischief" (Sermon l

1

29).

At the end of this sermon, as

in almost half of his sermon compositions, Johnson uses a
deliberate blending of Biblical wisdom and common sense in
order to encourage responsible moral conduct:
Let us all, therefore, watch our thoughts and
actions; and that we may not, by hardness of
heart fall into mischief, let us endeavour and
pray, that we may be among them that feared
always, and by that fear may be prepared for
everlasting happiness (Sermon 1, 38).
Johnson, then, uses Biblical quotations sparingly.
His usual technique consists in the incorporation of the
Scriptural text into the delayed outline of his sermon and

242
almost invariably a repetition of the same text blended
into his hortatory conclusion.

Johnson's Sermon 1 is

atypical because he incorporates five new quotations in
his comparison between friendship and marriage.

However,

the number of quotations involved even in Sermon 1 does
not alter Johnson's approach.

He is a layman interested

in demonstrating the value of common human experience for
easing the problems of life; he never uses the sermon
genre to debate fine points of theology.

His restrained

use of Biblical quotations, then, is another facet of his
layman's approach to religion.

The ordained clergy of the

day, both Established and Non-conformist, had a strong
interest in debating fine points of theology from the
pulpit and made generous use of Scripture to support their
contentions.

Johnson, however, followed neither example.

So far we have examined several of the rhetorical
devices in Johnson's Sermons which reflect his Rambler
style:

a general introduction to the Sermon's subject-

matter grounded in human experience; secular diction,
parallelism, and the disciplined use of figurative
devices; the delayed and in a sense "buried" outline; and
the restrained use of easily comprehended Biblical
quotations. These characteristics of Johnson's Sermons are
variations from the formal sermon tradition; each
variation accentuates the value Johnson places on concrete
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experience in dealing with the vacuity of life.

Johnson's

belief that conunon sense and actual experience provide man
with the best test for the validity of any postulate of
religion finds expression in his Sermons no less than in
his other writings.

He does not seek to persuade his

auditors by saying, in effect, "The Bible tells me so."
He relies rather on the vacuity of human experience to
produce concurrence and conunitment to the antidotes
suggested by religion.
Johnson's morally pragmatic attitude towards religion
is also demonstrated by his sensitivity to the inunediate
occasion for the Sermon.

As we saw in Chapter One,

Johnson used the particular character of the audience or
the peculiar situation for which he was writing the sermon
in order to suggest morally appropriate modifications of
human behavior.

Johnson never confines himself to the

traditional homiletic practice of offering consolation
only through generalized and abstracted appeals to
religious revelation.

For example, Sermon ll_, was

preached on January 30, the anniversary of Charles I's
execution.

It is a pragmatic moral exemplum which

denounces disobedience and wilful rebellion:
Of the strife, which this day brings back to our
remembrance, we may observe, that it had all the
tokens of "strife" proceeding from "envy." The
rage of the faction, which invaded the rights of
the church and monarchy, was disproportionate to
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the provocation received. The violence with
which hostility was prosecuted, was more than
the cause, that was publickly avowed, could
incite or justify (Sermon 23, 246).
Whatever one's opinion may be of the political views in
the passage, Johnson is clearly shaping this sermon to the
circumstances surrounding its delivery.31

At the same

time, the Sermon demonstrates Johnson's preference for
pragmatic moral principles; it is an embodiment of the
universal moral standards of personal honesty and respect
for others that have a relevance and truth independent of
time.
In Sermon 19, on charity, Johnson refers specifically
to the occasion of the sermon, namely, the founding of an
orphanage dependent on public donations.

He relates the

abstract concept of the religious duty of exercising
charity toward those in need to this specific occasion,
ref erring to "the reasonableness of laying hold on the
present opportunity for the exercise of our charity"
(Sermon 19, 212).

The mere exhortation to practice

charity is insufficient; it must be translated into an
actual charitable deed.
31 Johnson is following a tradition, which dated back
to January 25, 1661, when Parliament ordered the thirtieth
of January to be kept as a day of penance and humiliation;
moreover, it ordered that a sermon be composed in praise
of the martyred Charles I.
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Sermon 12_, which he writes for his wife's funeral,
includes a highly individualized list of virtues for which
the departed should be emulated:
Yet, let it be remembered, that her wit was
never employed to scoff at goodness, nor her
reason to dispute against truth. In this age of
wild opinions, she was as free from skepticism
as the cloistered virgin. She never wished to
signalize herself by the singularity of paradox.
She had a just diffidence of her own reason, and
desired to practice rather than to dispute. Her
practice was such as her opinions naturally
produced . • . . That she had no failings, cannot
be supposed: but she has now appeared before
the Almighty Judge; and it would ill become
beings like us, weak and sinful as herself, to
remember those faults which, we trust, Eternal
Purity has pardoned (Sermon 25, 269).
A litany of virtues was a traditional homiletic device for
personalizing the funeral sermon.

Johnson is deeply

touched by the death of his wife; yet, he is also greatly
concerned with adapting a painful personal experience so
that it will be spiritually enriching for the congregation.

Johnson's funeral sermon is effective because it is

personal and concrete in its treatment of mourning;
Johnson draws from his personal experience of loss to
suggest some general strategies for coping with the death
of a loved one.
Johnson's funeral sermon emphasizes the survivor's
proper response to death.

Drawing from his own experience

the realization that sorrow is a necessary result of the
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loss of a loved one, he attempts to sublimate the sorrow
and to channel it into two specific religious expressions.
The first is perpetuation of the memory of the departed
through the emulation of her virtues:
Let us therefore preserve her memory for no
other end but to imitate her virtues; and let us
add her example to the motives to piety which
this solemnity was, secondly, instituted to
enforce (Sermon~, 269-270).
The second method of religious instruction is to encourage
virtuous action based on the realization of impending
judgment which the recent death has aroused in the living:
Let it, therefore, be our care, when we retire
from this solemnity, that we immediately turn
from our wickedness, and do that which is lawful
and right; that, whenever disease, or violence,
shall dissolve our bodies, our souls may be
saved alive, and received into everlasting
habitations (Sermon 25, 271).
The mourner can solace himself with the belief that sorrow
in the face of death is not merely a natural emotional
response to the experience of loss, but also an
instruction and warning to the mourner regarding his
personal conduct during this earthly pilgrimage.
In Sermon 18 Johnson addresses himself to a
particular type of fraud which he feels is a product of
eighteenth-century circumstances and attitudes rather than
an abuse common to all societies and ages.

The particular
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"society" referred to in the sermon probably consisted of
those who administered the local benefit fund for the
almshouses and charities of Ashbourne; the officers of the
fund had invited John Taylor to preach to them:32
For the particular application of this doctrine,
I am sorry, that my native place should afford
an opportunity.
But since this society has
called me to stand here before them, I hope no
man will be offended, that I do my duty with
fidelity and freedom.
Truth requires, that I
warn you against a species of fraud, sometimes
found amongst you, and that of a very shameful
and oppressive kind (Sermon ]J!, 199).
He refers to the particular offense of depriving a
contributor from the benefits of a common fund when he is
in need.

It is another example of Johnson using a

particular experience as a means of religious instruction
and warning; once again, he fits the sermon to the
occasion, or in this case, to the culture.
Johnson's real masterpiece of adapting the sermon to
a unique situation is The Convict's Address to His Unhappy
Brethren.

This sermon (Sermon

£!!)

was written for the

Reverend William Dodd and preached by him to his fellow
prisoners shortly before his execution.

Johnson actually

takes advantage of the circumstances surrounding the
32 See, Jean H. Hagstrum and James Gray, eds., Samuel
Johnson, Sermons, 199, note 3.

248
sermon and capitalizes on the convict-mentality of the
congregation.
He begins with a fast-moving account of an incipient
prison break by Paul and Silas.

The prisoners are lured

into the sermon by the excitement of the story and the
relevance of the occasion to their own situation.

Johnson

here engages in a rare bit of theatricality; he exploits
the drama of the situation which is known by all--the
plight of the prisoners and the preacher's imminent fate.
Both the occupants of pulpit and pew respond from their
need to the jailer's question to Paul and Silas:
must I do to be saved?"

"What

Johnson makes the sermon

pertinent by answering the question in terms of the
prisoners' situation.

He stresses the urgency of the

convicts' state and eliminates unnecessary theological
hair-splitting:

"Of the efficacy of a death-bed

repentance many have disputed; but we have no leisure for
controversy" (Sermon 28, 308).

A few pages later he

states, "But there is no time for disquisition; we must
try to find the shortest way to peace" (Sermon 28, 309).
Johnson's style also reflects the urgency of the situation
for the prisoners--the sentences are shorter and simpler
than those in all of his other sermons.

Therefore,

Johnson once again takes artistic advantage of the
peculiar nature of the congregation and grounds his appeal
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for obedience and repentance in the practical experience
of the prisoners.
A test for the consolations offered by religious
revelation against the reality of practical experience in
Johnson's Sermons is noticeable in terms of another of the
"standards" for a good sermon for which he praised Blair.
Blair directed his sermons to man's reason; he exercised
restraint and discipline in appealing to the emotions.
Johnson's incipient emotional involvement in his Sermons
is evident in his departures from his usual style of
careful balance and parallelism.

This is not to suggest

that every "typical" sentence Johnson writes is packed
with parallelism and balance--many are not.

Nor am I

suggesting that all sentences in the Sermons which are not
based on parallelism and balance betray an emotional
involvement.

However, these limited "departures" demon-

strate Johnson's belief that restraint in emotional appeal
contributes towards producing the desired didactic end of
the sermon.
For example, his disciplined use of repetition
heightens the sense of his personal involvement in what he
is expressing.

In Sermon 15, the meditation on Job leads

him to observe:
Many things which are not pleasant may be
salutary; and among them is the just estimate of
human life, which may be made by all with
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advantage, though by few, very few, with delight
(Sermon 15, 160).
"Very few" is an apparent spontaneous intrusion--though,
of course, it was planned--and interrupts the parallelism
of "by all with advantage" I "by few . . . with delight."
In Sermon

~,

commenting on intellectual pride, he states:

But were our knowledge far greater than it is,
let us yet remember that goodness, not
knowledge, is the happiness of man! The day
will come, it will come quickly, when it shall
profit us more to have subdued proud thought,
than to have numbered the host of heaven (Sermon
~'

71-72).

The clause "it will come quickly" is an unusual note in
the Johnsonian cadence.

Again, it gives the impression of

an intrusion; it could easily have been incorporated to
read, "The day will quickly come," which would place the
emphasis on the parallelism at the end of the sentence.
Moreover, it is a repetition of "will come" and Johnson
seldom uses repetition when he can substitute parallelism.
Similar repetition occurs in Sermon 13:
To give the heart to God, and to give the whole
heart, is very difficult; the last, the great
effort of long labour, fervent prayer, and
diligent meditation (Sermon 13, 143).
"To give the whole heart" adds only one new word to the
previous phrase.

It is a re-thinking of the first phrase,

in a sense a correction of it, whereas Johnson's
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corrections are usually worked out before the final
written expression of the thought.

The second half of the

sentence is in Johnson's usual style, with no repetition
and three parallel terms of two elements each.

All these

minor breaks from Johnson's accustomed style suggest his
sensitivity to and accommodations of the oral dimension of
the sermon genre.
The most dramatic departure in Johnson's Sermons from
his usual emphasis on the role of human experience as a
valid judge of the consolations suggested by religious
revelation can be seen in all their conclusions.

The

Sermon conclusions consistently reflect the status of
unassailable truth that revelation possessed for the
religiously orthodox.

Indeed, Paul Alkon, in Samuel

Johnson and Moral Discipline, observes that "as they are
more directly didactic and religious, [Johnson's Sermons]
are artistically less effective than the rest of his work''
(191).

Alkon's critical observation is more relevant to

the conclusions of Johnson's Sermons than to other
sections of the works.

The conclusions rely heavily on

the traditional and highly formalized patterns of diction
which characterized the homiletic element of the sermon
tradition--the diction is highly liturgical and often
paraphrases Biblical forms of address.
churchman, Johnson really has no choice.

As a practical
He uses his
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Sermons' conclusions to summarize, to impose a logical
structure, to reinforce the outline, to remind the reader
of the Scriptural text, and to end things with a liturgical flourish.
An important rhetorical quality distinguishes the
conclusions of Johnson's Sermons from the endings of his
moral essays--restrained emotional involvement with the
subject matter.

Johnson uses the formalized exhortation

"Let us" rather than the intimate

11

I" or "you".

For

example, in Sermon 19 he begins his final sentence with
the first person, but ends with a generalized Biblical
quotation:
Let us endeavour to reclaim vice, and to improve
innocence to holiness; and remember that the day
is not far distant, in which our saviour has
promised to consider our gifts to these little
ones as given to himself; and that "they who
have turned many to righteousness shall shine
forth as the sun for ever and ever" (Sermon 19,
213).

-

In such passages Johnson seems to be overlooking the
thoughtful general principles rooted in human experience,
which are embodied in his beginning paragraphs, for the
sake of repeating the Scriptural text.
On some occasions, Johnson concludes his Sermons with
a liturgical formula:
An uniform perseverance in these holy practices,
will produce a steady confidence in the Divine
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favour, and that confidence will complete his
happiness. To which that we may all attain, God
of his infinite mercy grant, for the merits of
Jesus Christ, our Saviour; to whom, with the
Father and the Holy Ghost, be ascribed, as is
most due, all honour, adoration, and praise, now
and ever! Amen. (Sermon
84).

z,

After examining Johnson's imaginative adaptation of so
many elements from the English sermon tradition, this
unoriginal use of formula in several of his Sermon
conclusions is striking.33

When writing for the ''pulpit

of orthodoxy," Johnson always concludes his Sermons by
bowing to the conventions of tradition--to the absolute
finality of the criteria of religion for addressing the
vacuity of human existence.
Johnson's Sermons demonstrate that he refuses to
accept Scripture blindly, nor does he expect his auditors
to do so; however, when he tests revelation against life,
he finds the two in agreement.

Our examination of

Johnson's Sermons has revealed some important deviations
from those characteristics which he found so praiseworthy
in the

sermons of Blair and other representatives of the

English sermon tradition--variations which point to his
pragmatism and to his layman's approach to religion.
These modifications of the tradition include a general
33 Additional examples of Johnson's use of liturgical
formula to conclude his Sermons can be found in Sermon 6,
73; Sermon 9, 105; Sermon 25, 271; Sermon 27, 299; sermon
28, 313.
---
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introduction to the Sermons' subject-matter grounded in
human experience; secular diction, parallelism, and the
disciplined use of figurative devices; the delayed and in
a sense "buried" outline; and the restrained use of easily
comprehended Biblical quotations.

These techniques

accentuate the role of experience as a reliable test for
any proposed consolation for the vacuity of life; indeed,
even Scriptural revelation is not exempt from that
critical scrutiny.

While Johnson's Sermons formally

acknowledge that Scriptural revelation provides man with
such consolations, he always bases his argument on the
firm foundation of human experience.

Johnson's strongest

impulse was always to be honest with himself and with his
audience; he rejected what he considered to be
oversimplification.

Johnson's Sermons testify to the

serious perspective which a layman, engaged in the
concrete struggles of daily life, can bring to bear on
religion.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

Johnson described himself in his Rambler essays as "a
writer whose chief end is the regulation of common life"
(Rambler

11.

1

57) and who has undertaken "the arduous

province of preserving the balance of the mental constitution" (Rambler 47, 253).

In doing so, he wanted to

clarify some fundamental principles of human nature.
Johnson preferred neither the penchant of some rationalists for deduction from

~

priori configurations nor the

obsession of some pedants with adventitious particulars.
He had instead an affinity for inductive generalization
based upon observation and reason; with this orientation,
he analyzed the conduct of mankind to discover, by drawing
inferences from life as it is lived, the basic and
unchanging operational principles of human beings.
Throughout his Sermons, Johnson demonstrated his understanding that the pragmatic bases for action together with
realistic possibilities of accomplishment needed first to
be understood before a sermonist could effectively
motivate men to virtuous action and an improved life.
255
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Within the vast array of human trials presented in
the Sermons, Johnson found confirmation for his basic view
that the human tragedy lay in the insufficiency of things
which are limited and ephemeral to a hunger that is
limitless and infinite.

In classical Christian theology,

this insatiable hunger for wealth, power, fame, or sexual
gratification within the nature of man is called
concupiscence.

This orthodox theme of the contradiction

between human desire and human fulfillment, of
concupiscence, gives a basic coherence to the seemingly
unrelated subjects treated in the Sermons.

Moreover, the

Sermons demonstrate that Johnson's understanding of human
nature anticipated many of the discoveries of modern
psychology, especially in the areas of repression,
projection, fantasy, delusion, and motivation.

As we have

seen, Walter Jackson Bate argued convincingly that Johnson
anticipated Freud's theory of repression--the process by
which man attempts to escape from his anxieties and fears
by pushing them into the recesses of his unconscious mind
(Achievement, 93-94).

The forces that Freud described

were mainly sexual, whereas those that concerned Johnson
were broader.

Today, we could call Johnson's focus

"existential" because it centers on the problems man
encounters as he tries to grasp the meaning of life.
recognizing the existence of such fears in the human

By
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psyche and by analyzing how such forces shaped human
character and destiny, Johnson demonstrated "the pain of
being a man" in a compassionate effort to bring ultimate
help and comfort, rather than to reflect bitterly and
cynically on life.
Indeed, Johnson's Sermons answer the question of how
man is to be "consoled for the misery of life" in a
conventionally religious manner--faith in the possibility
of eternal salvation.

The Sermons, however, always frame

this conventional religious answer within a pragmatic and
secular understanding of the nature of man.

Through

rational control and common sense, through mature and
realistic perceptions about the self and

abou~

relation-

ships to others, by extending the benefit of one's
experience to others according to the rule of social
benevolence, Johnson tells the auditors of his Sermons how
they may pragmatically alleviate the miseries and problems
of this life without simply appealing to salvation in the
next life.
Johnson's Sermons reflect the insistent concerns of
many eighteenth century divines with ethical conduct based
on rewards and punishments, with the free agency of man,
and with demonstrating that the revelation of Scripture
and the demands of human reason were compatible.

However,

the variations in Johnson's Sermons from many of the
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"standards" for an effective sermon which he singled out
for praise in other sermonists--limiting the subject
matter, sensitivity to the audience, disciplined and
restrained use of emotional appeal, gesture and
intonation; the stylistic characteristics of parallelism,
controlled use of repetition and figurative devices,
sensitivity to a choice of diction which stresses
universal concepts over particular ones, and attentiveness
to formal structuring techniques within the sermon
tradition--suggest his predilection to test the truth of
religious revelation against the reality of experience and
common sense.
We have demonstrated that Johnson's deviations from
traditional English sermon style included a secular
introduction to the Sermons' subject-matter grounded in
human experience; secular diction, parallelism, and the
disciplined use of figurative devices; the delayed and in
a sense "buried" outline; and the restrained use of
Biblical quotations.

These techniques accentuate

Johnson's belief that human experience in itself is a
reliable test for the consolations proposed by religion
for life's vacuity; indeed, not even Scriptural revelation
ought to be exempt from the critical scrutiny of pragmatic
experience.

Even when self-consciously assuming the voice

of "sermon orthodoxy," Johnson could not completely
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anesthetize his propensity towards skepticism.

His

Sermons testify to the extreme depth and profundity of a
faith examined and forged from his understanding of the
nature of man.
Furthermore, in some significant ways, Johnson's
observations on the nature of man place him outside the
prevailing Christian moral philosophies of the eighteenth
century.

Johnson depicts the mind not as a hierarchy of

conflicting faculties but as an integrated complex; rather
than advising the sublimation of the imagination and
desire, he advocates their integration with reason.
Moreover, the answer to ethical and psychological problems
is given in the Sermons both in the traditional religious
terms of Christian purpose and in secular, "psychological," terms of a realistic perception about the self and
one's relationships to others.
Specifically, Johnson calls for the pragmatic
exercise of charity to alleviate, at least partially, the
experience of vacuity in this life.

Throughout his

Sermons, Johnson admonishes his auditors to be prepared to
aid others; and if they cannot help their fellow men in a
material way, they can at least extend to them their
sympathy and try to console them in their moment of
suffering:
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The power of godliness, as it is exerted in the
love of our neighbor, appears in the exact and
punctual discharge of all the relative and
social duties. He, whom this power actuates and
directs, will regulate his conduct, so as
neither to do injury, nor willingly to give
offence. He will neither be a tyrannical
governour, nor a seditious subject; neither a
cruel parent, nor a disobedient son; neither an
oppressive master, nor an eye-servant. But he
will not stop at negative goodness, nor rest in
the mere forbearance of evil; he will search out
occasions of beneficence, and extend his care to
those who have no other claim to his attention
than the great community of relation to the
universal Father of mankind . • . . One instance
of the power of godliness is readiness to help
the weak, and comfort the fallen, to look with
compassion upon the frail, to rekindle those
whose ardour is cooling, and to recall those
who, by inadvertency, or under the influence of
strong temptation, have wandered from the right
way; and to favour all them who mean well, and
wish to be better, though their meaning and
their wishes have not yet fully reformed their
lives (Sermon ]d, 145-147).
One of the major themes in the Sermons which we have
examined is that of earthly life as a testing period for
men.

Johnson believed in a system of rewards and

punishments after death which would be meted out in
accordance with the way a man has spent his life.

Thus,

in the exercise of charity, men make themselves eligible
for everlasting rewards.
However, as an observer of mankind, Johnson knew that
men are seldom motivated to goodness by the distant
prospect of bliss, though that bliss is final and
permanent.

Men do good principally in order to relieve an
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immediate ill and in the Sermons we see charity working in
just such a way.

Man gives his gift in order to escape

the pain of vacuity and he helps another so that he might
think well of himself.

Johnson's

~ermons

demonstrate his

transformation of the conventional ascetic ideal of
Christianity into the pragmatic and secular concern with
self-interest as the real motivator in human nature for
right conduct.

The Sermons do not rule out love of virtue

for its own sake as a desirable goal, but they make it
clear that they are not addressed primarily to those who
already love virtue for its own sake.

They are designed

instead for those who are struggling to progress in the
practice of virtue and need to have their self-interest
enlisted on the side of virtue.

The Sermons remind us

that Johnson considered enlightened self-interest a very
different matter from selfishness and a perfectly
legitimate foundation for moral action.
Johnson's concept of what defines evil also reflects
the complex interrelationship between the religious and
the secular aspects of his definition of--and exhortations
to--right conduct.

The Sermons demonstrate an understand-

ing of immorality as a process rather than as a static
concept.

If evil is seen as something inherent in a

person or institution, then it would be within the
province of the sermon writer to attack those elements.
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However, Johnson does not focus on a static concept of
evil; this would create a tone and attitude that could
produce resentment and so would be counter-productive to
the moral purpose of the Sermons.

Johnson focuses instead

on the processes by which evil may be produced; he depicts
the consequences of these processes more by the amount and
kind of harm done to other people and less by the failure
to adhere to God's commandments:
they, who have looked with indifference upon the
calamities of others, who have scoffed at the
mourner, and insulted the captive; who have
diverted the uneasiness of sympathy by vicious
enjoyments, and suffered others to languish in
pain or poverty, for want of that relief, which
would cost only a momentary pleasure, shall be
condemned to an everlasting society, with those
beings, whose depravity incites them to rejoice
at the destruction of mankind. And those who
have, in obedience to the institutions and in
conformity to the example of their Saviour,
endeavoured to alleviate calamities and to
remove distress; those by whose bounty the gloom
of prisons has been cheered, and by whose
tenderness, the languor of sickness has been
solaced; those by whom oppressive power has been
disarmed, and helpless innocence been defended,
shall be exalted to perpetual and unchangeable
felicity, and stand for ever in the presence of
God, employed in the contemplation and praise of
infinite benevolence (Sermon l:]_, 292).
While Johnson describes solace for evil in the conventional terms of hope for happiness in an afterlife, he also
emphasizes the pragmatic dimensions of virtuous conduct
and the solace religion offers for the vacuous experiences
of this life.
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Johnson is in the forefront of those self-conscious
thinkers who reacted to Cartesian dualism by emphasizing
the processes of the mind.

He does not think in terms of

the static concepts of mind against body, or in
hierarchies of order, but is aware of man's struggle to
integrate the passions, desires, imagination, and reason.
We noted earlier William Temple's rejection of the
"Cartesian faux-pas."

Johnson also refused to accept this

artificial separation of man from his world, of the human
mind from external matter.

With his typical common sense,

Johnson simply bypassed Descartes and observed that man's
mind, when healthy, engages the external world in a
vibrant relationship.

Furthermore, Johnson does not

attack man for his failure to attain the Christian ideal.
Man is attacked for affectations of importance, for
unrealistic perceptions, for vanity, for compulsiveness.
Johnson observes man as a fragmented being because man's
focus is often limited solely to earthly goals and to this
world as a place of flux and instability.

Religion

provides man with the means of overcoming the chaos of
this life in two concrete ways: (1) it suggests those
pragmatic behaviors which ameliorate the experience of
life's vacuity, and (2) it urges man to attend to the
transcendent goal of salvation.
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Johnson makes clear in his Sermons that the only
rational way to endure the radical misery of life is by
placing trust in the truth of revelation:
We know, therefore, that those whom he shall
protect cannot be in danger; that neither the
malice of wicked men, nor of wicked angels, can
really injure them, but that persecution and
danger shall only harass them for a time, and
death set them free from disappointment and from
pain.
He therefore that trusts in God will no
longer be distracted in his search after happiness, for he will find it in a firm belief, that
whatever evils are suffered to befall him will
finally contribute to his felicity; and that by
"staying his mind upon the Lord, he will be kept
in peace" (Sermon l.!, 15 5) .
His response is the traditional, familiar, and conventional Christian reply to the problem of life's vacuity.
Johnson believed in it; yet, he also knew how inadequate
it was.

He knew that it could not solve the misery of

life; it could only offer consolation--only assuage
temporarily the anguish of existence.

This realization

deeply disturbed Johnson because of what it meant about
the nature of life itself as well as the notion of a
divinely ordered universe.

Nevertheless, his response to

these fears was to seek consolation in the authority of
the established system of religion.

Yet, Johnson's

Sermons reveal his struggle to assert an unqualified and
unquestioned acceptance of that authority; the locus of
this tension suggests his almost "existential"
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understanding of the inter-relationship of religion and
the nature of man.
In presenting religion as a necessary adjunct to
man's psychological faculties, Johnson is not arguing for
an escapist, subjective substitute for facing the problems
of life; rather he sees religion--the Christian faith
personally applied--as a pragmatic, resolute, rational,
and objective way of mastering oneself.

The ''stability of

truth" and the "choice of eternity" he believes to be
solutions to miseries created by all human choices made
without direction or sound basis.
Johnson, believing that "the business of life is to
go forwards" (Idler lJ:.., 225), is not engaged in breast
beating or in gestures of despair; he demonstrates in his
Sermons that most of the difficulties and unhappiness of
life are both personal and spiritual, and that through a
right understanding of one's needs and through actions of
responsible choice, many of these difficulties can be
ameliorated.

In opposition to the Stoics, he teaches that

man's humanity cannot be escaped--desire and imagination
must and will continue to exist and influence us; and in
opposition to the Determinists, he argues that these
faculties are subject to control and direction, and that
man can choose his goals, his objects of desire and
pursuit, and his hopes.
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In his Sermons, Johnson's presentation of the
dissatisfaction involved in the attainment of worldly
goals is not intended to promote either despair or stoic
resignation.

Its true design is, in addition to teaching

a truth about human nature, to promote reflection on the
validity of religion's ability to alleviate the vacuity of
life.

The presentation of earthly distress and

frustration is vivid and extensive in the Sermons; it
functions as a comment on what Johnson believed to be the
stubbornness of man's heart--his unwillingness to change
his life or give up his illusions.

"Since life itself is

uncertain, nothing which has life for its basis, can boast
of much stability" (Rambler 184, 204); therefore, in his
Sermons, Johnson promotes a doctrine of stability which
was objectivity based upon experience, reason, and common
sense, informing and empowering Christian religion.

With

his intense interest in practicality and action, he sees
this stability as applicable to and effective in our
current lives--giving direction to our pursuits, hope of
reward for our endeavors, and power or stimulation for our
actions for good.
Johnson uses the Sermons, then, to make a strong case
for the pragmatic applications of religion.

Indeed, the

religion he advocates throughout the Sermons works most
effectively in the layman's world filled with vacuous
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secular preoccupations.

That man increases his chances

for reward after this life by living according to the
precepts of religion is a bonus.

The Sermons are not just

a guide to Heaven, but a portrait of the limitations of
man's nature; Johnson counsels us to adopt the counsels of
religion in order to alleviate the vacuity of life as best
we can.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abbey, Charles J. and John H. Overton. The English Church
in the Eighteenth Century. Vols. I-II. London:
Longmans, Green and Company, 1878.
Alkon, Paul K.
Evanston:

Samuel Johnson and Moral Discipline.
Northwestern University Press, 1967.

---------"Robert South, William Law, and Samuel
Johnson." Studies in English Literature (Rice), 6
(Summer 1966), 499-528.
Aristotle. On the Soul. In Aristotle on the Soul, Parva
Naturalia, on Breath. Trans. W. s. Hett.
Cambridge: -aarvard University Press, 1936.
Augustine. De Peccato Originali. In The Theology of
Original Sin. Trans. Edward Yarnold, S.J. Hales
Corners: Clergy Book Service, 1971.
Aurelius, Marcus. Meditations. Trans. Maxwell
Staniforth. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1964.
Baker, Sheridan. "Rasselas: Psychological Irony and
Romance." Philological Quarterly, 45 (Jan. 1966),
249-261.
Balderston, Katharine c.
"Johnson's Vile Melancholy." In
The Age of Johnson: Essays Presented to Chauncey
Brewster Tinker. Ed. F. w. Hilles. New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1949, 3-14.
---------"Dr. Johnson's Use of William Law in the
Dictionary." Philological Quarterly, XXXIX (July
1960), 379-388.
---------"Doctor Johnson and William Law." Publications of the Modern Language Association, 75 (Sept.
1960), 382-394.
Bate, Walter Jackson. The Achievement of Samuel Johnson.
New York: Oxford University Press-,-1955.
268

269
Bate, Walter Jackson. Samuel Johnson.
court, Brace, Jovanovich, 1975.

New York:

Har-

Berkeley, George. Alciphron: or, the Minute Philosopher.
In The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne.
Ed. A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop. Vol. III. London:
Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1950.
---------"On Religious Zeal." In The Works of George
Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne. Ed. A. A. Luce and T. E.
Jessop. Vol. VIII. London: Thomas Nelson and Sons,
1955.
---------~ Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human
Knowledge.
In The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop
of Cloyne. Ed. A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop. Vol.
II. London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1949.
Blair, Hugh.

Sermons.

Vols. I-III.

London:

n.p., 1790.

Boethius. The Consolation of Philosophy. Trans. Richard
Green. New York: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1962.
Bond, Donald F. '''Distrust' of Imagination in English
Neoclassicism." ~hilological Quarterly, XIV (1935),
54-69.
Boothby, Hill. An Account of the Life of Dr. Samuel
Johnson. ECf:" Richard Wright.---r:ondon-;-'Il.p., 1805.
Boswell, James. The Life of Samuel Johnson, LL.D. Ed.
George Birkbeck Hill.--Rev. and enl. by L. F. Powell.
Vols. I-VI. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934-1950.
Brain, w. Russell.
"Authors and Psychopaths." British
Medical Journal, 2 (24 December 1949), 1433-1439.
---------"A Post-Mortem on Dr. Johnson." London
Hospital Gazette, 37 (May, June 1934), 225-230, 288289.
Bronson, Bertrand H. Johnson Agonistes and Other Essays.
Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965.
Buchanan, James. The Doctrine of Justification: An
outline of Its History in the Church. Edinburgh:
n.p., 1867.
Burton, Robert.
1621.

The Anatomy of Melancholy.

London: n.p.,

270
Butler, Joseph. The Analogy of Religion to the Constitution and Course of Nature. 1736ff; rpt., 3rd ed.
Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1860.
Calvin, John.
Institutes of the Christian Religion.
Trans. John Allen. Vols. I-II. Philadelphia:
Presbyterian Board of Christian Education, 1936.
Carre, Meyrick. Phases of Thought in England.
Clarendon Press, 1949.

Oxford:

Chapin, Chester F. The Religious Thought of Samuel
Johnson. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,
1968.
Christie. ~ Catalogue of the Valuable Library of Books,
of the late learned Samuel Johnson. London: n.p.,
1785. - Clarke, Samuel. ~ Discourse Concerning the Unchangeable
Obligations of Natural Religion, and the Truth and
Certainty of the Christian Revelation. London:
n.p., 1716.
London:

Sermons on Several Subjects.
n.p., 1820.

Clifford, James L. Young Sam Johnson.
University Press, 1961.

Vols. I-VII.

New York:

Oxford

Daiches, David. ~ Critical History of English Literature.
2nd ed., Vol. III. London: Secker and Warburg,
1969.
Damrosch, Jr., Leopold.
Sense. Princeton:

Samuel Johnson and the Tragic
Princeton University Press, 1972.

De Letter, Peter. "Justification." In New Catholic
Encyclopedia. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967.
Descartes, Rene. Discourse on Method, Optics, Geometry,
and Meteorology. Trans. Paul J. Olscamp. New York:
Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1965.
Elliot-Binns, L. E.
Methuen, 1953.

The Early Evangelicals.

London:

271
Fischer, David Hackett. Historians' Fallacies: Toward A
Logic of Historical Thought. New York: Harper andRow, 1970.
Ford, Franklin L.
"The Enlightenment: Towards a Useful
Redefinition." In Studies in the Eighteenth Centurv:
Papers Presented at the David Nichol Smith Memorial
Seminar, Canberra, 1966. Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1968.
Fussell, Paul. The Rhetorical World of Augustan Humanism:
Ethics and Imagery from Swift to Burke. Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1965.
Grange, Kathleen M.
"Pinel and Eighteenth-Century Psychiatry." Bulletin of the History of Medicine, 35
(1961), 442-453.
-Gray, James. Johnson's Sermons:
Clarendon Press, 1972.

A Study.

Oxford:

Greene, Donald J. The Politics of Samuel Johnson.
Haven: Yale University Press, 1960.
---------Samuel Johnson.
ers, Inc., 1970.
Essays.
1965.
Guide.
1975.

New York:

New

Twayne Publish-

Samuel Johnson: A Collection of Critical
Englewood Cliffs: N.J.: Prentice Hall,
Samuel Johnson's Library: An Annotated
Victoria, B.C.: University of Victoria,

Hagstrum, Jean H.
"The Nature of Dr. Johnson's Rationalism." English Literary History, 17 (1950), 191205.
---------"On Dr. Johnson's Fear of Death. 11 A Journal
of English Literary History, 14 (1947), 308=319.
---------Samuel Johnson's Literary Criticism.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967.
Harvey, Van A. A Handbook of Theological Terms.
York: Macmillan, 1964-.-

New

Havens, Raymond D. "Johnson's Distrust of the Imagination," English Literary History 10 (1943), 243-255.

272
Hawkins, Sir John. The Life of Samuel Johnson, LL.D.
Bertram H. Davis. New York: Macmillan, 1961.

Ed.

Hitschman, Edward.
"Samuel Johnson's Character: A
Psychoanalytic Interpretation." Psychoanalytic
Review, 32 (April 1945), 207-218.
Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. In British Moralists: Being
Selections from Writers Principally of the Eighteenth
Century. Ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge. Vols. I-II.
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1897.
Hordern, William. ~Layman's Guide to Protestant TheolQSIY.•
New York: Macmillan, 1955.
---------"Man, Doctrine of." In A Dictionary of
Christian Theology. Ed. Alan Richardson. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1969.
Hovey, Richard B. "Dr. Samuel Johnson, Psychiatrist."
Modern Language Quarterly, 15 (December, 1954), 321325.
Howell, Wilbur Samuel.
"John Locke and the New Rhetoric."
Quarterly Journal of Speech, 53 (1967), 319-333.
Hume, David. A Treatise of Hwnan Nature. Ed. L. A.
Selby-Bigge. Oxford-;- Clarendon Press, 1888.
Irwin, George.
"Dr. Johnson's Troubled Mind." In Samuel
Johnson: A Collection of Critical Essays. Ed.
Donald Greene. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice
Hall, 1965, 22-29.
---------Samuel Johnson: A Personality in Conflict.
London: Oxford University Press, 1971.
James, William. The Varieties of Religious Experience.
New York: Doubleday and Company, 1963.
Johnson, Samuel. Diaries, Prayers, and Annals. Ed. E. L.
McAdam, Jr., with Donald and Mary Hyde. Vol. I of
The Yale Edition of the Works of Samuel Johnson. New
Have~Yale University Press,-r958.
---------~Dictionary of the English Language.
rpt., London: Times Books, 1979.

1755;

273
Johnson, Samuel. The Idler and The Adventurer. Ed. w. J.
Bate, John M. Bullitt, and r::-:-F. Powell. Vol. II of
The Yale Edition of the Works of Samuel Johnson.
New Haven:
Yale-university Press, 1963.
Hill.

Johnsonian Miscellanies. Ed. George Birkbeck
Vols. I-II. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1878.

---------The Letters of Samuel Johnson. Ed. R. w.
Chapman.--Vols. I-II!: Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1952.
---------~he Life of Cowley.
In The Oxford Authors:
Samuel Johnson. Ed. Donald Greene. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1984.
---------The Life of Pope. In Samuel Johnson:
Rasselas, Poems, and Selected Prose. Ed. Bertrand H.
Bronson. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
1958.
---------"Preface to the English Dictionary." In The
Oxford Authors: Samuel Johnson. Ed. Donald Greene.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984.
---------Preface to Shakespeare. Ed. Arthur Sherbo.
Vols. VII-VIII of The Yale Edition of the Works of
Samuel Johnson. New Haven: Yale University Press,
1968.
---------The Rambler. Ed. w. J. Bate and Albrecht B.
Strauss.--Vols. III-V of The Yale Edition of the
Works of Samuel Johnson. New Haven: Yale-University
Press,l969.
---------Rasselas.
In The Oxford Authors: Samuel
Johnson. Ed. Donald Greene. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1984.
---------"Review of [Soame Jenyns], '!:::.Free Inquiry
into the Nature and Origin of Evil." In The Oxford
Authors: Samuel Johnson. Ed. Donald Greene.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984.
---------Sermons. Ed. Jean H. Hagstrum and James
Gray. Vol. XIV of The Yale Edition of the Works of
Samuel Johnson. New Haveil: Yale University Press,
1978.

274
Johnson, Samuel. The Vanity of Human Wishes. In The
Oxford Authors: Samuel Johnson. Ed. Donald Greene.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984.
---------The Vision of Theodore. In The Oxford
Authors:--Samuel Johnson. Ed. Donald Greene.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984.
Jortin, John. Sermons pn Different Subjects.
London: n.p., 1826.

Vols. I-IV.

Keast, W. R.
"The Theoretical Foundations of Johnson's
Criticism." In Critics and Criticism. Ed. R. s.
Crane. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952.
Kenney, William.
"Dr. Johnson and the Psychiatrists."
American Imago, 17 (Spring 1960), 75-82.
Krutch, Joseph Wood.
Holt, 1944.

Samuel Johnson.

New York:

Henry

Ladell, R. MacDonald. "The Neurosis of Dr. Samuel
Johnson." British Journal of Medical Psychology, 9
(1929), 314-323.
Laud, William. A Sermon Preached before his Majestie at
wansted. London: n.p., 1621.
Law, William. A Serious Call to a Devout and Holy Life.
1728; rpt.~ New York-:-iS'utton, 1906.
Liebert, Herman. "Reflections on Samuel Johnson." In
Samuel Johnson: A Collection of Critical Essays.
Ed. Donald Greene: Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice
Hall, 1965, 15-21.
Lewis, c. s. English Literature in the Sixteenth Century
Excluding Drama. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1973.
Locke, John. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.
Ed. Alexander Campbell Fraser. 1894; rpt., New York:
Dover Publications, 1959.
Luther, Martin. The Bondage of the Will. In Martin
Luther: Selections from his writTngs. Ed. John
Dillenberger. New York: Anchor Books, 1961.

275
MacLaurin, Charles. "Dr. Johnson." In Mere Mortals:
Medico-Historical Essays. London: Jonathan Cape,
1925, 13-35.
MacLean, Kenneth. John Locke and English Literature of
the Eighteenth--ceTitury. New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1936.
Mandeville, Bernard. The Fable of the Bees: or, Private
Vices, Publick Benefits. Ed. F. B. Kaye. Vols. III. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924.
Mitchell, W. Fraser. English Pulpit Oratory from Andrewes
to Tillotson. New York: Macmillan, 1962.
Messner, Ernest c.
millan, 1943.

The Forgotten Hume.

New York:

Mac-

Pelikan, Jaroslav. The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition (100-600). In The Christian Tradition: A
HIS'tory of the DevelOPffient of Doctrine. Vol. I.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971.
Pierce, Jr., Charles E. The Religious Life of Samuel
Johnson. London: The Athlone Press, 1983.
Piozzi, Hester Lynch. Anecdotes of the Late Samuel
Johnson, LL.D. During the last Twent'Y Years of his
Life. Ed. Sidney Castle Roberts. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1925.
---------Thraliana: The Diary of Mrs. Hester Lynch
Thrale (Later Mrs. PIOZzi) 1776-1809. Ed. Katherine
c. Balderston.---Vols. I-II. Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1951.
Powell, L. F. "Dr. Johnson and a Friend."
25 Nov. 1938, 15-16.

London Times,

Quennell, Peter. Samuel Johnson: His Friends and
Enemies. New York: American Heritage Press, 1972.
Quinlan, Maurice J. Samuel Johnson: ~Layman's Religion.
Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1964.
Rahner, Karl, and Herbert Vorgrimler. "Justification."
In Theological Dictionary. Trans. Richard Strachan.
Ed.
Cornelius Ernst. New York: Herder and Herder,
1965.

276
Rieff, Philip. The Triumph of the Therapeutic: Uses of
Faith After Freud. New York: Harper & Row, 1966-.Rogers, Donald o. "Samuel Johnson's Concept of the
Imagination." South Central Bulletin, 33 (1973),
213-218.
Romaine, William.
"A Discourse on the Benefit Which the
Holy Spirit of God Is of to Man, in his Journey
through Life." Works. Vol. IV. London: n. p. ,
1821.
Sachs, Arieh. Passionate Intelligence: Imagination and
Reason in the Work of Samuel Johnson. Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967.
---------"Reason and Unreason in Johnson's Religion."
Modern Language Review, 59 (1964), 519-526.
Sahakian, William s. History of Philosophy.
Barnes and Noble, 1968.

New York:

---------- and Mabel L. Sahakian. Ideas of the Great
Philosophers. New York: Barnes and"°"Noble, 1966.
Schwartz, Richard B. Samuel Johnson and the New Science.
Madison: University of Wisconsin Press,-r9'71.
---------Samuel Johnson and the Problem of Evil.
Madison: University of Wisconsin Press,-Y-9~
Secker, Archbishop Thomas. Lectures on the Catechism of
the Church of England. London: ---rl.p., 1769.
Seed, Jeremiah. Eight sermons.
n.p., 1757.

Vols. I-II.

London:

Sherlock, William. A Practical Discourse Concerning
Death. London: n.p., 1743.
Siebenschuh, William R.
"On the Locus of Faith in
Johnson's Sermons." Studies in Burke and His Time,
17 (Spring 1976), Number 2, 103-117. -South, Robert. Sermon Preached at Lambeth-chappel .Q!l the
28th of November. Savoy: n.p., 1666.
---------Sermons Preached Upon Several Occasions.
Vols. I-VII. Oxford: n.p., 1823.

277
Stephen, Leslie. History of English Thought in the
Eighteenth Century.
3rd. ed. Vols. I-II. New York:
Peter Smith, 1949.
Swift, Jonathan. Gulliver's Travels. Ed. Louis A. Landa.
Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1960.
Sykes, Norman. Church and State in England in the
Eighteenth Century-.~New York: Octagon Books, 1975.
Taylor, Jeremy. Unum Necessarium. In Anglicanism: The
Thought and Practice of the Church of England,
Illustrated from the Religious Literature of the
Seventeenth Century. Ed. Paul E. More and Frank L.
Cross. 1935; rpt. London: S.P.C.K., 1962.
---------Whole Works. Ed. Charles Page Eden.
I-X. London: n.p., 1850.

Vols.

Theological Dictionary. Ed. Cornelius Ernst, O.P. Trans.
Richard Strachan. New York: Herder and Herder,
1965.
Tillich, Paul. ~ History of Christian Thought: From its
Judaic and Hellenistic Origins to Existentialism.
Ed. Carl E. Braaten. New York:~Simon and Schuster,
1967.
Tillotson, Archbishop John. Works. Ed. Thomas Birch.
Vols. I-II. London: n.p., 1820.
Tindal, Matthew. Christianity as Old as the Creation.
London: n.p., 1730.
Toland, John. Christianity Not Mysterious: or ~ Treatise
Showing that there is Nothing in the Gospel Contrary
to Reason, nor above It, and that No Christian
DOctrine can be Properly caTl~ r;fystery.
2nd ed.,
enlarged. Printed for S. Buckley. London: n.p.,
1696.
Voitle, Robert. Samuel Johnson the Moralist.
Harvard University Press, 1961.
Wain, John. Samuel Johnson:
Viking Press, 1974.

A Biography.

Watkins, Walter B. C. Perilous Balance.
Walker De Berry, 1960.

Cambridge:

New York:
Cambridge, MA:

278
Watson, Tommy G.
in Milton."

"Johnson and Hazlitt on the Imagination
Southern Quarterly, 2 (1964), 123-133.

Watts, Isaac. Logick, or the Right Use of Reason in the
Enquiry after Truth. London: n.p., 1755.
Wesley, John. The Works of the Reverend John Wesley, A.M.
Ed. John Telford. Vol. V. New York, 1835.
White, Douglas H.
"Swift and the Definition of Man."
Modern Philology, (May 1976, Part 2), 48-55.
Whyte, Lancelot Law. The Unconscious Before Freud.
York: Basic Books, Inc., 1960.
Wimsatt, w. K. The Prose Style of Samuel Johnson.
Haven: Yale University Press, 1941.

New
New

Wollaston, William. The Religion of Nature Delineated
(1724; 8th ed. 1759). In British Moralists: Being
Selections from Writers Principally of the Eighteenth
Century. Ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge. Vols. I-II. Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1897.

APPROVAL SHEET
The dissertation submitted by Thomas George Kass,

c.s.v.

has been read and approved by the following committee:

Dr. Thomas Kaminski, Director
Associate Professor, English Department, Loyola
Dr. Douglas White
Professor, English Department, Loyola
Dr. David Loewenstein
Assistant Professor, English Department, Loyola

The final copies have been examined by the director of the
dissertation and the signature which appears below
verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been
incorporated and that the dissertation is now given final
approval by the Committee with reference to content and
form.

The dissertation is therefore accepted in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor
of Philosophy.

Director's Signature

